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PREFACE 
This report  is the  r e s u l t  of a study funded by the National Aeronau- 
t ' c s  and Space Aclruinistrr?tion through the ;hcs  Research Ccntcr t o  a s sess  
the  f e a s i b i l i t y  and i : . i~l icat ions of a hypotilcticzl decisio!l t o  dispose 
of Isng-lived Ilig5-lcvcl n t l c l e ~ r  waste:;, or sc:.:c port ion of 'cilcsc m s t c s ,  
i n  c a t e r  space. I t  i s  i q n r t a n t  a t  tiie wtsci 1 . 3  del jneatc  thc  boundaries 
of t h e  study and t o  c l e a r l y  s t a t e  t h e  pre-ises t h a t  were stipulatcci and 
d is t inguish  them from those  a reas  t h a t  liere more thoroughly explored. 
The focus of the  rescarch has lecn on the  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
implications of a decision t o  implcc!cnt t h e  space disposal idea,  and on 
t h e  various socia l  and p o l i t i c a l  s t ruz tu rcs  t h a t  would bc associated 
with it. The technical  work t h a t  has been done (primarily under an inde- 
pendent, but assaciatcd intergovernmcntal pcrsonncl agremcnt with D r .  
Gene I. Rochlin) was oriented primarily towards s c t t i n g  out  the b o u n d ~ r i c s  
of a model f o r  the  nuclear i~ ldus t ry  and of t h e  associated fuel  cycle  
services  so  t h a t  accurate estimates f o r  high-level waste quan t i t i e s  and 
charac ter iza t ion  could be made. Owing t o  ' the  la rge  number of possible 
decisions t h a t  might be taken regarding the post-reprocessing treatment of 
iii 
wastes, howcver, less accurate es t imates  could be  nadc of t h e  q ~ a n t i t i e s  
t h a t  might be involved i n  space d ispasa l  operat ions.  Accordtngly, a 
semi-pzrmetric  approach was adopted, w i t 1 1  t he  progr-a, characterizcd a t  
two extreme and one medial l eve l  of operations: 10, 100, o r  1000 s h u t t l c  
launch missions per year. 
J t  was not  poss ib le  20 pe r fom an illdopendent rcsieu of pl-esently 
considered space tcchi:ologies t h a t  might be applied t o  waste d isposal ,  
nor t o  attempt t o  a s s e s s  t h e  cont r ibut ions  t h a t  might be made by some 
of the more advarrccxl launch vehic les  thct have been snggcsted. Given 
our  l imi ted  resources and t h e  small mount o f  technica l  exper t i se  i n  
l.aunch and vehic lc  ttchllology avar l ab le  t o  u s ,  it was necessary t o  ass~une 
;._ t e c h ~ o f o g y  ar,d mission y ro f i ? c  t l .a t  W T S  a!rcady i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  
As e x t c ~ s i v c  s tud ies  have been mzde i n  rhc i)a:t of o;,crarions using t h e  
space sfiutt?c o r b i t e r ,  both by K,fSh and i n  x a s t e  manngement review s tud ies ,  
t h i s  was t h e  mission adopted f o r  t h i s  study a s  proto typica l  over t h e  tin.e 
period of concern. Thj.s is a sonewhat r e s t r i c t i v e  assumption, because a 
t o t a l l y  comnitted waste vehic le  would have a more favorable payload t o  
veh ic lc  weight r a t i o  than could any adxptat ion of a multi-purpose 
veh ic le  such as the  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r .  llouever, given t h e  range of assump- 
t i o n s  used i n  construct jng t h e  semi-parznctric launch models used f o r  
t h e  ,tudy, we se r ious ly  douht t h s t  a s h i f t  i n  veh ic lc  would subs ta i i t i a l ly  
a f f e c t  our conclusions as to t h e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  implicatioiis of a 
space disposal  program. 
There is no s i t e - s p e c i f i c  s o c i a l  impact chapter  here.  To do a 
d e t a i l d  impact analys is  on even such a narrow and local ized s t r a t u a  of 
population a s  t h a t  s u r r o u n d i ~ ~ g  t h e  present launch s i te  a t  Cape KenncEy 
would requi re  f a r  more i n  t i m e  and resources than could possibly have 
been a l l o t t e d  t o  t h i s  study. Moreover, a s  have o f t en  been s t a t e d ,  t h e  
s o c i a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  works i n  a r e a l  world s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  is  not  
subject  t o  ready abs t rac t ion .  The impact on acy s p e c i f i c  population is ,  
jn fact ,  s p e c i f i c  t o  ' t h a t  pnp!:!atj on i n  i t s  exact s i tua t ion .  bfo1.e gencral-  
i zed  rules can be abs t rac ted ,  but  they nus t  be applied ~ i t h  g rea t  caut ion .  
Ne do not a t t e n p t  t o  speak with prec is ion  about t h a t  whj.ch we were 
unablc t o  explore i n  d e t a i l .  Tile level  of  ana lys i s ,  therefore ,  v a r i e s  
f ro~n sec t ion  t o  sec t ion  wi th in  t h i s  repor t .  With regard t o  ex tan t  tech-  
nologics and pas t  and present  pa l icy  apparatus, some de ta i l ed  and f a i r l y  
s p e c i f i c  coxacnts could bc nadr. But w i t h  regard t o  fut.uro dccj.sioiis 
and f u t u r e  soci a 1 and pol i t  i c a  l inpacts , the  analys is  is gcncric,  liot 
spec i f i c ,  and should be  applied with so:ne caution.  A ca re fu l  ana ly t i c  
group is s t r i c t l y  a non-prophet organizat ion.  \hat  has been done i s  not 
t o  attempt t o  predict  outcmcs  o r  f u t u r e ,  b u t  t o  sketch out  what expcricncc 
and analys is  have taught us about t h e  responses o f  and impact on both 
se lec ted  and general populations under s i m i l a r  circurnstances. 
The repor t  is  organized as follows. In  Part  1 we o u t l i n e  the  back- 
ground p o l i t i c a l  and technica l  da ta  t h a t  a r e  necded f o r  pcrfoming t h e  
inpact  analys is .  Both i n  a h i s t o r i c a l  pol icy  co:ltext and i n  tenns of  the 
present and l i k e l y  fu tu re  dcvelop;tz;..t of nuclcar power tcchnolo!,y and waste 
management, wc o u t l i n e  the  preconditions t h a t  would have t o  be met f o r  the  
space disposal  option t o  be given ser ious  considcrat ion.  
In Part  I1  we descr ibe  t h e  po ten t i a l  r o l e  of the  space s h u t t l e  
program i n  t h e  management and d i s p ~ s a l  of high-level wastes. This 
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includes not  only t h e  technica l ,  but a l s o  t h e  s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  e t h i c a l ,  
and public  environments within which the  proposed program would operate.  
A ca re fu l  analys is  is ~ l s o  made of  the  technical  operation of t h e  system, 
and of t h e  technica l  l imi ta t ions  imposed upon t h e  program by t h e  operat ional  
procedures o f  t h e  commercial nuclear  power ind11st.z-y. 
Part  I11 discusses po ten t i a l  sccondal-y i n ; ~ a c t s  upon society of space 
d i s p ~ s a l  operat ions.  Tine prevent io~l  and managencnt of n c c i d c ~ ~ t s  a  we1 1 
a s  t h e i r  d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  i f  tlrey shoulu occur a r e  included here.  For 
inc idents  and accidents  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  occur i n  even the  bes t  designed 
s y s t c ~ ~ s ,  and f a i l u r e  t o  provide f o r  t h e i r  occurrence can be a se r ious  
f a u l t .  A f a i r l y  s p e c i f i c  lock a t  ~ h c  causes and conscquenccs of such 
failtircs is takcn here,  ss well a s  ;.n exr.i:.i.nzti>n of t h e  conscquenccs 
of b u i l d i n g  up zn opcratioi?al srrucitirti c~mni t tcc i  t o  3 Y t i - Y  lox  failzre 
r a t e .  
Par t  I V  continues t h e  discussion of secondary impacts with a f u r t h e r  
inves t iga t ion  of t h e  inpact  of space disposal  opci-ations on s o c i a l  experience. 
The discussion here  i s  f u r t h e r  extended t o  encompass t e r t i a r y  impacts; 
c u l t u r a l  and p o l i t i c a l  responses t o  t h e  secondary e f f e c t s  of  changes i n  
s o c i a l  experience. As most of  t h e  e f f e c t s  discussed i n  t h i s  sec t ion ,  f o r  
example d i s t r i b u t i o n  of jobs and soc ia l  p r iv i l ege ,  requi re  considerable 
s p e c i f i c  d e t a i l  f o r  a n a l y t i c  conclusions t o  be drawn, t h e  discussion here 
is  l a rge ly  gcncric and co~lcepZual. Mrat i s  s c t  out  i s  n o t a n  e x p l i c i t  
descr ip t ion  of a  p a r t i c u l a r  set  of responses, but a more wide-ranging 
discussion of the  po ten t i a l  f o r  generating c l a s s e s  of response. 
We havc a l s o  appended t o  t h i s  repor t  a sec t ion  on t h e  dosign o f  e r r o r -  
correc t ing  organizations. For, with space disposal  of highly toxic. radio-  
nuclides,  we would e n t e r  v;mn a systcin where tlrcre would Le a vcry high 
p r i ce  t o  pay f o r  even t h e  first major f a i l u r e .  Any organizatiorr designed 
t o  operate o r  mallage space disposal  operat ions \could have t o  have b u i l t  
~ i ~ l i j l l  it t l i ;  p t e n t i a l  t o  detec t  a ~ ~ d  col-rclct inr-i;>ic::t f?i!~:rcs bv.fo:.c 
Ulcy occur. -Illat such requirements a re  by no i:leaiIS t x i v i a l  of fu1Tillirtc:rrt 
i s  described i n  t h i s  sppaldix. 
I t  is a l s o  F ~ I - ~ I I  setting out  l ~erc  t h e  ass j .s ta l l rc  t ha t  was given t o  
t h i s  s tudy by tire mul t ip l j ca t ion  of  e f f o r t  owing t o  o thcr  a c t i v l t i c s  o f  
two of i t s  p a r t i c i p ~ n t s .  C r .  Dan Mctlay was, i n  a d i i t i o n  t o  h i s  \iorl. on 
t h i s  sitidy, a :-!entbcr of s U.S. Nucl c2r R c ~ I I ~ ; ? I ~ ~ I ' ~  Co:.::. issio;; Ta-k 1:o.rcz 
on C3- i t c r i~ .  211d Go:l;s i o z  r;scIt:ir b:i:>i.C K ~ I I L : ~ ; : .  21: : - c . ~ ~ D ~ . ~ . o I I ,  ii;licI! ~ ; . v c  
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hkr: ~ . C C C S S  t o  and inforifiation f r c 3  a la rge  nunibcr ~f Fcrsons wllose pol icy  
or l ega l  involven~ent with such a program would be grea t .  He a l s o  contr ibuted 
t o  t h i s  study several  chapters  derived from work donc on h i s  d i s s c r t a t l c n  
i n  p o l i t i c a l  science. D r .  G. Rochlin was, during a port ion of t h i s  study, 
a ~ c m b c r  of an American Physical Society study on the  nuclear fue l  cycle,  
giving him access not only t o  the  most up-to-dztc technical  and econonic 
project ions f o r  nuclear gro\-;th, but a l s o  acccss t o  experts i n  evcry fie1 d 
of t h e  nuclear industry re la ted  t o  u a s t e  nanagcment. Ssnc of t h i s  !rLrgc 
mount of e x t r a  work contr ibuted t o  t h e  s tudy  xas donc a t  NhSAs expcrlse. 
I t  amounts t o  a gra tu i tous ,  and fo r tu i tous ,  contr ibution.  
After reviewing a l l  t he  information ava i l ab le  t o  us, we havc coir~e t o  
a largely  negative conclusion regarding t h e  po ten t i a l  value of  a space 
disposal  program, and negative on both operat ional  and soc io -po l i t i ca l  
groucds. On t h e  operat ional  l e v e l ,  it appears  t h a t  t h e r e  a r c  a l a r g e  s e t  
of precondi t ions  t h a t  \could have t o  be met before  i t  would nakc sense  
t o  i nves t  the l a r g e  amounts o f  money and t e c l ~ n i c a l  and i n d u s t r i a l  cf for t  
the  program would requi re .  Unless t hese  precondit ions werc met, space 
d isposa l  would simply not reduce t h e  r e a l  and perceived r i s k s  from long- 
l i ved  coxponciits of t hc  rr:lstcs t o  o !r.vcl t h a t  would j t ~ s t i . i y  t h e  cCfol-t 
i ~ ~ v o l v c d .  
On t h e  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  l e v c l ,  t h e r e  are gsave doutlts a s  t o  both t h e  
poss ib i l  i t y  of opera t ing  t.he j n s t  .lilt:i cl;zl and ~ r g a i l i  zat i.onsl supixn-t 
sys t cns  a t  t h e  rcquj.rc d 1:vcls ant1 gso \~ t l l  r a tes  and so  t o  t1:c possi1)Ic 
i j n p c t  on SXSAs o t h e r  n i s s i o ~ l s  and goa ls  even i f  t h e  o,)cr.;tions werc 
:~:~tcc:isft~l ;rl!cl free of i;; i! I:?-es. 
. . @:I :I ~ccdieyz l  :,:a;> of Gri- ta i l : ,  ;i la:gc :IT<: t o  i h c  rizl'!:: 15 i,:nrl:e< r : i l l ;  
t h e  legend: "iizre there Le ~ o l v e s  ." ,~lthou:?l this provl6c.s no specific 
guide f o r  t h e  t r a v e l l e r  t o  u s e  j n  eva lua t ing  a s a f e  rou te  through t h e  
a rea ,  nor  3 q u a n t i t a t i v e  2ssess::lent of t h e  r i s k s  involved, it does s e r v e  
some purpose i n  r a i s i n g  a  no te  o f  caut ion .  So it i s  with a gene r i c  s tudy  
such a s  t h i s  one. No s p e c i f i c  po l icy  recon~mcndatic?ns a r e  made he re  a s  t o  
whetllcr o r  not  a  space d isposa l  progran s1:ould be inp lc!xnted ,  nor  a s  
t o  which program might be the b e s t  t o  pursue. Sunlc of ttic rijl-s and 
c o s t s  t h a t  n igh t  be cn ra i i cd  arc  sct o u t ,  and sciae of thc  arcas r c c l ~ j r l n g  
f u r t h e r  i nves t iga t ion  bcfore  a wisc dec i s ion  could be n ;dc  a r c  sketched 
out .  But we do r a i s e  a  note  of caut ion .  I t  is our  vici i  t h a t  NASA a s  an  
-
i n s t i t u t i o n  would run f a r  from n e g l i g i b l e  r i s k s  i n  t h e  opera t ion  of a  
space d i s p o s ~ l  program, and t h a t  conscqucntly it should, a t  t h e  minimum, 
v i i i  
investigate carefully whether it is thc appropriate agent to manage such 
a program even i f  i t  were to be implenentcd. 

a 
INTRODUCTION TO PART I 
In Par t  I of t h i s  study, we introdtlce t h e  preconditions f o r  rhc 
technical  and p a l i t i c a l  decisions t h a t  would have t o  be made i n  order 
f o r  the space disposal  program t o  be g5.ven evon scrious cor~siderotion as 
2n option 03 t h e  snne footil-ig ss such ciri.rerrt ylzns a:. dis~>o.r.ilI i n  salt 
i n  Part I1 of  t h i s  report  of t h e  potent ia l  role of t h e  NASA shutblc program 
in nuclear waste . . disposal ,  and t h e  ana lys i s  of not only t h e  t e c l ~ n i c a l  and 
s c i e n t i f i c ,  but t h e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  rni1j.c~ tha t  would be required f o r  
a decision t o  move towards implementation. 
Chapter 1 focuses on tlie past h i s to ry  of  radioactive wzste management 
i n  the  United S ta tes ,  f o r  i ts  is important i n  s e t t i n g  up the socia l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  con*.ext t o  understand how and why it caine f-:, be t h a t  nuclear  
waste dj.syosa1 rcinaincd an unresolved problem as long as it d i d .  Secondly, 
one should be cognizant t h a t  fu tu re  decisions w i l l  not and cannot be taken 
in an atmosphere free of t h e  clouds of old b a t t l e s  over wastes. No waste 
d i s p ~ s a l  program, incltrding t h i s  ox?, can ever operate with tlre blan!: s l a t e  
of ten years ago. 
Chapter 2 sets out t h e  e th ica l  and moral concerns over long-lived 
toxic  d i o w s l i d c s  t h a t  form the  fundamental motivation f o r  consideration 
of such ex;,ensivc and high-technology disposal programs as transmutation 
cm space disposal, For, were it not f o r  our concern over t he  future and 
t h e i r  we1 1-bei-p, it is c l e a r  that waste disposal would not be considered 
a ~i j f i t  y;obl-:a. Gettins the K Z S ~ C S  wt of t he  biosphere :or ollr l j f c t i n e s  
wa;~lC be no great teclmical feat. Even f o r  the l i fe t imes of OPT children, 
them a r e  many rays to  ejlplace the  wastes to preserve thein fm.n ham. But 
wer the  very Ions l i f e t i e c s  of the tz-miuranic isot0pt.s a s  potential 
hazard, our uilcertainty a s  t o  geoiopy, cul ture ,  socia l  and po l i t i c a l  
dcvclopcnt,  znd deaogrzpliy r a i s e  t o  a high level our uncertainty abollt 
thc futut.cts zbfiity t o  r c c z ~ ~ i z c  an 11:ltoxard t - ~ c n t ,  l e t  alorlc t o  rcjrrce 
Chapters 3 sad 4 addrcss the  tcchilical preconditions f o r  space t o  
became a chosen option. In Chapter 3, w e  discuss the  growth of the  nuclear 
power industry and its associa?ed wastes,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  suppol-ting fue l  
cycle f a c i l i t i e s  tha t  w i l l  be  needed. Within t h i s  context, we examine the  
several ways o f  processing spent fue l  t h a t  would reduce the  waste masses 
t o  quant i t ies  manageable by a hypothetical space disposal program. In  
Chapicr 4,  t h i s  inforination is used to  derive a set  of technical  c r i t e r i a  
for efficiency of fuel  cycle  opcratlc~l t h t  would z1la.t- t h e  space pmgran 
t o  rispond t o  tfrc concerils raiscxi i n  Chapters 1 aild 2. For, unless there 
is a w j o r  reduction i n  t he  t e r r e s t r i a l  inventory of  trarlsuranic isotopes, 
and paf i icular ly  the  isotopes of plutonium, it would s iap ly  not make sense 
to invest the  resources tha t  would be required, technically, economically, 
po l i t i ca l ly ,  and socia l ly ,  t o  make the  space disposal program a r ea l i t y .  
HI!ZORY AND DfrERPRETATION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
HIL!BENT IN TIE UNITED STATES 
Tnt-foduc: i o : ~  
--- ----- 
=I!-s is an interpret ivc history c.8 radioacti\*c waste t;::ncgeacilt <n the  
United States.  It is interpret ive because it seeks t o  teasc  out the s igni f i -  
cant strands of  policy and organizational behavior ra ther  than t o  give a 
complete chronicle of past actions, A s  a resu l t ,  'Acre is not a detailed 
\ 
description of what occurred i n  every facet and pl~sse of the  Atomic Energy 
Comeission's involveracnt in waste management. Instead, sans aspects have 
been enphasized and others hardly touched upon at a l l .  
This a l l o ~ s  us t o  focus on broad themcs of bchat~ior and upon vilriations 
on thosc thenes. We can highliplit those things which stzna out  as being 
part icular ly  c r i t i c a l  i n  t he  his tory o f  waste mangcment. From discussions 
with a number of people, both pract i t ioners  and observers, we belicve t h a t  
m y ,  i f  not a l l ,  of the important patterns of how wastc managemcnt policy 
was determined and implemented have been captured. Nevertheless, in te rpre t ive  
history is often highly error prone. I t  depends upon the analyst 's 
ab i l i ty  t o  scan sensit ively the e n t i r e  h i s tory  t o  select f o r  cement 
those parts which arc, i n  fact, essential  t o  a f a i r  and conplctc under- 
standing of  the  whole. 
. 
Historically,  waste management detisiomaking has been characterized 
be periods of profound unconcern iilterspaced with r ~ r e  mwcnts of intense 
in terest .  Lacking the "sex appealn cf reactor c'cvclo;~.rnt o l d  the "pork 
barrel" qual i ty  of other  segments of the fuel cycle, wastc management be- 
cane, organizationally znd operationally, a rcsidwl category. Aftcr a 
br ie f  synopsis of the s ignif icant  events i n  the his tory of waste manage- 
ment, we develop this history's  s ignif icant  themes. Examples from the 
~ . z s t  a rc  marshaled t o  illus1ra:e tlien. Scae lessons arc dral.3 which nccd 
t o  ilc recalled Ly f a t . 2 ~ ~  Ccsi gni ni; tiaste ~2nzgc:ncl:f sys t c-as . 
Origins and Backgpoufid 
'Ihe creation of todayls unwanted radioactive waste legacy resulted from 
many small, past  actions, prenisec! on limited vision a,;! constrained by few 
resoufccs, sevcre t h e  prcssures, and overwhelming competing p r io r i t i e s .  
Nowhere is that description more accurate than i n  the  case of the wastes 
generated by the Atomic Energy Commissionls mili tary program. 1 
The AEC has operated thrcc f a c i l i t i e s  --at  tfan ford, Kashingtcn ; 2t 
Savannah Rivcr, South Carol.ina; and a t  t h e  National Reactor Testing Stat ion 
i n  Idaho--for tha purpose of producing plutonium i n  reactors for the 
weapons* program o r  t o  process i r radiated fuel  fcr the  experimental reactors 
a s  well as from the reactors of the Nuclear Navy. As of 1974, these 
wastes, i n  the f o m  of l iquids,  s a l t  cakes, sludges, crystals,  and calcine 
granules represent some 85 millioq gallons. 2 
'Zhe production of wastes is an inextricable par t  of the operation of 
those f a c i l i t i e s ;  as soon as f i s s ion  takes place--whether i t  be i n  a produc- 
tion, r e s e ~ r c h ,  naval , or c iv i l i an  nuclcar pawr reactor--wastes are produced 
and the need t o  manage t h s m  becomes manifest. Different s t ra teg ies  fo r  
- 
management have been adir ~ e d  a t  each of the  three AEC f a c i l i t i e s .  A t  
I!;lnlcord, t!lc waste strca~ns have becn neut r~ l i r t - i l  n ~ d  thcr? stored i n  s ing l r -  
tialled carboil s t ec l  tznks. The ncrt-bailing wastes arc  now being s o l i d i f i e d  
i n  t h e i r  tanks. The self-boil ing rz: stcs are being fractionated t o  remove 
the long ha l f - l i f e  hcat generating isotopes of cesiula and s t ron t iu . .  The 
waste t ha t  remains is non-boiling and is being sol idif ied.  A t  Savaniiah 
Kivcr, the neutralized uaste solutiens arc  stored i n  carbon s t cc l  tznks 
t!:al: sit l i k e  cups in saucer-l j ix cii~boil s tccl  she: 1s.  A t  Idaho, tile wastns, 
ii:;tialiy st  :.:!:c.d i n  s:air!icss s t c c :  ta i lks ,  are csl ci.;ia tr;d (solid: i.i 2.2; axi: 
are  then put in to  s t a in l e s s  s t ee l  bins  which a r c  housed i n  concrctc s t ructures .  
The so l id i f ied  wastes can be easi ly  retrieved. Present and futuye plans fo r  
these wastes are  summrized i n  Figure 1.1. 3 
Waste management operating experiences a t  each of these threc f a c i l i t i e s  
have differed as well. The worst record has been a t  lianford. Beginning i n  
1956, a t o t a l  of 18 separate leaks have bee11 detected i n  which 450,000 
gallons of l iquid entered the e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~  An unkno\rn nrnber of potential  
leaks were foresrallcd by trar~sfcrring the waste  solutic?? froxi wwr;..kc:icd 
tar& t o  othcrs possessing grcater strcngth . The secondary containments 
used a t  Savannah River have prevented major releases t o  the environment; 
less than 100 gallons of waste have escaped in to  the s o i l  there.' The best  
record has bcen compiled a t  Idaho. lhcre the use of s ta in less  s t e e l  tanks 
has eliminated the need t o  neutral ize  the waste stream emerging frorn the 
reprocessing plant. This, i n  turn, has made it possible to  calcinate the 
wastes. l%c now s t - l i d  waste can be stored and handled easily;  the only 
precaution which must be taken i s  to  i so la te  the highly leachable sol ids  
fraa water in the environment. To da t e  no accidents have been reported at 
the Iddlo f ac i l i t y .  6 
The basic ionceptu~l.  frarneiiork for c iv i l i an  tc ma1i3ge~1ent ,which 
still do~cinares most reoylc's thinking,  cmerged f r o m  a report by the 
National Academy of Sciences' Cocilnittee on Waste Manageinr~~t in  19.57, The 
Committee notcd that @%fie most pro~l~ising method of disposal of high level 
7 
xaste at thc piesziit tin.: seeins to bc in s ; ~ I t  d c p o s i r ~ . ~  Fow years l a t e r ,  
i n  anot!:cr zcncr: th:: sa;c  :idvis~?ry cc~s!~ i r t - r : t .  rersarkcd th;t "Ex.-j,~.riencc both 
i n  thc i i c i d  and j:i ti12 l:ibc\~str;i-~- a:: t:ic Ljs~clsal  cC ~ - . : s t c s  i n  s:lt have 
been very productive and well conceived; plans fo r  t h e  future a r e  vcry 
p m i s i n g  ." 8 
This imprimatur of the Academy stimulated a research program under 
the direction of the Oak Ridge Nation21 Laboratory (ORXL) . A major par t  
of tha t  program, called Operation S a l t  Vault, was t o  determine the con- 
sequences of exposing bulk salt t o  r a d i a t i o n  and h c a t .  Thc site of' the 
experiment was an abando~led s a l t  mine near I,yons, Kal~sas. Spent fuel  
elements wcxc used t o  represent the s o l i j i f - i c d  kiaste bccztisc ific lsefcr 
was no t  available a t  thc tim. Electr lc  Ilcatcrs si irx~lated the t h e r , ~ a l  
output of tlie waste. (Because of the experimental character of Pro jcct 
Sal t  Vault, re t r ievabi l i ty  was b u i l t  i n to  its design from the vcry 
9 
beginning.) Efforts were made by the ORKI. s t a f f  t o  conduct the e f fo r t  i n  

f u l l  view of the  Kansas popul.?tion. Consllltations wcrc held with the  
loca l  c i t i z e n r y  bcfcre the pro jec t  began. Once t h e  experiments s t a r t e d  
operat ixg , r z ~ d  ttr tours  were conductcd i n  which the gciicral p&l j  c could 
v i s i t  the  mine. The r e v e r s i b i l i t y  of thc effoort and the  openness o f  its 
iiliplcrnc~~tation prod:lced a cl imate of acceptance. If not  loved by a l l ,  a s  
sone participants claim, a t  l e a s t  Project S a l t  \'ault: d i d  not cvc.kc: fears 
and hor r s r s  i n  the riinds of t h e  cent ra l  Kansas pop:iln t i o n .  DespS te  i t s  
i n i t i a l  promise and u l t imate  success i n  producing data,  Projec t  S a l t  Vault: 
never r c a l l y  enjoyed nuch support from t h  2cactor L~evc:o;iriiant Divisioi! a t  
the AEC. Funds had t o  be "bootlegged" by OLiL from o the r  projects simply 
t o  keep i t  going, ?;tit i f  :he Gi%L s a l t  c spe r i i~cn t s  c c r c  i n i t i a l l y  ncglcctc.d, 
evcnts soan conspi.rcd t o  propel tlient into view. 
A fire at t!lc EXC ucz;!cns facj lit,- lccatcd   TI Rocky Fl:*.ts, ColorsGo, 
gave r i s e  t o  a l a r g e  v o l m c  of low leve l ,  plutofiiun! cciltaminatcd debr is .  
Following its standard operating procedures, the Production Division of the  
AEC forwarded t h a t  waste t o  the  Idaho Rcactor Tcst ing S ta t ion  f o r  in ter im 
bur ia l .  That action outraged Idaho's Senator Frank Church, who saw no 
reason why h i s  s t a t e  should become t h e  d 0 q j . n g  grounds f o r  Colorado's 
waste. Church acted and ext rac ted  a conaitnent  frox ACC Chairnsri Glen 
Seaborg t h a t  a l l  the  waste s tored  i n  Idaho would bc rcmovcd by 1980. 10 
A t  t h e  sar4ie t i ~ c ,  steps wcre heirig taken t o  form.~latc and t o  forr;:!.l; :.cl 
a regulatory policy conceining corncrcial  ly gencrnt cd was tcs. Ilp t o  t h a t  
point ,  whatever policy exis ted  had been more o r  l e s s  ad hoc, a r e s u l t  of 
a se t  of individual  decis ions  such a s  those made i n  the  l icens ing of t h e  
Nuclear Fuel Services reprocessing p lzn t  and t h e  five low-level commercially 
operated b u r i a l  grounds. That first systematic attempt t o  develop a waste 
11 
management pol icy  l e d  u l t imate ly  t o  the adoption o f  Appendix F t o  10 CFH 50. 
Among its other provisions,  the regula t ions  provide t h a t  s o l i d i f i e d  wastes 
s h a l l  be 'Itransferred t o  a Federal repositoxlr no l a t e r  than 10 years  
following the separat ion of f j  ss ion  products from the  i r r a d i a t e d  fue l  .It 
. .- Itlus, t h c  Cocky Fla t s  fire and thc 1107: ofLicifll1:~ ~cl .r~(:~!cdged need ftrr 
a reposi tory which stirnulatccl thc Coriiinission t o  r s a i ~ s f o ~ m  the car1 y 
exyerircelltal efforts a t  the Kansas s a l t  mine into a dcinonstration reposi- 
torp.12 If nc. e s s i t j -  forced t h e  dcl,ision, it d i d  a c t  ncen preii:at ure st the 
time. In thc words of orlc of tile AEC n!anagers; " I t  was time f o r  ORNL t o  
r'ut up or dlut up. Fitllar t5r-y should Jesi!;n ;r facl lit). ci- s top  clzi~ing 
it xas tcciul3 c2l l y  possliblc ." 
l l ~ c  Co;?-J ssion c~nsidcred lclcating l . ! ~  i n c i l i  t)' I n  Kan!;.s, l~iiclli grin, 
and New York. Kone of those  three  a l t e r a n t i v c  sites possessed any g rea t  
geological advantage over the  others:  each appeared q u i t e  su i t ab le .  
Thrce fac to r s  swung t he  decis ion  i n  favor of rhc Lyons, Kansas, si  tc: 
1. "Detailed information on thc  a r e a  had been gathcred a s  p a r t  
of Projec t  S a l t  Vault .I1 
2. A sense o f  confidence i n  receiving a "favorable reception 
on the  p a r t  of  local and s t a t e  o f f i c i a l s  and p r iva te  c i t i z e n s . "  
. 3. The r e c o p i t i o n  t h a t  w~iccessar)v jnvest igat io: is  t o  prove 
out  the  accep tab i l i ty  ol" ( the  o ther)  sites uould r e s u l t  
i n  considerable delay estimated on t h e  order  of two years." 13  
That June 12, 1970, decis ion  was followed f i v e  days l a t e r  by an AEC 
press re lcasc  t h a t  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  se lec t ion  was t en ta t ive .  
ORIGINAL PAGE IE 
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That few people t ru ly  believed t h a t  claim was a harbinger of things to  
cane. Among those who rdacted negatively was the National Academy of 
Sciences' Radioactive NBS t e  Manage~nent Ccunmittec meeting that very day i n  
Lawrence, Kansas, t o  consider the s u i t a b i l i t y  of the  Lyons site. the 
press announcement c lear iy  suggested to  them t h a t  they were being preempted 
and led t o  the formation of long l i ved  and high3 y dsinaging resenhaenf s . 
It  wc~s  haldly an auspicious be;;inning. 
I t  was a l l  dmn h i l l  from t!lere. Relations betwcun the AEC Reactor 
Dcve1o;~~ent Divj.sion uzdcr EIiltoii Shaw and ORVL were ncvcr pleasant; tha 
Lyons' project  ce r ta in ly  did nothing to  improve then. The nanagers a t  AEC 
headquartcrs caaplained tha t  the Laboratory directors  never fu l ly  appreciated 
t h s  f r ~ c t  hat they wem cnr?str~ict.ing an oyerztioanl f a c i l i t y ,  not  designing 
a research center. Incrc;tsing!y, tbt:  I.i:C Keac:.;~. Pcvcloprr,cnt C iv i s i an  
ycrsonnel f e l t  t h a t  calcularions tha t  had been presented as complete and 
sophisticated were actually "back of the  envelope" effopts.  A perceived 
combination of sloppy technical work with disregard for  the pragmatic 
r e a l i t i e s  of the project  quickly soured the Reactor Develcixnent Division 
managers on OWL. 
Nor was the i l l  w i l l  one-sided. For t h c i r  par t ,  scientists from 
ORNi, accused the  headquarters bureaucrats of bdlavior which could be termed 
techilological arrogance. The O2.k Ridkc scientists observed the fund of 
good w i l l  t h a t  the)' had b u i l t  up among the local population over many )-ears 
being dissipated. In ;;heir view, t h e  "outsiders from iu'aoirirrgi~~" trcstec! 
the  local  scicr sts a t  the S ta tc  Geological Survey and a t  the  S t a t e  
universi ty i n  such a patmnizing and condescending manner tha t  it bordered 
on contempt. Perhaps as important, a t  l e a s t  subconsciously, the OffiVL 
s c i e n t i s t s  saw themselves being ignorcd and pushed i n t o  the  background 
when it came t o  policy decisionmaking. 
Houcver, t h e  tension which existed b:*tween OiWL and hcadyuarters 
was i n s ign i f i can t  compared t o  the  f~lndamental cleavages t h a t  developed 
between t h e  Kansas s c i e n t i s t s  and the  M.C. The leader o f  the teclinological 
'r 
o;?;>iis~tjon was I ' : iI l i ;u~ ilnm!jJcton, thc  Dirc.ctcr of. tlie I:?nr:ss Gco1oi;lcal 
Survey znd a ~ne;,iucr of the Xational Acaden:~ of Scie l~cc  panel co~~vened t o  
assess the Lyons' p ro jec t .  Hambleton's i r e  a t  the AEC \ria5 first aroused 
in  two i n i t l a l  neet ings held bc tmen  t h e  Cu:i?;nis:;i(>n anJ t h c  Ac~.dcmy p n e l  
i n  the spring of 1970. A t  t h a t  time, h e  f e l t  t h a t  the  Comr!iission was in-  
scnsi.rivc i n  t h 2 i r  dealinzs \ i i t i l  thc  i~:ad?lay i n  ~.;r.~crr;l. c?r::l w i t i t  I ; i ?  5 . 1  
p:irticular. 
iiamllcton's object ions Kcre not cri.2; ;.ely ca~t.;rci by pcrsonnl pique . 
He was convinced t h a t  the ORXL ca lcu la t ions  xerc  too pr imi t ive  t o  allow any 
statement about t h e  s a f e t y  o f  t h e  repos i tory  t o  be made. Hambleton was 
concerned t h a t  not  enough was knots71 about possib! c rad-i a t i o n  dnmagc t o  the  
s a l t ,  2bout waste c a n i s t e r  movement i n  t h e  s a l t ,  and adout r e t r i e v a b i l i t y .  
bfost importantly he was skep t i ca l  about t h e  ca lcula t ions  on hea t  t r a n s f e r  
extrapolated from a tvo  dimensional t o  a thrce  dimensional modcl. 1 4  
Those s c i e n t i f i c  objections provided a b a s i s  fo- 2 o l i t i c a l  opposition. 
The p o l i t i c a l  forces Kcre l e d  by I;ansas Kcprcscztntive Joc Skubitz  2na.I hy 
Govcrnor Robert Docking. Together they at tacked pcr iphcrs l  i ssues  i n  the  
hope t ha t  t h e  project: xould collapse.  The op t imis t i c  forecas t  o f  the  AEC 
s t a f f  for rcady publ ic  acceptancc o f  t h e  Lyons' Project  proved t o  be 
ext raordinar i ly  ephemeral. While t h e  Kansas opposition ncver succeeded i n  
stopping the  projec t ,  it scored something of a triumph when the  Congress 
passed a n  Amendment i n  1972 t o  the  ACC Autl~rrrisation B i l l .  Thc amendlnci~t 
sponsored by Kansas S e n a t o ~ s  Pierson and Dolc , btit i l l s t iga t rd  by Sk\l!~i.tz, 
prevented the  AEC from implementing t h e  Waste Repository Projec t  u n t i l  a 
dist inguished advisory comni ssion c e r t i  f i e d  t h a t  t h e  p ro jec t  was sa fe .  15 
Illc MC, lrolccvcr, vic\sed these attrclpts a t  political I:iu'assnc::~t n!i!!ost 
disdainful ly .  Wiey proceeded conf idcr~t  tha t  dcsp i t c  some unresol~cd proL..lcns 
a tccllnical so lu t iun  could be foucd. None of tl:ci~. s tud ics  itlined up any 
infor;nation that  ~ltercd t1:ai vje:;. To be surc,  thci L? vrcxc: iiiore Lore Ilclcc 
f r a n  gas and o i l  explorat ion thsn had been cxpectcd; but  given tifile and 
~j lw; : t io~:  ~ \ i l i ch  1;:s c c c o ~ ~ n t c d  f o r .  B t i t  tllc \rul~r!;.c rilis s~).isl! an2 ::~.sec! no 
danger. In  shor t ,  the  AEC proceeded down t h e  road t o  implementatiorl carrying 
out  co~lfirmatory t e s t s  t h a t  would f u l f i l l  t he  conditions t h a t  t h e  NP.S had 
imposed i n  t h c i r  repor t  t e n t a t i v e l y  affirming the  s u i t a b i l i t y  of rhc Lyons1 
si t c  . 
?hen in Scpternber, 19?1, the  AEC Reactor Dc\lclolment 1)ivision WAS 
infornied t h a t  t h e  American S a l t  !Ii~!i.ng Company had undertaken a massive c f f o r t  
using hydraulic fract.urinp, i n  a mine t1i0 t o  three  miles south o f  t h e  pl.oposed 
r c p ~ s i t o r y .  (Sce Figure 1 .2 )  I t  was i n i  t i n l l y  tho~~::llr t h a t  the  outc  onc of 
t h a t  ac t ion  would be t o  rcmovc v i r t u a l l y  a l l  the s a l t  i n  t h a t  a rea .  I f  
t h a t  were the  case, subsidence followcd by the  formation of wl.nke Lyonsq1 
was .a d e f i n i t e  possibi l j . ty .  Such a "lake" would thrcatcn the  i n t e g r i t y  
of another American mine which i n  tu rn  was located a mere 1,700 f c e t  from 
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an extension o f  the Car r i e  mine wlrich aga in  i n  tu rn  was p a r t  o f  t he  r epos i to ry  
itsbif. Tllis p o t e n t i a l i t y  was the straw t h a t  broke the  Lyons ' p r o j e c t .  
The Rcactor Devc1op:ncnt Divis ion blansgzr of the  prog?.nnl rc turned  l o  
Vaslkington convinced t h a t  the AEC was "now i n  n no win s i t u a t i o n  ." No 
technological  f i x  coul d . e v c r  be dcvcloped t h n t  would convince t h c  yul t l ic  
t h a t  t h e  dangc. was mini ma1 . 
lPlLs turxr of e\rcllts was soon f o l l c ; ~ c d  l ~ y  a \is:.aing froin tl;t:  :;ixon 
M i t e  liousc t o  t h e  Conunission: do nothing t o  rock t h c  boat  t h i s  c l o s e  t o  
t h e  c l e c t l o n  . The ncv: Qisjrman, James S c h l c s s j . ~ ~ g e r ,  and a new Co:lznissioncr 
I t i l l i m  0. Doub werc es ] ) cc i s l l y  sens i t i \ rc  t o  t h i s  p l ea .  Slowly, Lyons 
fadcd i n t o  tllc Lackgro::nd. By Fc'.b~-u:lry, 1973, t he  rcpositary pro jcc t  i n  
rcac ted  by rcfusir,y t o  cvnsidcr axjr plan  tihich involved b u r i a l s  a t  depths 
l e s s  than 10 miles  and by press ing  f o r  cons idera t ion  of e x o t i c  waste 
nnnagomcnt alt::~.i.itivcs such a s  t ransmutat ion and spacc d isposa l  . I7  Iiowaver 
some new p rac t i ca l  concept had t o  bc developed i n  t he  s h o r t  run. r h c  
Commission could no t  afford t o  be spen as having no waste managcntent po l j cy .  
Uflder t h e  directj .on of tlic new Dircc tor  o f  the Division of I':rrstc! ?.lanagcmcnt 
and Transportat ion,  Frank Pittman , the  not ion  of an Engineered Rctricvclble 
Surface Storage I'acili i y (ISSF) was devcl opcd. E1a;i~ 01 cr: \\'cLI:~ bc con- 
s t r u c t e d  i r l  t he  west for tEic .r,tc,ragc of EZC gclwratcd cn;! co:.~;ncrcially 
generated waste. Once a  permanent r epos i to ry  was developed the  waste 
could bc t ranspor tcd  to  it. 18 
This  pol icy ,  announccd i n  May, 1972, survi.vcd one chal lenge IS months 
l a t e r .  The General Manager proposcd t h a t  i n s t ead  of  bu i ld ing  an RSSF, the 
. , 
s o l i d i f i e d  waste be storod a t  the reprocessing p lant  u n t i l  a permatlent 
reposi tory was established.  In la rge  por t  because of the object ions of  
. . the Director  of Regu~ations,  thc change i n  pol icy  was r e j ec ted  by the  
. . 19 Commission . a 
, 
. , 
Nevertholass, t h e  RSSF corlcept was not t o  he it:~pl eillented . I11 Septaribar , 
1974, a d r a f t  onvironmentnl impact statcmeni. on thc yl-oject was issxd-; 
" . 
Comments rcceived front efiviron;ncntal grouns and frcrrii state and l ocs 1 
governments were general ly c r i t i c a l .  The coup dc yracc, however, was 
--*------ 
delivered by d1e Enviro~unenial i'rotcction t tgcr~cj* .  In  i t s  cur~nents EPA 
concluded: 
The developmci~t: of an cnviroruncn:-all y acceptable 
systcm for pcrnancnt d i  sposai of cni~n~erc ia l  ly gencrsted 
radiosctive w s t e  waul d nppcar to bc n h i g h  p r i o r i ~ ) .  
]>rograrn t h a t  is c:;stl~ti;tI for thr: devr i o:)~:~eiit. of 
t ~ u c l e a r  poxrr . iiov;cvcr, rhc. d r a  f ~ .  s ta?;c.:!lc;\t d ~ z s  
not  contsiil adequate descripticm oi a progrm t o  
develop such a permanent d i s p s a l  systcm, n o r  does 
it r e f l e c t  e i t h e r  t h e  p r i o r i t y  attached t o  dlis 
overa l l  program by t h e  AEC nor an indica t ion  of the 
resources required. Because of  the  overwlrel~sing 
need t o  devclop Ln crivironmentall y acccptal)i c ul t imate 
disposal method and t he  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  tncrc  i s  a 
r i s k  of  f a i l u r e  i n  any research and developntc!nt 
e f f o r t ,  we bel ieve  that work on promising a l t e rna t ives  
should be pursued concu. ~ e n t l y .  
A major concern--the cmplopent of thc RSSF con- 
ccpt - - i s  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  that economic fac to r s  could 
l a t e r  d i c t a t e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of the f a c i l j  t y  a s  a 
permanent rcposi tory , contrary t o  I h e  s t a t  v ~ l  j ;:tent: 
t o  mqke thc: IGSF irltcrim i n  tlature. I:conon:.ic inctors 
would consist nainl y of the f i  sczl  invcstmcnt attcndnnt  
t o  its construct ion and rhc ac t iv i t i e s  which a r i s e  
i n  the  sormnercial segment of  the  economy t o  s q p o r t  
its operation. Since there  a r c  cont ro l l ing  environ- 
mental f ac to r s  t h a t  must be considered b >fore f i n a l  
d ispos i t ion  o f  the  RSSF, it is important tha t  these 
f ac to r s  never be allowed t o  bccome sccondary t o  
economic fac to r s  i n  the  decisionmakjng process. 
Vigorous and timely pursu i t  of u l t imate  disposal 
techniqu s would a s s i s t  i n  negating such o possi-  
b i l i t y .  28 . 
- .  
'Ib draft emvfmmatal statemeat maived EPABs larest category of 
walurrrbaa. Sigrffiamtly me of the first actions takar by Ridrard 
Seanaas after he became Administrator of  ERDA uas t o  u i t h h w  h i s  q u e s t  
h r  dmds b e h i i d  tbe ILSSF. W e  tke Lpmst salt line be* it, the 2. 
RSSF urs off ic ia l ly  dead. M 
lhis historical narrstivc of tile AIiC's invol~eaect in radioactive 
waste managerent was presented t o  provide a sumiary of uhat traspirrtd tn 
the past. Given this ar t l inc  w e  can now discuss the broad thacls of waste 
maqci3ent  pol icy. 
Cr~cTcriying 7% ca;;?s of Wasie P:actge~nt Pol icy 
Spezi~liz~.: icbn hss cJ:e r-irmie ~f dringiag ti, bear ezrpcrtize i n  solvirrg 
Robert Wrtm h s  called mined Incapacity t o  Think.192 In either 
case, specia l iz r t im furnishes r particular lens through which the problems 
ore viewed and solutions reached. I t  is hardly sarprising, then, that  
a technologically based agency bas came t o  see the solution of the radio- 
active waste eprobleas'l i n  terms of a technological fix.  hrbl ic and 
private statements of ker agency decisionaakcrs support th is  view. 
For instance, D r .  3. A. bibencan, Chief of the Environarental and 
Sanitav Engineering Branch of the Reactor Dcvclc:incnt Ui-sisior., tes t ;  fying 
before L're Joint Camnittee on Atomic Enerkv, as early as 1959, szid that: 
Although one has t o  be careful to distinguish 
Between aspiration, ru ' ; ty ,  ;and speculation, it 
is ry strong feeling that t h e  development program 
has thus far fund  [technical] solutions t o  sane 
of the waste problars that. ..and a t  1 a s t  indi- 
cated solutions to othcrs.23 
i 
"l!k do have today (in t l le'RS~f th& ansuers needed for safe mwmgeaa&t:ot 
. . 
. . 
. .  . 
m a 1  high lave2 rac?ioaetive w ~ t a . 3 ~  *A& Baa tlatt oi! the 
3 , . 
C 
Alternatives Evaluation Prag.-ae, a t  t h ~  Bat ttlle Pacific Northyos t falitmatory 
* - '$. 
- 
bDld The Task group: 'There is no ttxhnical problem, the -waste can Ue ' 
managed; the crucia~-~r&lea is public reception of rdimctivc ma%eri~2s.~ 
E m  the worst blunder in  waste management history, the Lyonsg Project, 
was theoretical13 possible. b i l l  k c l a i n ,  the O%iL mining engineer on 
t&t effort, was asked by the Task groq~ &ether the labaatory could 
have handled thc pmblens in  Kansas. tk replied: 'Of course, ft w a s  
ted~rzlogically pos~i3le.~ &.e g ~ t s  a s t r o ~ g  ixprcssion, then, fraa 
rc;!u'ing ti.c public rccord sad from t a lk ing  v:j.th zgnilcr pc1~~33',mel :i:;ct 
the AEC personkl think that if they were just @on cnougl~ money and left 
alone they bwld solve  the "problem*' expeditiously and to virtually 
1 .  
everyone's satisfa1:tion. 
Vhis position is held despite denoritrated failures because the 
people uho hold it are specialized. Ihey have coae to view problem 
solving in particular--not necessarily wrong or evil--technological way. 
?heir entire training, sense of stmctrrre, and socialization has reenforced 
their conviction that problem solving is dependent merely on additional 
doses of teclxnology-. In this case, tlicy say titat the waste mtlagcncnt 
problem can be solved by designiag a technological system which can 
i solate  the waste frop the enviwnnent indefinitely. 
. > .  - . 
- - .  AltBo@ such a technological fix is not t h ~ ~ r e t i c a l l y  frgossible, 
. . 
. . experience has shorn, i n  the case of other earplex tn?chnological syst*, 
. , 
. . the belief tha t  technology alone 9s enough -is aoro often than aot s3mplg 
- .  
... , 
F,, , .
illusmy. i or example, h e  deve1-t of g-d disposals nt permi& - ,. 
. .. 
."A. 




os being a technological so lu t i a i  to  d a ~ e s t i c  incmvedliwpce. Yhe &O0 
. . 
.- . 
was poll utian of rivers, It rcsss t & ~  necessary to find wars of  wr-Xyis;,& 
the rivers t o  maintain water quality. (he means was t o  use bacteria; W' 
a great quantity of oxygen was required for the bacteria t o  destroy the. 
organic pollutants. Thus a technique had t o  be found t o  oxygenate the 
.ire=. h d  so it goes.2S complex technologies, l ike nuclear waste -age- 
ment, are by the i r  wry definiticm hzad t o  bomd. To the  cxtenz tliat such 
circu;:.scrjpt im; is d i f f  j.cu?t a .teclmologicrrl f i x  is izpossible . Tccfinic~l 
of the waste Wagement problem: Any policy adopted must t rea t  a wide range 
of issues not simply the design of the technological core of the system. 
Of course one can posit  circumstances mder which decisionnaking 
need not include non-technological factors. [For instance, institutional 
questions of implementation.) I f  the cjrstm could guarantee the cornplcte 
isolation of the waste hdef in i t c ly  then a bounded technological f i x  could 
be quite conceivable. Yet, for  any such system to be adopted, as opposed 
t o  proposed, two conditions must be f u l f i l l e d .  First a high degree of 
agreement wt exist as t o  how the important parameters of the system, 
, , 
i .e.,  degree of isolation, are to  be measured: there has t o  be a common, 
accepted, uetric of evaluation. Second there RUS~ be a strong consensus 
ever what operations lead t o  the llcorrect application of the re t r ica l*  i .e., 
orhat tests accurately masure the d e w  of extended isolation af 
the wasto. Absmt those two codittons, no technological solution can 
find broadly based acceptance. lack of broadly based acceptance implies 
By its very existence that a technological f i x  is not viotb2e. 
, . 
Implicitly, the AEC technical- personnel encl decisiamakers recognize ' 
this lack of tec31iological viability, and this pmxpts the i r  ,complaint 
that the system is too open. 3%ey say that environrrmtalists are irrespan- 
sible; politicians are simply trying t o  grab headlines to be reelected; 
the general public is \Ininf-eded and i r r a t i c m l l y  fearful 'abaut .things 
nuclear. If these extraneous influences were mnoved, then something 
could bc accoslplished, i .e . , wrcertiiinty ccnrld be resoled sub jecfively 
and a technological so lu t im could be i~plernmted (imposed). 
It is  not hzrd t o  see why thc JEC directors strained t o  decouple the 
technological core from othcr aspects of the system. To succeed in doing 
so--in effect t o  simplify the problem--cmser-zes such scarec organi zatiaral 
resources as time, thought, and mncy. Moreover, t o  consider other 
aspects of the lpr;Jblem*l would force the agency outside the bounds of its 
. expertise, of its specialization, of its trained incapacity. To accupt 
the notion that a zechnological fix is nor possible is ultimately t o  agree 
that  the control of the prohlern solving effort should be shifted sway from 
the AEC. I t  is hardly s u r p z i s i ~ ~ g  that strenuous efforts have been ,made to 
preserve the i l lusion of a techno1 ogical solution. 
Institutionalizing Belief i n  a Technological Solution 
Early thinkers on waste management recognized zhat radioactive w a t e  
had t o  be m a g c d  i n  ways altogecher different from other industrial  
wastes. She idea of du: ; ;ng the waste in to  nearby bodies o f  water w a s ,  
hrr example, re jectd almost out ef W. #oreover, the record indicates 
that as l a te  as 1955 the AEC had not succumbsd t o  thc easy assumption of 3 
technological solution. For instance, A. E. Gorman of the Reactor 
bvelopmcnt Division speaking to  ttie F i r s t  Natioual Academy of Science 
Advisory C d  t tec cm Waste Dis?osol, about the AEC Producticm Faci lities 
I.&ing backward we know of the mistakes tha t  
rany.industries made ?.n asswing that the disposal 
of waste was simply a backdoor problem that anyone 
- :  
m ' d  hrndle. To some extcnt because of our . _  
".. geographically isolated locations, it has been 
possible t o  sweep t h e  pmb-lers under the rug, so t o  
.., 
sped.. B u t  thrtse of us who are close t o  it are . - 
convinced we must face up t o  thc frrct that we are 
confronted \:it11 3 rebl prob1en.26 
Dr. Leibernan of thc Division of Operational S:fety notec! "1 ccrt:~inly.ho~:! 
I can iisdbuse you of the idea tha t  we have any solution that ~ - 1 1  solve 
L a e d i g e l y  the problems of waste disposal.*t27 Yet. if b a t  YAS study 
began on a note of caution it ultimately provided the major support for the 
technological optimisa that  developed i n  the agency. Although the writers 
of the report  were carcful to  note the. need for  further research they 
stated categoricaily that Itthe colnittee is convinced that  radioactive 
waste can bc disposed of safely i n  a variety of ways and i n  a large number 
of s i t e s  i n  the Unitcd s ta tes  Further, they stated &at n8dispcszl in  
sa l t  w a s  the most promising retllod for the near future .w2' The consegucnces 
of such judgments have been great. A person who has been i n  the waste 
manageacnt program for a rmPrber of years said i n  an interview that 'The 
NAS report did i n s t i l l  r sense of complacency i n  the minds of the people 
dealing with waste management. In part  because of it we felt . b t  a 
solution w u l d  be available whenever we needed it." ' Hawever ft is clear 
. . 
t h a t  the NAS study did wru than simply instill confidence that waste 
disposal could be a c c q l i s h c d .  It a l so  established the boundaries of tfh 
problem. I t  suggested +at all that is required is a technological f i x .  : 
mat f\mdamental premise was reenforced i n  an extended set of hearfnigl~ 
before the Jo in t  Co~la~ittce on Atomic Energy s t a r t i n g  in  .?anuwy, 1959. 
'Ihe hearings opened with a statement by kble Kalman of John?; Hopkir~s 
University. Wallran rehsed t o  minimize the problems of waste aanagemt, 
He noted: 
I c  have to hare continuity of government supervision 
*fither long or shor t ,  b*ether strong or weak. This is 
not a problem, i n  other words hllich can be tackled frtm 
the standpoint of tc3poraz-y expedience. It is a problcvl 
which \ s i l l  require a deep govern.wnta1 sujjer\*isor, a.. . 
very long wrd c..xitinu~4 uninterrupted s ~ ~ n : i s i o n  ovcr 
the Sate and loesticn of t k s c  ~atsriais .3C 
Wor d i d  Walman suggest tha t  the problcins were simply technological. 
It is s ra ther  in te res t ing  i f  subtle observation 
that in conversation with indus t r ia l i s t s  interested 
in nuclear fission power they consider the waste 
problem to be quite unimportant I believe for psycho- 
logical  reasons. It  is unimportant t o  them because 
they a re  nor responsible f o r  its management and hence 
its cost.31 
Walmanls testimony led Representative G e t  Hollofield to comment: 
So it would be accurate t o  say that  the  problem 
of pcrrmanctnt disposal of hish level ua5to has not 
been solved; that it is i n  the state .of scspension; 
that we are holding these high level wastes to the 
extent of many millions of gallons in temporary 
custody and that no decisions have been wade as t o  
the . f i na l  disposal of t he  high level waste.32 
However those notes of caution and skepticism were v i r tua l ly  the only 
oaos to  be heard a s  the hearing progressed. One expert a f t e r  another 
frola the AEC, from the National Laboratories, and from industry, t e s t i f i e i  
1 
that a technolq$cal solution to the problem was possible and was, i n  fact, 
the mZy aspect of the question that needs t o  be addressed. Their a~pwmcb 
was t y p i - T i e d  by the couw8cnts of Herbert Parker, the Manager of the Richland 
Facili t ies.  When asked how long he thought the tanks at Richland would 
last, Parker replied: 
1 wili answer that  question by ssying tha!: for 3 
longer timc than any cjpratioa llcrcfofrrc c.~i:tenplatcd 
by nan, these wastes w i l l  have to  remain isolatthl from 
the environment and u n t i l  the time we m a t e  a better 
way the isolation w i l l  be i n  tanks of th i s  character. 
This does not mean it w i l l  have t o  be in this  particular 
tank. I n  otner wards if the tanks we have turn out t o  
be prepad at thc right time w i t h  a r  altert~ative set 
of tanks and prmp the liauids in to  the n- tanks. Ne 
havs cxtensivcly moved the liquid from one tank to 
another and are persuaded we can do t h i s  operation 
with perfect safcty.s3 
E,1tho:rg?1 Parker docs not sey so csi;'lici~ly t':c tenor of hi5 stalc:icc::t dlcn 
I 
read in its entirety suggests t113t be sees l i t t l e  : ~ T G : I ~  with r~ai i i i z in ing  
that strategy into the indefinite future. H i s  vi=s probably represent 
extreae endorsement of sr technological f i x  for uaste ntanagaacnt. '!he other 
~ritnesses k i i l e  pore subdued i n  their  vie~s are cleari:i phil~sophically 
aligned with the position which Parker had championed. 
The wrulat ive impact of the KAS reprt i n  the Joint  Comittce hear- 
ings was t o  legitimate a technological approach t o  waste managment. Over 
thc years it evoii2d into an of f ic ia l  doctrine of t h e  agency. Tiie~e is ;no 
evide:lce that its validity w a ~  ever seriously questioned or even reassessed. 
More significantly, the search for  a technological solution has persisted 
and the belief in  the efficacy of a technological f i x  has been maintained, 
often i n  the face of disconfiming evidence. 
In prtf atlay, the AEC has cartin* to pursue a technological fix - 
. - . . -  
desp&te evidence t h a t  non-technological factors are an integral  part of lihe 
waste management system. Ihe approach taken i n  dealing w i t h  the leaks at  
-ford. i1lustrrat.e~ tha t  point  -11. ?he tad; ' potentf a1 for leaking 
compelled the operators t o  implement a system t o  detect fa i lures  i n  the 
tanks. The systen w a s  a highly routinized one i n  which volume 'levels were 
reasurcd by technicians and conpared against previous levels.  Although 
standard operating procedures were enforced to insure the ~tasurements ,  no 
procedures were developed to  force the  requisite cmyarisoz~s. Tf~us, it 
m s  only a matter of time before a leak would go unnoticed. I n  the spring 
of 1973, Tank 106T leaked ll5,0011 gailons i n t o  the  ernrironment. Excerpts 
fmx t::c chrono1og.y coi~tz ined i n  t!le o f f i c i a l  report of t h i s  incident t e l l  
the s t o ~ y  best. 
On Nay 2 the f i r s t  weekly l iquid level reading of 
'hnk 106T a f t e r  the complction of  the pumpii~g 
operation was taken it was recorded at  178.9 inches. 
The information was recordcd i n  the  s t a t i c  tank 
farm inventory log and l e f t  on the off ice  desk. 
The day s h i f t  supervisor has s ta ted  tha t  he did not 
review the information becausc of the press of 
other duties. 
On Elay 7, the weekly l iquid level reading for  Tank 
. 106T was recorded a t  174.0 inches. The information 
was logged i n  the s t a t i c  tank farm inventory log i n  
the day s h i f t  supervisor's o f f ice  . He did not revicw 
it. 
On May 14,  tile week1 y l iquj  d level reading for  lOGT 
was recordcd a t  167.9 inches. The infornation was 
logged in  the s t a t i c  tank f a m  inventory log. I t  was 
not reviewed by the day s h i f t  supervisor. 
Qn May 21, the  weekly l iquid level  reading for l06T 
was recordcd a t  160.4 inches. The infomation was 
logged i n  the s t a t i c  tank fann inventory log. The 
day s h i f t  supervisor did not review it. 
- .  Qn Way 30, the weekly 1 iquid level  reading uas 
- .  
. . recorded a t  1S2.7 inches. me data was logged on 
the static tank farm inventory- log. 'he day shift  
supemisor did not  review it. 
-. , 
-, . 
On June 4,  the weekly 1iqui.d level reading f u r  
Tank 186T was =corded at 149.2 inches. I t  w a s  
logged i n  the static tank fami inventory log. me 
day shi f t  supervisor did not review it. 
Similar faif ures tmk place i n  t h e  thy well monitoring system tltat 
was a redundant back up for the volume masuring systea. Thus the leak 
which began on April 20 was not confirmed u n t i l  June 6, a period of 6 
weeks, 34 
After the leak of Tank 106T, a s e t  of new'procedures were adopted. 
Liqr*id lcvel measuring instrunlentation was cocputerizcd; readicgs were 
uadc cort. freqce~t I y . Taxk t~msfers  ucrc rtani.toycd awe precisely. "A 
implemented t o  insure compliance w i t h  approved proccdures.**35 Several 
organizational changes were carr ied out as well, Management responsibi l i t y  
was consolidated; internal audits were rcenforced; a division of qual i ty  
assurance and safety was created; more aggressive manageu~ent was recruited. 
I t  is hard t o  assess the effectiveness of rllosc changes, The two 
years i n  which they have been i n  operation is hardly time for a f a i r  tes t .  
Nevertheless, they do scem to have pcrfonneri well. Yet it is clcar t ha t  
the dlanges do not treat the root causes of t l ~ c  failure to detect  lcakagc 
i n  the lOGT Tank. lhat gailure uas due to non-technological factors. In 
tho words of the of f ic ia l  report. 
mere was no effect ive redundancy in the system to  
assure t ha t  a leak undetected by those primarily respon- 
si l i lc for  detection would bc detected by somebody else, 
. . or t o  a l e r t  nranagcment's a t tent ion t o  any breakdown i n  
the systcm.3G 
Moreover, by increasing the technological complexity of the detecting 
system without increasing the redundancies i n  the  non-technological elements 
needed fo r  implementation, the overall  r e l i a b i l i t y  of the system i s  l i ke ly  
t o  decrease. Such an outcome is almost an ine*pitable r e su l t  of thinking 
. 
that focuses primarily on technological solutions. 
The pattern of behavior at  Hanford is rea l ly  not  atypical .  One could 
just as easily point t o  the operations a t  Savannah River, t o  the Lyons1 
Project, and t o  the RSSF. In each case, di rectors  focused at tent ion 
pr iuar i ly  m: . \ - 9  technological aspects of the endeavor and largely ignored 
the non-technoiogical issues  and concerns. In the end, it was those l a t t e r  
factors largely determining the outcomz. Experj.cncc should have tzught 
tiie K C  dircctors a lesson: i t s  vision i n  dcaling r r i l l l l  v::astc managc:ne;:t 
pro3lems had t o  be broadened. Only recently !?:is there bczn evidcncc th:it 
&ch lessons have been learned. 
Mot only has the past  demonstrated t h a t  f a i t h  i n  a technological 
solution may blind decisionmakers t o  other important facets  of problems, 
but a lso the past  has shown t h a t  even solutions t o  tcchnalogical problems 
may bc only temporary. Again, the experience a t  Hanford i l l u s t r a t e s  the 
point. By the ear ly  1960qs, i t  became increasingly c lear  tha t  the 
. 
optimism expressed by Herbert Parker a t  t h e  1959 Jo in t  Committee ilearings 
was premature. The carbon steel  tanks were bcing corroded a t  a fas te r  r a t e  
than i n i t i a l l y  anticipated.  Thus, a decision was made i n  1965 to  evaporate 
the waste solutions; the resul t ing s a l t  cake not only would not leak but 
a l so  would seal  up any holes i n  the tank. Yet as the Natural Resources 
Defense Council noted in  t he i r  pe t i t ion  for  NRC licensing of ERDAls high  
level waste storage f a c i l i t i e s :  
Eliminating the excess l iquid has t o  a great  
extent a lso ended ERDAqs a b i l i t y  t o  remove the 
waste from the tanks since as damp sol ids  the 
waste can no longer be pumped hydraulically o ~ t  
of the tanks. Moreover, l iquid cannot be re- 
introauced i n t o  many of the tanks t o  resuspend 
the waste sincq t o  do s o  would almost cer ta inly 
result i n  substant ia l  leaks t o  the  ground.37 
While the al ternat ive of mining out the waste does exis t ,  tha t  technique - 
is bcsct by a nunher of  problems: a renotc control system f o r  mining would 
have t o  be developed; e f fo r t s  would have t o  be made to reduce airborne 
releases; the material is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  deal with; thcre is no place t o  send 
the material once removed. i'hus, while ERDA maintains that  it has several 
viable alternatives t o  choose from, the  record suggests tha t  "the techno- 
logical  f i x  of sol idif icat ion" may be a tc i ip ra ry  one a t  best .  I t ,  t o o ,  
has engendered pro3 le~i\s for  the future. 
* 
Consequences of Maintaining a Faith i n  a ~ e c h n o l o ~ i c a l  -- -  
The pers is tent  fai th i n  a teciu~ological fix has produced a myopic 
vision of the waste management problem. In  theory, as well as  i n  r ea l i t y ,  
the boundaries of t h e  waste management wsystenll have been severely circun- 
scri'bed. This constrained view of  what must be considered i n  d e s i p i n g  a 
waste mangement system has resulted i n  a niunber of s ignif icant  dis tor t ions .  
\ 
Firs t ,  the  waste management system i s  implicit ly conceived of as bcir~g  
self-implementing. Those who believe i n  a tcchnological f i x  s t r i ve  to  
eliminate the human factor--an element which, it is  generally-held, .can only 
produce noise. Yet, time and time again, persons interviewed 
stated t h a t  the  weakest l ink i n  a waste management system w i l l  be the  
. . 
hurasn one. Although many people bel ieve  t h a t  a human Cailure such as t h e  
one t ha t  took place i n  t h e  106T Tank leak at Hanford could happen again, 
there seems t o  have been l i t t l e  considerat ion by t h e  AEC of what leads t o  
such errors or how they might be f o r e s t a l l e d  i n  the  fu ture .  One person 
suggested tha t  du Pont b e  consulted t o  advise about t h e  proper use  of indus- 
t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  (manipulation) because the, sse~ii to  have been s u ~ c e s s f ~ ~ l  i n  
t h i s  area i n  t h e  past .  But t h e  only evidence offered f o r  du  Potlt's success 
is  t h a t  employees c a l l  t h e i r  supervisors by ',heir f i r s t  names. Such a view 
of how t o  t r e a t  t h e  '%e;lkcst l inkM i n  t h c  systrxn may not f u l l y  r e f l e c t  AEC 
thinking. I t  most l i k e l y  does' r e f l c c t  thc degree o f  s u s t ~ i n e d  considerat ion 
nhic l~  the agency has given t o  this question. 
A sccond distorrior~ that has arisen bes;iusr of fa i th  i n  a tcchno!ogical 
f i x  i s  the  very hisiit discounti l~g of factors w l ~ , c l l  Icrij' bc af iectcd i r d i r e c . ~ l y  
by the system. Complex ;fecisionmaking is d i f f i c u l t .  Rules of t h m b  havc 
t.o be adopted t o  simplify problems t h a t  a r e  seemingly in t rac tab le  because 
of s ign i f fcan t  gar4 i n  the  knowledge base. Judgments havc to be made zbotlt 
38 
which fac to r s  t o  consider and which others  t o  ignore. Decisionmakers 
who view a probleni through the  rosy lens of  a technological f i x  have made, 
and .are l i k e l y  t o  make i n  the h t u r e ,  their judgments i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  way. 
Fcctors associated with technology's primary capacity such as econotuic 
grord~, safc ty ,  e f f ic iency,  and pcrliaps even cnvironmcntal cotlscqLri:ccs are 
given w e i p h t ;  f ac td r s  associated w i t h  technology's ind i rec t  effects such 
as the impact on t h e  soc ia l  system o r  its implications f o r  c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s  
a r e  highly discounted. 
Ignoring such i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  of course, might be eminently sens ib le  
i f  the re  were b a s i s  f o r  bel ieving t h a t  i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  are, i n  f a c t ,  
negligible.  Unfortunately, the  i ssue  was never faced by the  AEC. For 
bel ieving i n  a technological f i x  predisposes those decisionmakers t o  accept 
I 
as negl ig ib le  what is, i n  f a c t ,  r e a l l y  prohlematical.  Such acceptance is 
f q i l i t ~ t e d  because secondary impacts a r e  hard  t o  quantj.fy. They a r e  not  
amenable t o  easy inclusion i n  a cos t /bencf i t  ana lys i s .  In essencc, then, 
these i nd i rec t  consequences of tecl~nology arc o f t en  banished t o  a never- 
never land where they lanquish unheard and i l l  considered. I f  the  h i s to ry  
of o ther  complex technological systems had not '  d ~ m o n s t r a t ~ d  t h a t  those 
secondary effects could be signif i .csnt ,  concern about discounting them 
highly i n  desj.gning a \;.a$, t c s  na11agc;lcnt systen would be niltcd. flowever, 
t h e  t rack  recorJ fro:,i tlie past docs s r r o n ~ l y  argue t h a t  t h e  str:!tegy of 3 
t'conservati.rew design philosophy should be adopted i n  a l l  aspects  of the 
construct ion of a waste management system and no t  merely i n  the  technological 
S t i l l  another consequence oT the  b e l i e f  i n  a technological f i x  was 
t h a t  it reenforced fac to r s  t h a t  reduced the  incent ive  t o  devote scarce 
organizational resources t o  solving the  waste problem. Had not  the  A E C t s  
v i s ion  of  the  i s sue  been conditioned by a b e l i e f  i n  a technological f i x ,  
tllc cos t  considerations and the locat ion of uast-e nanagcmeilt a t  the  end of 
the fuel cyclc vrould not had the impact t h e y  did i n  f a c i l i t a t i n g  
postponerncnt of a vigorous a t t ack  on the  problem. The influence of these 
f ac to r s  i s  sub t l e  but  nonetheless r e a l .  
Consider f i rs t  the  quest ion o f  cos t .  Compared t o  the  cos t  of o ther  
p a r t s  of t h e  f u e l  cyc le  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  t h e  c a p i t a l  cos t  o f  r e a c t c r s ,  
t h e  c o s t  o f  cvcn an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  e l abo ra t e  \<as t e  managcmcnt sys  tent i s  
q u i t e  low. In  1959, i n  hearings bcforc  d ~ e  J o i n t  Ccmi:tce on .lt91iiic Energy, 
the c o s t  was est imated t o  be considerably l e s c  than  a f lSact ion of 1% o f  t he  
t o t a l  generat ion c ~ s t  of e l e c t r i c i t y  .39 Fif teen  years  l a t e r ,  while t h e  
"costs are vcry niuzh higl1c.r t han  prcvj 2:~:l:; 1i:?c! I,.::? ;?,.s.iq!?d t h e y  r1.c 
still n o t  a t  t hc  po in t  v l ~ e r e  they havc an adverse ::ffect c?i: c o ~ i ~ ~ : i ~ a t ~ ~ : i '  
ccononics of nuclcar  versus foss i l  fue l . "  40 Aliho~igh p rec i se  fi nrrcs 
car- iot  bc given ilo'd, cstj.:ao;cs pl:!ce d i e  ~3;jit;il cos;s of thc  S y s t c : !  zi. 
considerably l e s s  than 1% of t h e  t o t a l  il!xrestmcnt of 200 reac tors  and 
t h c i r  assoc ia ted  f u e l  cycle  fzici l i t i c s .  Acro~J;;;;, t o  o ~ c  es+,i.s;ltc, 
aiy'lj:osii.:3teIj' 0 .OC l n i  11s ;\cr kilo:;;, i.: I?our : i t  cf n to : : ; !  of 25 .G : i ! 1s 
psr ki  : m m t t  IICGS cos t  of c l t c t r i  c i  t y  . se:r. ~!s<!c;i:-  112: L:?. r:s;if 2 no f :.!. 
was te  managcrllcnt . 41 
Its pzrccived low c o s t  combined with an o p t i m i s t i c  view of \;hat t he  
.-. 
s o l u t i o n  t o  s a s t c  management entai- led a l l o ~ ~ e c l  pcl'licy 1:~akc-r~ t o  m g l c c t  
t h a t  p a r t  o f  the f u e l  cyc le  wlrilc developing o the r  p a t s .  E f f i c i e n t  waste 
management could be bought only by imposing s u b s t a n t i a l  c o s t s  a t  t h e  point 
of e J e c t r i c i t y  generat ion o r  rcproccssing.  I t  was more cos t  cf fect ivcr  t o  
optimi z? those  p a r t s  of  the  system and t o  s c t t l e  f o r  su l~opt i r i~ iza i ion  a t  t!ic 
f i n a l  wastc msnagciiicnl. s tep .  'Ilius , c.f f i c i  ~ 1 1 ~ ; ~  i n  w a s  : ;,. ri~~inng:.:,::  ti K:.S 
never a primary goal ,  a s  was the  efficiei icy i n  opc;ati a:. , cnri c1,- 
ment, o r  reprocessing.  I t  i s  n o t  a l a r g e  s t e p  from no t  worrying about 
opt imizing a por t ion  of t h e  system t o  worrying aSout it Iiardly a t  a l l .  
Olsat. taste r~aagcmemt represents t ke  final s t e p  i n  the system has 
also w l ~ ~ b c c d l y  innucnced p q l e 8 s  a p p r d  to the questiea. If the 
attitrde prevails  :hat a salutiar. can be willed in ro  being when it is 
m p b e d ,  than there is little intcntire t o  pursue it vigorously in  the 
meamtire. Tam may,  more imed ia t e  tasks have t o  be acbmplished. It i s  
not uncacsmon f o r  people t o  say even today tha t  the  waste manageclmt i ssue 
is cxcggerated. After a l l ,  re are told,  we do not tiaye any reprocessing 
plants operating; therefore, we do not have a waste management problem. 
Horawer, the  mst serious co:lseqgence rising f r m  a f a i t h  hr a 
technological fix is tha t  it provides a ra t ionale  f ~ r  decaupling t h e  ques- 
tic-n of azste from the resz of l h c  riuclcar yo:.-cr s:~stcz. Ey d e f i ~ i t  ion, a 
tec!u:ological f i x  i q l i c s  tha t  z bix;ldcJ s o l u t l ~ : ~  ca i  be jsplcrxalcd, one 
- b a i : r ~  I ky d e ~ i p  dozs r!?: : i ~ \ r e  c f f ~ ~ i s  c.1csir;': l h c  tcck~.3!0gi~a! C G ~ : :  9: 
the system. It is an e;sy t rans i t ion  from believing tha t  a wasrc 
magement systea w i l l  not have indirect  social impacts to  believing tha t  it 
.-.- 
w i l l  not havc any i p c t  on the r e s t  of thc  nuclear fuel cycle. h c e  that 
h a t s i t i o n  is d e ,  it is again an easy s tep  t o  fragment the  question of 
waste from the  rest of tb -u:lear power systcm. 
Such fragmentation is hardly a ra re  phenomena; it is caused routinely 
. 
by a nlnrber of conditions such as budgetary constraints or short  time 
horizons. fie isolation of the kaste nanagcncnt issue, however, was 
clear ly  ccwpounded by the belief in a technological f i x  tha t  allo-xed 
~rganizationa' decision makers t o  adopt a simplified vision of h%at is 
required t o  solve the waste management problem. Although intimately 
associated with a number of elemeats i n  the  fuel  cycle, waste management 
was never treated .as part of an integrated whole. As a re su l t  any attention 
that was given to basre muagemest urs u b l l y  beeawe of its intrinsic 
, - interest as a teclmologicol problem. 
That appeal hm-ever was often very low. A t  t h e  highest levels  there  
-re I ~ O  e d s i - r s  par t icular ly  interested in the problers of waste 
. 
m n s v t ;  with the exceptian of C o m i s s i a e r  'haq~son ,  never i n  the 
his tory of the AEC did that area have t lead coraissimex who eharnpimed 
its needs i n  the same malrler tha t  James Ramey pushed reactor devolopieeitt 
or as Glcn Seaborg pushed physics1 research. For gost of the coaarissiamers, 
baste uas s i q l y  unpleasant and unglanorous. For exmple, Dixie Lee b y ,  
according t o  trao informants, would simply turn up her nose  en the 
subject was mentioned in ncetings. 
Nor could thc causc cf waste ~;iri2gc1~~:1t hc sustaincd throSdg!l the  
ski? l fu l  use of htc-rnzl  pal i t i c s  1.)- ~ c r s o n n c l  at lover !elTels. For the3 
t o  pursue the  issue intensely hardly mzde nach scfisc. Grand carcers were 
made in reactor developr~enc tiliere the  organization's resources rcre 
caauitted not mLuaste disposal. Moreover waste management a l so  seuued to  
lack the in te l lec tua l  challenges t ha t  surrounded reactor research or high 
energy physics. 
In short, because f a i t h  i n  a techiological fix f ac i l i t a t ed  the frag- 
9 
mentation of waste management from thc  r e s t  of the nuclear fuel  cycle, 
rs:.;tc ananagcraent l iterally became a res idual  c?tegoqr. Aut$ority, and 
therefme responsibil i ty,  uas diffused throrighout the  organitatiaa. Only 
a f t e r  considerable prodding from, outsiders did thc  AEC take steps t o  
reorganire its waste managcrent In 1970, thc Division of Waste 
and Scrap Management w s  created; a year later a stronger Division of 
Waste Management and Transportation was f o r d .  Ilouever, even t ha t  new 
erganizaticmal base did  not l ed  to mre favorable t rea t ren t .  Budget 
dlocbionr -in& .I-t p i t i f u l l y  at11 (See Table 1 -1) Waste 
management, as the  ERDA Task Force on t he  Nuclear Fuel C y c l e  correct ly  
QBbdnred, remined neglected. 44 
In recent years, the failivre of f ragaenta t im has been made clear. 
Nuclear industry spokesmen coaplain about the uncertainties of the back 
end of the firel cycle that  were caused by the  ME'S dcveloping t he  
d i f fe ren t  elements sequentially ra ther  than having integrated thcm into 
a whole. Nuclear critics refuse t o  accept the E C t s  u ~ r d  rhzt tech- 
nological solutions are at hand. In t h e i r  minds, it is not optinisia but 
blind unthinking f a i t h  h i c h  tlnderlics the AECWs ar.3 not: EWAqs zrperrts 
that we nccd not ha l t  nuclcar de\*clo;r?e:,t ::ntil o "soluticn" "c the 
. kzste problcs: hzs bc-en r a n d .  Ems it ~ t . ~ i t s  1I-zt p a t  a t t e s j t s  t n  
simplify the  problen by focusiag on the  tcchriolcgical side ~ l o n c  m l y  
have led t o  greater coaplications in  the  present. 
f i  
Lessons t o  Be Learned 
While the  th rus t  of these arguments has Seen c r i t i c a l  of the way waste 
management policy has been conceptualized, thcy should not be 
interpreted as  an affor t  t o  blame individuals for  actions they have taken 
i n  the  pzst. Pointing rhe  finger o r  passing out black hats  is hardly a 
productive endeavor in  t h e  best of c!rcucsranccs; but in  t h i s  c2se 
recriminations are even more unwarranted than in most. 
The fa i lu res  of vision which plague waste management decision making 
are deeply rooted i n  the American approach to technological dcvclopent.  
Alexi; 3e Tocqucvillc f o r  example, in the  l a t e  18308s remarked on how 


tagarly hricras adapted neu ianovatims. That f a i t h  i n  t he  technological 
progress has reamined an in tegral  part of the Aaerican character. I t  is 
hard t o  fault m agency for being i n  tune with t ha t  fundamental s p i r i t .  
IdwQver, ia recent *ars evidence has accusasllatcd t h a t  c a l l s  i n t o  
clpeotim the seduetiva nature of the  technological fix. Nuclear agencies 
aught t o  reastcss t h e i r  approach t o  problem solying. That recmsideratian 
wil l ,  unfortunately, be painful. k m g  held t rad i t ions  and patterns of 
behavior n v e l y  are a l te red  easily.  lhere are costs--perhaps heavy ones-- 
to be paid. Houover, it is hard to imagine t ha t  any other course of 
action can yield positive r e su l t s  in t h e  long run. Continued f a i t h  in a 
r?ythial easy technological f i x  can only push the nuclear agencies 
further m t s i d e  t h e  bounds of rea l i ry .  
lhc d i f f i c u l t y  of sh i f t ing  t9t: way t ! ~ e  n istc  problcia is conci:~tuali:ed 
can be eased i f  the  ERDA and NRC were t o  open themselves t o  interested 
outsiders par t icular ly  t o  those who may hold different  views about which 
.-* 
courses o f  action t o  adopt. Past agency practices of v i r tua l ly  ignoring 
critical outsiders such a s  the  National Academy i n  the '  case of the  Savannah 
River Redrock Project o r  the  Government Accounting Office in  t he  case of 
waste management production f a c i l i t i e s  need t o  be reconsidered. Broad 
participation and decision naking does not guarantee good outcomes, but 
i t - c a n  spotliglat flawed conctptualization of t h e  problem. Had such 
ins t i tut ional ized c r i t i c i s n  existed i n  t hc  past ,  the  AEC might not have 
held t o  its f a i t h  i n  a technolog'ical f i x  as long as it did. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OPTIONS FOR KASTE fiEWNAGFAIEX..- -CRITERIA FOR CHOICE 
There i? a ~oiisc:;s~s thfit, tila single o~rcr--riding cr i te r io i l  f o r  s e l c c ~ l i , ~  
a ncthud f o r  the disposal  of h igh- leve l  wastes should be t h e i r  i s o l a t i o n  from 
t h e  biosphere. This should bd ensured f o r  a long enough time and t o  a  s u f f i -  
.& 
c i c n t  degree so  t h a t  they present  no s i g n i f i c a n t  hazard t o  l i f e  over t h e i r  
lifetimes. I t  is  much more d i f f i c u l t  t o  ge t  consensus on the d e f i n i t i o n s  of 
wtlong enoughStt "suff ic ient  degree ," and "0 s i g n i f i c m t  hazard ." The very 
long ha l f - l ives  involved r a i s e  ser ious  qucstjons as t o  our a b i l i t y  t o  p red ic t  
gcological or material  s t a b i l i t y  over t h e  riccessary s torage  times. bIore 
s ign i f i can t ly ,  oar i n a b i l i t y  t o  predic t  rclcvant socia l  o r  pollitic:il factors 
over tinics of even hu~idrcds of years y rcc l \~des  a ~ y  cstixlation of ci.:her the 
impact o f  a containment f a i l u r e  o r  t h e  condit ions t h s t  might result i n  an 
accidental  a r  d c l i b e r a t c  breach of the system. 
A further complication i s  t h e  prascnce of very la rge  q u a n t i t i e s  of 
short- l ivcd beta  and gamma emit ters ,  primari ly f i s s i o n  products, t h a t  present 
an enonnous short-term hazard and nuke handl ing  of thc wastes d i f f i c u l t .  
Whatever method f o r  waste management is se l ec t ed  w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  have a 
non-zero risk of accident  o r  sabotage, m d  t hus  a f j n i t c  chance o f  l a r g e  
damage and l o s s  of l i f e  Gver t h e  s h o r t  t e n .  A method f o r  d i sposa l  t h a t  
ensures  complete long-ten; s e c u r i t y  w i l l  not  be acceptab le  if t h e  sho r t  -term 
risks are excessive. But again,  t h i s  r a i s e s  t h e  quest ion a s  t o  what c o n s t i -  
t u t e s  an acceptable short- term r i s k ,  and v f~n t  31.e the benef i t - s  t o  be gai!lcd 
by assuming t h i s  r i s k  for  t h e  s a k e  of  long-term s e c u r i t y  aga ins t  containme:lt 
or iso1atj.011 f a i l u r e .  
E th i ca l  and Moral Concerns 
There are,  i n  facc ,  fou r  c o n s i d o r a t i c i ~ s  i n  d e c i d i n g  upon ari acceptnl?le 
i.it:t;lcr< f:);. t h i  r i j .sp~sc?l of ;KIC? 1:1. K ~ ~ s t i . 5  : or?;. - ?.PI'LI ~ 2 f c c ) - ,  diol ' t -  L W I Z  
safc'iy, o;.crrrirional s:fe'iy, and c a s t .  !;;it ~?o:;c of r-hcsc a re  q u ; i ; ; ~ i f i a b l c .  
I t  may bc p a s s i b l e  t o  judge r i s k  and p r i c e ,  aithough t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n -  
volved a r e  l a r g e  cnough so t h a t  t h i s  m y  be  quest ionable.  These a r e  normative 
judgments t h a t  r~tust  u l t ima te ly  hc made by society through the p o l i t i c a l  
process.  
Crucial t o  t h i r  proccdurc w i l l  be the  ranking of concerns.  If c o s t  o r  
opera t iona l  s a f e t y  arc t h e  dominant f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  as they  havc beet: 
i n  t h e  past, then t h c r c  is  l i t t l e  o r  no  likclj!;ood t h a t  space disposal  opcra- 
t i o n s  \ s i l l  eve r  be  s e r i o u s l y  co:lsidel.crl. Cu t ,  a s  c'iscusscd i n  detai l  f a r t h ? r  
on in  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  there is s t rong  empir ical  evidence t h a t  t h e  general  pub l i c  
ranks long-term s a f e t y  ahead c2 both short- term s a f e t y  and cos t  a s  c r i t e r i a  
for  selecting a wastc d isposa l  method. Although nuclear  t echno log i s t s  and, 
t o  a l e s s e r  ex t en t ,  pub l i c  u t i l i t y  cmployces d i d  no t  agree  with t h i s  ranking,  
p lac ing  c o s t  f i r s t  followed by short- term and then long-term safcty,  we dr,  
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not bel ieve t h a t  t h i s  a t t i t u d e  w i l l  remiin unchanged. Indeed, a great  deal 
of t h e  prescnt cont rworsy  ovcr t h e  disposal  of nuclear  wastes a r i sed  from 
t h i s  d i f ference  bctwzen t h e  e l i t e s  and t h e  public .  
This publ ic  a t t i t u d k  would appear t o  r e f l e c t  the  predominance of e t h i c a l  
and moral concenls ovcr economic ones. But e t h i c s  and morals a r c  prchaps t h c  
Q 
u l t i n a t c  c x t c r r n l j t y ,  i n  t h n t  there i s  no way at 811 t h a t  they c;,n be brough:: 
i n  t o  a cost-benefi t  a n a l y s i s .  That thcsc  concerns appeay t o  be  somewhat 
vague and formlcss t o  t h e  nuclear  industry i s  p a r t i a l  l p  a r e f l e c t i o 3  of t h i s  
nor.-quant i f i a b i l i  t y ,  aad p 3 ~ i  i a l l y  due t o  the  grea t  d i f f i c u l t y  of formul atix;g 
t h e  e t h i c a l  and noral  b a s i s  f o r  deal ing the  f:ir fu tu re .  
In h i s  r i d c l  y-quot-vd a r t i c l e ,  A l v i ~ t  1Tciir.i-erg c?-mractcriz-.d t h e  devclopncnt 
c t f  fis:.: c:n pt'hi:: 3:s :! "?~l.:.,:j .!I: b 2 r ~ : i i : - ! , ~  \iif!~ ci c:-nnl vigj.lal;cq being t l ! c  
p r i c ~   ti i i ~ t i - i :  -"c,:. ?hr. ric;jri:;ition of a " : lc~s ly  iltL:;iiai!s'i jblc'' source of 
1 
energy. His.~conclusion was t h a t  t h e  required v ig i lance  was not too  grea t  
a p r i c e  t o  pay. Bu: t h i s  is one of thc normative judgments t h a t  socie ty  must 
be f r c e  t o  make. Indeed, li'einbergt s discussion raises ;KO c ruc ia l  c ih ica l  i s sues .  
Future cenerations would be r e w i r e d  t o  mnilltain t h i s  v i r i l  . and t h e  associated 
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  k i thout  c11oj.ce arid deriving any of t h e  benef i t s .  The 
.- --- 
e t h i c a l  bas i s  f o r  tllc present assuming the  benef i t s  while export ing t h e  risks 
a d  associated cos t s  t o  the fu tu re  is l e s s  than secure.  A l l  forms of cos t -  
bencf i t  o r  r i sk-benef i t  a n n l j s i s  nccessai-ily assume t h a t  goods and bads w i l l  
accrue t o  the  same popular ion, at least i n  the  generic scnsc. Fur thcrmre ,  
t h e  use of mathematical t c o l s  such z.s discount r a t e s  f o r  deal ing with t h e  cr 'sts 
and bcnef i t s  t o  t h e  fu tu re  can cxtcnd at  most a few decades. 
The second e t h i c a l  problem r a i s e d  is t h a t  o f  g r e a t l y  increas ing  t h e  
2 
unce r t a in ty  experienced by f u t u r e  genera t ions .  Hall113.h Arendt has  
pointed out t h a t  tllc f u t u r e  i s  by d e f i n i t i o n  uncertain, t h a t  t;np;edictebi l i  t y  
of r e s u l t  is a necessary consequence o f  any ac t ion .  In  t h i s  regard,  we may 
hold t h a t  t h e  degree of unce r t a in ty  is c e r t a i n l y  smal le r  f o r  t h e  n e s r  f u t u r e  
than  for t h e  far .  E:lt cri\ic:il 1;diavior Zr!cs 1:) CC;':C. ~ I I  d e ~ r c i . ,  . I f  i t  
could be  stated \<it I: c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  tlie tec!,niqucs nrlci inst j . t t i t  icjlls f o r  : ..st c 
managelnenr could be constructed so  t h a t  thcy would be r e l i a  . i e  ovcr t h e  many 
thousands of years rcquircd,  i f  i t  could be gu:ir.crrl~.ccd tha t  ftiti11.c genera t icns  
hfould bc equipped t o  dea l  w i t h  poss ib l e  f a i l u r e s  2nd maintziri the  s i t e s  
aJeqi~.?tcly,  the!: cost  -cf<ect  ivc-rrws mi.giit ! j ~  an ii;);!ropriate cl-itcl-ion. I1 
is,  l~ci~,~;~~,~c;-, n o t  v-[liic:11 ly 01 I:!>> 31 l y  $o:, i ,d t o  zc.1 :!:, i ?  t i~i . : ;  1 L::.C SO z~ i : !  
coerce the bchavj.or of the  f u t u r e  by r equ i r ing  t h a t  t h e y  guarantee t h e i r  
own s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  o r  e l s e  bear  t h e  consequences. 
3 
'illere i s  a .  s:!lall body of l i t e r a t u r e  on tliis prol)lcm. Siii th re-cxa?!?ir,ed 
d' 
t h e  possibi1i t .y  of using r i s k - b e n e f i t  anb lys i s  and ca:nc again t o  t h e  c o ~ c l u -  
s ion  t h a t  no f i n i t e  s o c i a l  discount  r a t e  cpn be used,  and t h a t  any attempt t o  
ycrforr,t q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i s k  eva lua t ions  i n t o  t h c  fat. f u t u r e  i s  prc-orclaii~cd 
t o  f a i l u r e .  Even i f  t he  t o t a l  r e l e a s c s  of radi.onuc1ldes c o ~ l d  be prcdic tcd  
\j.ith o fa ir  ~ ~ i ~ u n i :  of ccrtzir: ty,  j.t i s  i;ot posciblc r o  dci~x; :~ . in~ th? pr:;-,.?;:- 
t i o n  dis t r ibut ior : ,  and thc re fo rc  t h e  t o t a l  dosc received,  o r  t hc  pcjssj.bil i t y  
or c f f i c a c y  of  mi t iga t ing  neasttrcs. hlorcover, it is not poss ib l e  t o  determine: 
how a l i f e  i n  t h e  f u t u r c  would be valued. 
Attcmpts t o  dea l  witir t h e  f u t u r c  wi th in  t h c  s t r u c t u r e  of economics 
have s i m i l a r l y  had l i t t l e  success .  Kenneth Arrow has s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  c t h i c a l  

the future has no tiae horizon. He argues for a set of e t h i c a l  norPs based 
on irreducible r i g h t s  that derive no t  froa the social organizat ion of t h e  
future,  but its h-aanity. The duty to preserve t h a t  frorn harm is an obliga-  
tion based not on their &cia1 i dea l s ,  but the ir  f t d a m c n t a l  rights to sur- 
rim1 a d  human d ign i ty ,  Regardless o f  t h e  intervening the ,  w e  should r e f r a i n  
''as fsr as possiblew frm Jeopardizi!!~ these, rafcjng i n t o  accmct the  c q ~ r l l y  
w l i d  rights of t\e present. 
Eoth of t t -ese ailttiors i r p l i c i t l y  zssme thzc  t r a d i t i o n a l  e r h i c a l  corns 
a n  be carrizd ovt-r zontincc,:isly fmx dezling v i t h  o w  ccfitcir:~rzrit.s t o  our 
descendmts, asd ihrough thca t o  the future.  But, as $onas8 has pointed oil, 
desccfi.::;.qrs- 1; 5s je;.;?if.js:c g 3 :  .: 3~ evil c f  aa  act ih:ft 3 ~ ' t t n > F i - . 3 ~  
i ts mral and e t h i c a l  content,  and t h e  long-term and poss ib ly  unforeseen 
conseqcences o f  those  actiass a r e  to be left t o  providence. 
Even t he  ~ r c a t i o n  of irre~ersiblc conscqucnccs for  ti:c future could not 
be considered unethical .  Every actioi. w e  take h a s  some i r r c v c r s i b l e  conse- 
quent, and if t h e  fu ture  h3s to pro-;iclc for  i t z c l f  ciit of &at it h z s  bccn 
given, t h i s  is T,O Port rhzn v2s givcn to the prcscnt .  It is 031)- requircd 
t h a t  an act ion b e  well-intcnrioned and 1;cll-pcrforzcd v i t h i n  the irac2iate 
cant c xi. of kilo;;] tcfgc e x !  c f feet. 
But Jonas fu r the r  argues t h a t  the  s c a l e  of poss ib lc  i cpac t s  of nodern 
technolog)- has burst t h e  fraarckmrk o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  e th ics .  Such bulwarks of 
9 
morali ty as Fiat  j u s t i t i a ,  pcrcat mndus cease t o  be applicable when t he  
cons. Fcnccs o f  present ac t ion  can r c s u l t  i n  t h e  world perishing i n  f a c t ,  and 
not jus t  i n  metaphor. He argues an axiomatic basis f ~ r  our obl iga t ion  -- t o  
the d i s t an t  future: that  there ought to be a future  at all, and humans in it, 
is ss undemonstrable as it is persuasive. #ha*. has rl~anged is our a b i l i t y  t o  
destroy the - basis  for all obliglitioii, the  existence of c a d i d a t e s  for a moral 
Or.-!r-rinp rhc Cri te r ia  
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lie therefore argue t h a t  t h e r e  is a persuasive case f o r  subordiiiating 
borh cperztiona! ;ifid s i~or+-te :~  risks t o  potr-ntizl Img- tcm risks, ar!d that  
cost  may be tokcn to he tile l eas t  important o f .  the criteria. Cos t  shoilld be 
u s d  not z s  a d c t c n ~ i n i n g  factor, but as a houx!:~ry c ~ n d i t i c n  t o  be satisfied 
uri l i~c ly  to b2 p ~ ~ i ~ l i i t i . ~ '  ior 2::) G: Lile ~ieii.:x!s c u r r c n ~ l y  bcfrig s~:r,zcsted, 
including ,.ace disposal.10 If t h c  cos t s  arc subsequently judged t o  be ex- 
cessive, t h a t  decision will  have t o  be jus t i f i ed .  Affordability is 3 f l a i b l e  
socia l  a d  po l i t i c a l  decision. In t h e  absence of ac: ilally prohibi t i v c  costs ,  
t h e  question is  what level of safety  society i s  wil l ing t o  pay for.  
A s imilar  argmcnt is made fo r  subordiila:inc s h o r t - t e r n  and op rn t iona l  
r i sk s  t o  long-term ones. The r ~ l a t i \ ~ c l y  immcdiatc r i s k s  o f  waste d i s p ~ s a l  
0j)crations w i l l  a t  leas t  be borne by t h e  s n m  populati n t h a t  dcrivcs bcncfits  
froz thc nuclear  pO\':L'r -113t Create-s the waste:;. 'i';?c n o n n t i v e  \ ~ 1 1 1 . i t b 3  OF sa fe ty  
and bcnefit  can be submitted t o  socie ta l  judgment; as with c ~ s t ,  thc socia l  and 
po l i t i c a l  guidelines a re  e l a s t i c  and adjustable. Ccrtainly there  w i l l  be a 
des i re  t o  minimize present r i sks .  I f  t h i s  en t a i l s  t h e  sclection of a method 
whose long-term r i sks  arc h igher ,  then r i s k  i s  being cxpomcd t o  future gcner- 
ations who w i l l  derive no direct  bcncfits  and wlio have no voice i n  formulating 
the normati\*e decis ion  frame-aork. The e t h i c a l  and moral problem of jus t i fy ing  
t h e  export ing of  r i s k s  t o  t h e  fu ture ,  or t o  o t h e r s  who do not p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
t h e  benef i t t ing  socie ty ,  nay not be a resolvable  one. Again, thc nininzgn 
ethical c r i t e r i o n  i s  tha t*  such decis ions  be made exp l i c i t ly .  
The primary c r i t e r i o n  for ordering waste management options,  is t h e  
a i n i r 2 t a t i ~ : i  OC 1o:ig-ten risks. If these cocld bc yrcc i sel y d ~ i .  c z s i ~ e d ,  
Waste nmZaP;;:.C;lt 0i-)tic?as could be e a s i l y  rar?kcd. But t1:gs.e a r c  great technical 
and soc ia l  c n c e r t a i n t i c s  as t o  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of waste contaiment ovcr  t h e  
long t i s c s  t.hat it rmsr 5c! msintojncd. An a c . ~ ~ y i r ~ b l ~  e t h o d  f o r  the disposal  
of high-level h'astes must be proof against  ~ c c h n i c a l  f a i l u r e s  such as corrosion 
cf %ate:-;::Is 2nd s t i r . : ~ ? i f i c  f a i l u r e s  such a s  ovcrcsti:.:~? ing thc cfficzcy of 
- Il..,lilzl ?,- t,z:--rjcrs to :.;j grat ic; l  :::= c;cll as 3-- s :-!st. c.eol n5:-c:-11 c!:::;:!??. e l  2c i  cy?. , 
. , .'. . 3 c. 
c.., -*  :. ' - - ,. . , x ,  L , . . i . : ; : . ~ ~ .  I :c~ .  d j  . ; ; f ~ s z i  7 ::ii~t.15 c;:;: br cr .:; ,,',::; l)- g-.:?-ran:: :3 to i-L. 
permanent ovcr the  hundreds of ti lausaids of years t ha t  i s o l a t i o n  is needed; 
a more reasonable c r i t e r i o n  is t h a t ,  should the containnlcnt f a i l ,  thc t i n e  t o  
return the wastes t o  tCc mvircnrr,cr,; is of the s'mc orc!cr of may.nii~idc 3s t h e  
time ~~ecessarp f o r  t h c  t o x i c i t y  t o  be reduced t o  a Icvcl a t  or  below hack- 
ground rzdiation a t  a conparablc s i t e .  The uncertainty associated with in-  
pcrfec t  ions i n  present I:nowl edge and th c probrrbi 1 ist  i c  nature of thc frequency 
and s e v e r i t y  of c a t a c l j - s i c  events can be so3c;{!lnt co~pc!~satcd  f o r  by 
se:oj:d;?yy L.2rric.r~ i;: pro;-ldc k r  s l o ~  d i l  f::sio:: ar.3 rcCur.1 2 i- Tli :  ~ ~ 3 s :  cr; . 
Owing t o  t he  very lorig h s l f - l i v e s  of elpen the  sh~.~z:-l ived cc,:qioncn:s 
of t h e  wastes whcn measured against  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  time sca les ,  no 
guarantee of fu tu re  a b i l i t y  t o  r epa i r ,  clean up, o r  even recognix a breath 
of containment can be assumed. Our i n a b i l i t y  t o  predict s o c i a l ,  c u l t u r a l ,  
or p o l i t i c a l  fu tu rcs  a l s o  implies t h a t  an acccprahlc d i s p c a l  mcthod must 
be secure  not only  iigainst acc ident  o r  f a i l u r e ,  b u t  a l s o  aga ins t  bo th  inad- 
v e r t e n t  and d e l i b e r a t e  b u t  uninformed ent ry .  Given t h e  i n s a t i a b l e  c u r i o s i t y  
o f  intelligent l i f e ,  the norc a t t e n t i o n  a s i t e  a t t r a c t s ,  t h e  more l i k e l y  i t  is  
t o  be brtachcd. To one $ho can not  read o r  t r a n s l a t e  it, a warning s i g n  is 
sore likely t o  i n i t i a t e  such a c t i v i t y  than t o  prevent it. - 
l11c a~::nunt 0,' n d ; c a c : i i - i t y  i n  the 1:lt:c ts : ktnc t ion  of tir.1~ all:! 
t e c h ~ i c a '  and s c i e n r i f i c  est i ~ a t  e s  of t l ~ c  probab i l i t y  a£ f a i l u r e s  can be 
used t o  g c x r a r e  z sc'i o f  numbers t b a t  cx~>~..esz t h e  I o i l g - t c ~ ~ ~  r i s ?  z s  t h e  
probable re1ea.t~ i ; ~  ;ny g i ~ e n  ycal-. But t:hcther chc case chosen is average 
r e l e a s e  or  ors st-case, these d a t a  must be convcrtcd v i a  t o x i c i t y ,  mobi l i ty ,  
a;:d p0;?:'1;: i.j.311 25s t :-i?:?it ii)ilS ti) yi e iJ  c\-i!l z :-z:!gh i <:.c:r:~? of soci n l  impzct . 
. . c :~ : ,  2v.?:.:5pyb :?.. j .:-,:*:--r:c! ;.I::! ~ . r ~ L ~ i : ; ~ ; . : : ~  i z  t:!.: <:icp a: sc-::-l , tecii::ict:, 
- * - .  
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a l t e r n a t i v e  d i sposa l  methods. Nhat is suggeszed below is a mcrhod f o r  
extending the r i s k  e v a l u a t i o ~ i s  i n t o  a set o f  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  r e f l e c t  not on ly  
technica l  pa ths  fc:. r e t l ~ n l i n g  t f . 2  t iastcs t o  tht e i i ~ i r c ~ ~ ~ c ~ l t ,  btlr a l s o  the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of a c t i v e  intel l rcnt ion by more o r  l e s s  i n ?  e l l i g e t l t  beings.  
The re:isoiling prcscntcd h c r c  ?ias informcd bi?th our  tccIlnicn1 and s o c i a l  
inpac t  ?nalgsis. 
TcchnS.cal I;.rcvc~.t-- jl;i I i t y  
------ --- - ----- 
Technical i r r e r c r s i b i l i r y  is d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  Jcgrcc t o  which c:npiaced 
wastes a r e  r e s i s t a n t  t o  rccovcry o r  r e l c a s c  c i t l i c r  by acc ident  o r  by t h e  
d e l i b e r a t e  ap7 l i ca t ion  of  technology. I t s  s i g n i f i c a n c c  as a  c r i t e r i o n  is 
t h a t  t h e  morc i r r c v e r s i b l c  a waste d i sposa l  method is ,  thc morc conf ident  vc  
may be t h a t  the wastes w i l l  remain i so la ted  in  t h e  face  of soc ia l ,  technica l ,  
and geologic uncer ta in t ies .  If t echn ica l  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  is high, then 
n e i t h e r  c a t a c l y s ~ i c  na tu rz l  events nor  the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  i n t e l l i g e n t  and 
technological ly adept beings can r e a d i l y  r e tu rn  t h e  wastes t o  t h e  emriron- 
Ilaent. Retrievable surface  s torage ,  f o r  example, i s  highly reversible:  
vulnera4lc t o  zccicirnts 2nd e s s i l y  accessihlc fsr .I-r.co\rcry. E jcc t io :~  into 
dccp space is ab.05~ completely i r r cve r s ib l? .  I.iclrjl;g t h e  w ~ s t c s  i n t o  a 
s o l i d  rcck matrix u~u!-d be h ighly  .i_rrevcrsi'ule: a gr~ologic evcnt t h a t  ~ ~ i . i l c ?  
r e s : ~ ; ~  i n  l a rge  rc l cases  of tox ic  rad io i~ i c . l ibe s  ~ i o u ! d  bc. very i~~in-olsb!e; t h e  
a2pl ica t ion  of f a i r l y  ad\va;lccd a d  sophis t ica ted  t i ining technology uo-ild be 
reqcirel t o  Jelibcl-;rely re-ext rac t  tkc:: f r c n  t h c  I X : : ~ .  
Tee?, ;icr.l ir;'r~:t?rsi.!,i:i:)., tiicr?, j 5 dc"j nri :.;:1b. S S C ~ T . !  1)- i:::.. p!,::,~.:caIIy. 
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s i b i l i t y .  I r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  as defined by thd sccond lax  of  therixodyntmics is 
based on t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of r e s to r ing  an i n i t i a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  the  f ace  o f  
s t a t i s t i c a l  p robab i l i t i e s .  Thc prclscncc of i n t  el 3i gtncc, hoxcver, a1 lows 
t h e  c rea t ion  o f  improbr!ble circumstances. R c v c r s i l i l i t y  may be espcnsive, 
but it is not i n  p r i n c i p l e  inposs ib lc .  11 Irreversibility can a l s o  be cxpresscd 
nec!lani'cally, a s  with a ba l l  r o l l i n g  do:n a h j  i l  i i ;  the xiddlc of  a f l a t  111;tin. 
The applicntjor.  of a l i t z l e  intclligcncc, pcrssibly a l i t t  l c  cncrgy a s  
vclf , cnn casi l y  i-cstorc t h e  :la11 tc t:ic t o p  or t ! ~  ; t i l l  . 
Tncrc a r e  p3ra:lcl cxxq~lcs of socia l  i r rcv~i -s i 'o i l  t f i  l t  i s  T . ~ ; L ? I  
e a s i e r  'io c rea te  a bureaucracy tllan t o  des t roy it. Increases in  thc  pcrccivcd 
q u a l i t y  of  our l j v c s  a r c  not r c a d i l y  forcgonc. An example of almost purely 
soc ia l  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  t h a t  is more t o t l l c p o i n t  hcrc is t h e  fabulous p i r a t e  
p rac t i ce  of burying a t r easure  i n  a rc~notc or ohscrlrc locat jon and then 
k i l l i n g  those who how of it. The mechanical act o f  r e t r i e v i n g  t h e  t r e a s u r e  
is very  simple, and q u i t e  revers ib le .  But t o  the extent  t h a t  acc identa l  
discovery is  highly  un l ike ly  and t h a t  a de l ibe ra te ,  but unguided, search has I I 
f 
a very low probab i l i ty  of 'success,  t h i s  emplacement is very i r r eve r s ib le .  I 
The purpose of imposing i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  as a c r i t e r i o n  is t o  provide ! i 
sale degree of s e c u r i t y  agains t  brczching of cofitainment xiid f a i  l u r e  cf ! , 
i s o l a t i o n  i n  t h e  fzcc oE tinknoikn soc ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and c u l t u r a l  Ccvelopincnts, I 
t o  provide t h e  g r e a t e s t  pcss ib le  s e c u r i t y  against  t h e i r  r e l ease  or aisuse by 
an agent not equipped t o  reicgnize o r  ccyc ui th  thc tinnzcrs. Although 
s t a b i l i t y  against geologj.czl change i s  necessar)- t o  provide t h e  des i red  
h j l i t ?  ::!sP :.':y-n,js c-r? r: :e ??sent of attnn:io;i i i ? a t  rr;jgkt b c  G;'ai;!~ i f 1  'i!?r_- z i t ?  
. . i,y ;:ih~lp:J;.h! ir.aci:rr.s i ;- l i 2 . i :  '.f i;.!;:.~ sy;i:n.:rL. 3nrc.i iigi;;:t: !if? iz 
notoriously incautious i n  indulging i ts cur ios i ty .  Construction of  a l a rge  
concrete matwolean on a remote mo~intain top  may be n e c h a ~ i c a l l y  q u i t e  i r r eve r -  
s i b l e ,  but t h e  a tcent ion  it would d r a ~  alnost gusrantec tha t  concerted 
e f f o r t s  would be made t o  breach it by intelligent, but uninformed l i f c ,  On 
soc ia l  g~ound,  such a nethod is held t o  be q u i t e  r evc r s jh le .  Additional 
i r rbvcrs ih i  l l t y  cannot bc provided by warning rricssnges, syrt:bols, o r  1 abcl s. 
Ke can;?ot arstmc. that Circn a soc ie ty  that  has thc i ~ ~ h ~ ~ o l o z y  t  undo 1- ther  
or  t h a t  they will be able t o  decipher a mess3:c they ca!-,not read. I:idced, tI:d 
presence of such an in2eci~J lcrablc  message uould only arouse addi t ional  
i n t e r e s t .  wIn te rc r - ingw geological formations such a s  s a l t  dozes arc equal ly  
l i k e l y  t o  draw a t t e n t i o n .  The soc ie ty  t h a t  d r i l l s  i n t o  them uay know nothing 
of radiologica l  hazards, but st i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t l y  advanced technological ly 
and s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  t o  be curious about t h e  formation itself and its poss ib le  
contents.  
I t  should be kept i; mind t h a t  techni;al i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  is mant t o  
provide a c r i t e r i o n  f o r  choice and not t o  preempt it. Coinplete i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  
t h ~ r  prccluc!cs a l l  possi!kility of recovery of the wasrcs rlzy not be the ;nost 
des i rab le  outcone. I t  can be argued t h a t  our  obl iga t ion  t o  t h e  f u t u r e  extends 
t o  t h c  7reseruslion of ~ p t i o n s  as tic11 r s  the ~~rcvcriiion of ham, that we have 
an obl igz t ion  to t r y  t o  avoid irre\rc:-sib12 consequccccs of our actions. Ir 
Kay then bc co--.cidcrrd n a s t  2 e s i r a t l c  t o  disposc of  the ua-cccs by a nethod 
13 
riru:;l:i.ly 22; irrc: t-rsiblc ;:.- the d i  sj,?i--ial of urii:iil~.r. i n  13:-c'sc:lt or r s  . I h ~ s  
. - ii..-j;l:G a t  1 ~ ~ s ; .  p ~ y ; ~ : : ' . : ~  ~ G ~ - : C , - ;  i-L-rever5il;~~- t!,;:'c.tio> of , - - * - -  A , .  . - - -  . .-! 
s L f , i  1 .  ':'flLa j>r~t:J c ic:: of  an al-i j f icj: i l  oy:. is 
intended t o  make these msicrial  s accessi3l c on1 y t o  thosc  who understand 
what they are mining and d ~ y .  In t h a t  regard, t h e  a r t i f i c i a l  bcds could be 
s o m d ~ a t  core secure against  accidental  nining than natuzal beds have been i f  
care i s  taken to  make s u r e  that t h e  s a s t e s  a r e  not co-located with other  
dccirablc n ine ra l s .  A c r i t e r i o n  f o r  s i t e  locat ion t h a t  z i d s  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  
is t h a t  it bc a s  rrnintercsting as poss ib le ,  and so  draw no attention for &her 
reasons. 
Table 2.1 i s  a preliminarJp c1assific::t ~L:I of several kastc d i s p ~ s x l  
metllods mci:tioned i n  the  current  l i t e r a t u r e  according t o  t h e  degree o f  
4 
technica l  i r r e v e r s i b i l " ~  posscssed by each. In  moct cases,  t h e  ne t  i r r e v e r -  
s i b i l i t y  is dcrivcd from considerat ion o f  both technical  and soc ia l  f a c t o r s .  
The ca tcgor iza t io :~  is dc l ibe ra tc ly  broad, as  a more prcc isc  d i s t i n c t i o n  would 
require more de ta i l ed  analys is  of t h e  several opt ions  and is, i n  any case, 
l imited by technica l  an3 soc ia l  uncer ta in ty  as discusscd p r e v i m s l ) .  hhat 
is c o t  indicated on t h i s  table i s  tha t  many ~f the suggested waste diczpsal  
methods could be made more o r  less i r r e v e r s i b l e  by a judicious a l t e r a t i o n  o f  
present  plans t o  provide addi t ional  technica l  o r  soc ia l  b a r r i e r s  t o  prevent 
breaches OT t i ie c o n r z i n ~ c n t  a i d  isslztion, For c~:rl;>i~, ernplzc.er?.rnt in 
geological formations ~sould be aorc  irrevcr sib 1.e if c!lcaical ncar;s cou1 d be 
f ~ u n d  t o  jr=o!)ilite t k c  wastes zgaifist untnke i n t o  blolopica l  systems, s ince  
s ~ c h  u!Kal.e can bar:) 5ncrezsc waste   obi 1 i i y  and 1;ravide for su!,.;cqueat 
r e c o ~ c e n t r a t i o n  of the Kastes i n  the  food ci~airr.  Disposal on t h e  oceail 
b0tt03 \-..;r.:: IJC ncTe j;-rcuersjh! c if tIIc l oca t i cn  of the  canistr-:? is not 
;.~p.5, a!:,: ;]:~y arc x?.:,:,:! , 1- - + ?  i ..-- : P'- so r!:: a ? c  1 i I,:x:-::tc all;! i i i f~ ; . : . :a i  
. . 
sci31-~;~b t:p.: ;< 23  i : ~  :<y::s2;->- 13 r~:y.~::- t:-:y; i i ,  5 :;i,: f j c:;,;. ~J;-%:YS . 
Technical i r r c v c r s i b i l  i t y ,  ther,, i s  seen t o  bc determined I s rge l  y 
by the s i z e  and sop!~ist icat inn of t h e  technology or ~ ~ a t u r a l  mechanis~ t h a t  
would bc necesszry LO returit t h e  :isstes to t h e  hios3hcr- i n  quan t i t i e s  or 
at r a t e s  t h a t  w m l d  be radiologica l ly  significant. I t  tends t o  c o r r c l o ~ e  
f a i r l y  ucl l  with thc  degree of s c i e n t i f i c  and t c c l ~ n i c a l  apt i tude  t h a t  
would be required for Zclibcrate xaste rcco\rel-y by rr society of inie1ligcr:l; 
beings, end with thc s i z e  and cost of the  iiccessary effor t .  Ti~e s e a t e r  tllc 
degree of tecf.,nical i r r r b r i ~  s i t>,i i tt, the T.i:lrc C O ; ? ~  ldc11t tie ~ 2 1 1  1):. t h ~ i ,  if 
the wzstc disposal  +ethnology works a s  advcrtiscd, any feilure of isola.i;t n 
and containment w i l l  occur only through t h c  intcrvelltion of tllosc fully 
capable of understanding t h e  r i s k s  involved. 
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w .  
! Disposal Method Physical Irrevers ibi l i ty  - Social Irrcvcrsil- i l ity Irreversibility 
! 
Retrievable surface F.Iodcrately low for nbovc Vcry low 
storagc ground convection coolcd 
cn:;ks t o  vcry low for 
r~nccr-coolcd con~plcxcs 
Very low 
Mined s a l t  caverns l,o:.: t o  vcry low Jcpcnding Low for s a l t  domcs to Low 
on proximity of groi:nd inodcratc for bcddcd 
watcr 531t 
Sandstonc caverns 
Space: Earth orbit 
Deep rock melt 
Space: very high 
Earth orb i t  
S?ace: Solar Escnpc 
M.mcrato t o  modcrarcl y bloderately high Moderate t o  
h i  1:h moderately high 
Bloc:crato t o  high 1iigh 
Jcpcnding on formation 
clr~tl  w ; l t  cr 
Vvry high Very I t i ~ l ~  ' Very high 
Complcte Conpl e t  c Complete 
Tn'o!? 2 . 2  
Waste Disposal Systcms C: : :s : j : ; . r i c l  ------ by Irrc*;crsibiiity 
M u l t i p l i c i t y  
- 
Yet another  s e t  of f a c t o r s  must be  cons idered- -mul t ip l ic i ty  o f  s i t e s  
and d i v e r s i t y  o f  options.1S Thcse provide f u r t h e r  ncasures  aga ins t  error 
and uncer ta in ty .  In  t h i s . r c g ~ r d ,  t h e  va lue  of increased  m u l t i p l i c i t y  must 
be c a r e f u l l y  exalniilcd t o  ensure t h a t  it a i l 1  reduce t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of damage 
~1;s net jficrczse j.t. I f  tile n t~ i t rc r  of sitcs i s  i~crcased, t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
t h a t  c,ilt. of ti1er;l k:i13 C2j . j  01- ire acc.Tdt-~:f,??]y l):-r-x;.I;cJ r.ialV 2 1 ~ ~  i;icrcrsc. 
Tn t h a t  czse, t h r  p o t e n t i a l  dnnzge t h z t  coald be done by a r e l e a s e  should be 
rcdl:cc"e coz;~c;.~s;,te. ] - > :  . )  t i ? i .  tha? .:;.s 1 e?.:.:c;. ';l.:se fact c:  ; ?;-;>.2i!,.!.- 
upon 1,-hetiler t h e  :. .. l ;:nt of m t e r  ial co~~t:;inc.d a t  a s i t e  i s  j~lJ::eJ to yrcsc.;l; 
a sn33 1 0;- an C: ;:;-:?:.rs !:~~::(ri ' c I if?, :.;;d ';GI ect  i:.!~ ;!n a~y!.;;rri t* e cix :-;;:i;:z 
- .. . . .  
r..tj;:: i y  2: 1~:::; .*.;I.', .. . 1: 2 ?I;?;-;..,:: 22- s;,~.;., - 
. . , .. < :- :. ... . * .  . . . - 1.:: '.;..; :;;.I 2 ,  1 !., .: 1 :.; % < :.-- . ; : ' : - . .  ., .-,f l'.l.:-C>: ..:. a ;  2. .- ; - -: - .  ' 
. J  ..'! - -  . .  . . . . 
dispos? i  i ; : ~ h ~ d s  c n i G  1 ) ~  i.:;lrcnsci! by i:.sking t h e  li~ii>Scr of  carristcrc ~ c . 1 . ) -  
l a r g e  and thc  potCntia1 r i s k  due t o  t h e  breach of any s i n g l c  c a n i s t e r  relatively 
small .  T'ne technica l  ncasure can then be augncntcd by rando:nly emplacing t h e  
c a n i s t e r s  i n  unrczorded loca t ions ,  makicg dc l  i b e r a t e  rccovery norc d i f f i c u l t  . 
This  m y  make t h e  accident  ril discovery o f  a s i n g l c  t a n j  s t c r  Fore prohal~le. 
I f  so ,  t i le incrcasc i z  probr;!>ility of Giscovcrj- nus t  be tala~lcc:l  n ~ a i n s l :  "clc 
lowcr radionucl ide invcr.tory t o  s e e  whcrhzl- ana1ysj.s bca r s  out t h e  intui t i*:c  
rr?~. ioni; lg t i ; ~ t  t ! ! i  s Et?.;!tt;y f.:o~li! ~~;c!.I.;?zc i1c.t i?.rc'v~;si!;i 1 j: y i 163126 t  a 
~ i . d c  range of geols:,ical a113 r o c i a i  fnc'iol-s. i ' i ~  ~. : i&. .  ::ic a ~ i ~ r ~ ; l ~ ! i  w3.;:d lac 
t o  c o l l e c t  many years  production o f  waste i n t o  a s i n g l c  g i an t  con ta ine r  and 
the11 t o  cnplacc t h i s  s o  dccply and w i t 1 1  such rcdanrlant b a r r i e r s  t h a t  ally 
brcach sccms h ighly  improbable. This  mcchnnical approach t o  i nc reas ing  
i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i nc reases  t h e  prob;lblc conscqucnccs o f  a 
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re lease .  I t  is our contention tha t  t h i s  provides less ne t  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  
i n  t h e  face of uncer t a in t i e s  a s  to  t h e  na ture  and p robab i l i ty  of  po ten t i a l  
ca tas t rophic  events .  Again, it would be useful  i f  t h i s  i n t u i t i v e  response 
could be supported by more de ta i l ed  analys is .  
Mul t ip l i c i ty  of s i t e s  does r.ot, of course, provide any s e c u r i t y  agains t  
fundancntsl conceptual o r  design e r r a r s .  It doer h n l p  t c  ~s ix l i rn j  xc thr. corr- 
sequences of stic;~ cr20rs i f  the f a i l u r e s  arc ra~liion ncd \ridely spscr:d both 
temporally and ?hysical ly,  o r  i f  gross e r r o r s  a r e  r ~ o s t  l i k e l y  t o  occur soon 
cno\~g!1 so that  2 fi,ir C;u:irr):;tec of abi lit:. t o  t a X c  ~cl::eJia1 ~ i l ~ i i  can he  
given. But i f  confidence in  t h e  perfoi~llance of a  s ing le  s i t e  i s  high, mul t i -  
pljcit;:  d ~ c s  nc+t necessarily pravic!c e:i :+ii\'a-lt>; z \:n dLecii;~jcal grc::n5s. 
. .  . . .  n;c aclvzn;:igp pf 5 - t e  ~ - : ; : ! : l y l j ~ i ; ~  . - 1 x - -  ---.--.-- 
. ..-. A . I L I ~ -  a ., :z: j 0;; c<  :!I 
c~:).-i'q.:ei!ces 9' C1"."'-q CiiCr.'.--" - .  . . . . . .  J. .. , - -- < A.ps s~tc- i  > j 2 i.,. :.L:i~:s i;, : : : i ; s . * .  ..-, : -. *,+, r . ,  ?I.: 
poterltial conseqi:unces of t h e  de l ibc rn re  or i,,atircrtant ac t  ion of i n t e l l i g e n t  
l i fe .  One aspect of t h i s  is damage l imi ta t ion .  I f  tile openir~g of a  s ing le  
s i te  causes minimal :lam, 2nd i f  thc  discovery of one s i t e  docs not automatically 
p2ovide t h e  key t o  uncovering o the r  sites by o t h e r  thin infomcd arid soph i s t i  - 
catcd ac to r s ,  catastrop!~i.c r e l eases  a rc  unl ike ly  t o  occur. Furthcriorc,  
t h i s  uwdld provide a t  l e a s t  the  time fo r  e f f e c t s  to be note3 3r.d for t h e  
proxim?te, i P  no t  t h e  u l t jmate ,  causc t o  bc real izct l .  lie a.re a l s o  unable 
ta predict t h ~  c l j  5: riSi;'i, 0:: at,.! h.7lri.t; of  f u t ~ ~ ;  psi>zlrttio:;r., S j  t e  r,:l]ti- 
p l i c i t y  uould tend t o  reduce  the  psssjbiliiy of  scverc accidents. O u r  fiiorc 
6 complete ulrcertainty a s  t o  f u t u r e  behavior, as opposed t o  f u t u r e  gcology, 
leads  u s  t o  conclude that provisions f o r  dmagc l imi ta t ion  ca r ry  more weight t 
when considering socia l  uncertaint.ics.  
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Increased site m u l t i p l i c i t y  is  not iden t i ca l  t o  increased technica l  
i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y ,  although it tends t o  c o r r e l a t e  with it f o r  many waste 
d isposal  methods. In  t h e  case of some, such as  re t r i evab le  surface  storage,  
t t  3 two c r i t e r i a  arc near ly  independent of one another. For some, such a s  
space d isposal ,  m u l t i p l i c i t y  w i l l  a f f e c t  on ly  t h e  immediate risk.16 In o t h e r  
cases,  it can be used t o  separa te  two methods t h a t  have roughly equal i r r eve r -  
s i b i l i t y .  
Figure 2.1 loca tes  a number of waste disposal  opt ions  on a two- i '  ;: 
, , 
dimensional p lo t  t h a t  t r e a t s  tlrc tcchnica l  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  and s i t e  n u l t i p l i c i t y  
. , 
as independent c r i t e r i a .  I n  doing so ,  we e x p l i c i t l y  do not attempt t o  ass ign  
r e l a t i v e  \<eights t o   the^. I t  nust  be cmr~hasj zcd 31 so illat t h i s  i s  a qua l i t a -  
. - t.lve nap, r-;d t h a t  not o?lly t h e  absolute, but  possible a l so  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
? c a t i o t ~  of any cptinil is a mzttcr of inrarand judg-lent. It is not only 
d i f f i c u l t  but  unwise t o  t r y  and l o c a i i z e  any rne:hod too  narrouly. Even i f  
t h e  axes coi~ld  be p rec i se ly  and quan t i t a t ive ly  labeled, inherent  unce r t a in t i e s  
i n  p r ~ d i c t i r ~ g  t h e  f u t u r e  would l i m i t  our  a b i l i t y  t o  pin do\m any method 
prec ise ly .  
Applying t h e  C r i t e r i a  
The previous discussion cat1 be grapllically in terpre ted  by saying t h a t  
t h c  f u r t h e r  i n t o  the upper r i g h t  hand corner of Fig. 2.1 a nelhod l i e s ,  
t h e  g rea te r  t h e  reduction of po ten t i a l  f u t u r e  risks i n  the  face  of technica l ,  
physical ,  and soc ia l  uncer ta in t ies .  Put conversely, t h e  more confident we 
a r e  about soc ia l  and physical s t a b i l i t y  ovcr the  time s c a l e  during which t h e  
wastes must be kept contained and i so la ted ,  the  c loser  t o  the  lower l e f t  
corner an acceptable acthod w i l l  l i e .  
Figure 2.1 
WASTE DISPOSAL BETHODS 
very low lo# moderate high very high complete 
TECHNICAL IRREVERSIBILITY 
PREFACE 
This  r epo r t  is  t h e  r e s u l t  OF a study fundcd by tkc Nations1 Xeronzu- 
t i c s  and Spacc k&. l in is t r~ t ion  through tl:c ;hcs Rcsexch C:;;tcr t o  . . - 
t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  and i!-;$ications oE a hyi)otl lct iczl  ciccision to d '  8 . i  
of long-l ived h igh- lcvc l  n\~clc,?l.  v-.?src~:, o r  SC!:C p.- - i o n  of r i~csc  t.n,,.cs, 
in @ater spacc. It i s  i rp3rtar . t  z t  tile ~ t i t s c ' t  t o  dnlineatc  t h e  bccnkiries 
of t h e  s t u c g  and t o  c l e a r l y  s t a t e  tIlc prcx i sc s  th;, vcre s t i p u l a t e d  and 
d i s t j n g u i s 3  thcn f ron  those  arcas t h a t  i ierc more -~horoughly explored. 
The focus of t h e  r c sca i ch  has Gtcn on t h e  socia! and pol.itic,al 
imp l i ca t ions  of a d e c i s i o n  t o  inplenlcnt t h e  spacc di;;osal i dea ,  and on 
t h e  va r ious  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a i  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  v:ou:d be a s soc i a t ed  
with it. Tllc technical ~ o r k  thc t  has  becn done ( p ~ ~ r r a r i l y  under an indc-  
pendent, b u t  associ3tcd j ntcrgo~errir.c:ltaI ~ C S S C ~ I I I C ~  r s reczcnt  with Dr. 
Gcnc I. Rochlinj isas oricx~2cd priinnrily ic:<nrds sct; ing oxt rhc  bour.Jr.rics 
of a model fo r  t h e  nuc lear  i~idustr;; ai:d of ihe 2ssociatcd f u e l  C ) * C I C  
services so t h a t  accu ra t c  esti::,atcs f o r  high-lcvcl  i.xstc qunntitics -:;J 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  could bc m d e .  0v;ir.g t o  t h e  l n r s e  :?1:15cr of p o s s i b ~ c  
dec i s ions  t h a t  might be taken regarding t h e  post-rc;rocessin,: trccit:2crit of 
'd 
popla t ion  a s  that surrounding the  present launch site st Cape Kennedy 
would requirc far more i n  t ine  and resmrccs than co*rld possibly havc 
becn al lot ted t o  t h i s  study. :-!orcover, as havc often becn stated, the 
social o r  pol i t ica l  sc icnt i s t  works i n  a real world s i tuat ion tha t  is not 
subjcct t o  ready abstrzctioa. The impact on acy specific pop~la t ion  is, 
i n  f zc t ,  specific to-thlt p3;::Iatio~ i n  its exact situation. Nore general- 
ized rules can be abstracted, but  they t:ust 5c applied s i t h  grcizt caution. 
Ye do not at teapt  to  speak with precision about tha t  which w e  were 
unable t o  explore i n  detai l .  The lcvel of analysis, therefore, varies 
£rara section t o  section within t h i s  report, gith regard to extant tech- 
nologics &XI past and present palicy apparatus, suar detailed and f a i r l y  
s p r i f i c  ctrzzcats could hc 232~. , Eat wizh rtgard t o  futlirc decisions 
and future sociai and yoliziczl izipacts, t h  a a i y s i s  is gcncric, not 
specific, and should be applied with scae caution. A careful analytic 
gmup is st- i c t l y  a non-prop!!et organization. h'hat has been done is not 
to attempt t o  predict outca!zcs o r  future, but t o  sketch out what cxpcricncc 
anii analysis have taught us about the responses of  a d  impact on both 
selected and general populations undcz similar  ciramstances. 
The report is organized as follows. In Pan I w e  outline the back- 
g;ourd poli t ical  and tschaical data that  are needed for pcxfoning the  
inpact analysis .  Loth i n  a historical. policy ccntzz: an:! i n  terns of t h e  
present and l ikely future dcnrelc,mcnt of mclcar p e r  technology 2nd waste 
mnagcarent, he outline t he  pr -3nditions tha t  w o ~ l d  hsvc t o  bc met for  'he 
spcc dispssl optic? to bc given serisis co;:sider?:ion. 
In Part I1 we describe the mtential ra lc  of 15c spscc shut t le  
program i n  the  managcmcnt .rnl Jj.sposcl1 o f  high-lcvel wastes. Tllis 
In Part I oC t h i s  s t d y ,  KC intr@di?cc thc prcccdi t ions  for  zhc 
technical  and p o l i t i c a l  decisions that u0::id have t o  bc nade i n  order 
fox tllc space disposal progrim t o  bc gi.ven e\*cn scrims coasiGcrzticn as 
m option 03 the s a c -  footir,: zs st:ch cr:i-rent ylzns 2: d i s p s a l  in s a i t  
b&. Xiis  nSc-:iaZ s1:y211ics t he  neccsr.c;-,v bzcT.:r.c:ral for the di;e.~ssj.c.~ 
i n  Par t  I1 of this  report  of t h e  potent ia l  r o l c  of tbe XAS:. sFiuttlc program 
in nuclear xas tc  . . disposal, and t he  analysis  of not only t h e  technical  and 
scientific, but the  soc ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  n i l i e u  t h a t  would be required for 
a decision t o  move towards impleixientation. 
Chapter 1 focuses on t h e  past his tory  of r a d i o x t i v e  wzste cznagement 
i n  t he  United States ,  fo r  its is inportant i n  se t t ing  up the  social  and 
po l i t i ca l  context t o  unde r s t a~d  how 2nd wily i; cane rn be t h a t  n x l e a r  
waste disposal rclaincd an umcsolve$ problnm 2s 1 ~ a g  as it did. SttonJ?y, 
one shou1.d be cognizant t h a t  future  dccisiocs w i l l  and cannot be takcn 
in an atnrosph. rs free of the clouds of old  b a t t l c s  01-er tiastcs. Xo waste 
d i s ~ s a l  program, inclu3ing t h i s  one, can ever opcrazc with t he  blznl: slstc 
of ten years ago. 
Chapter 2 sets out the e th i ca l  and noral concerns ovcr long-lived 
toxic radionuclides t ha t  f o m  the fund.u;rcntsl ~ t c t i v a t i m  for coxlsiderc?t ion 
of such expensive and h i  g> -tcchnoloy~ dispas.11 PiCzr:;:.:S 5s transsut a i  i o:t 
or space disposal .  For, were it not fo r  our concern over the fu tu re  ar.6 
. 
thei r  wcll-beiilg, it is clear t h a t  waste disposal uould not be consid;.red 
wil ld  be no great  tcclinical Eeat . Even for  the lifc:incs olC o x  cf.%lJrc;'i, 
them a r e  m y  h-ays t o  eaplzce tile wastes t o  preserve tl1e;n fro3 h:-:n, But 
over the very long l i fe t i raas  of thz t i m s u r a n i c  is2topcs a s  po t~ i*Lia l  
hazard, our uncertainty as t o  geology, cu l tu re ,  social  and political 
dcve lopcnt ,  2x15 dmogrqtiy r a i s e  t o  a higli i c c l  oar uncertain:)- a b m t  
its ~ D : L S C ( ~ , ~ ~ : ; I C C S .  
Chapters 3 and 3 address tile tccfuiical prccon3itions f o r  space t o  
become a chosen option. In Chapter 3, we discuss the growth of the  nuclcar 
p e r  industry and its associated wzstes, a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  sup3orting fucl 
cycle f a c i l i t i e s  that w i l l  be needed. Ifithin t h i s  c ~ n t c x t ,  we c x a i n e  the  
several  ways of  processing spent fue l  t h a t  would r d ~ c e  t he  c a s t e  masses 
t o  quant i t i es  mr.lagc.~ble by a hypothetical space d i s ~ s a l  program. In  
Chapicr 4,  t h i s  inforzation is used t o  der ive  a set of technical  c r i t e r i z  
f o r  efficiency of fucl  cycle @;e:atic;l thzt xovlJ 2113s the sp2cc pr@;:r33 
is  a majcr reduction i n  thc t e r r e s t r i a l  inventory of t ransuranic  isotopcs,  
and par t icu la r ly  thc  isotopcs of plutonium, it wouli! s i ~ p l y  not make scnsc 
t o  invest  t he  resources tha t  uould be requircd, tecj,nically, cconosically, 
p o l i t i c a l l y ,  and soc ia l ly ,  t o  make the spacc disposal program a real i t y .  
The two c r i t e r i a  measure, in  o crude my, reduction of r i sk  over 
increasing t h e  and the attendant increase i n  uncertainty. Using Fig. 111-1 
as an i l l u s t r a t i v e  device once again, this is  equivalent t o  asser t ing t ha t  
there is an ef fec t ive  t i m e .  scale  measured diagonally from t he  lower left 
(reversible single s i t e )  t o  the  upper r i gh t  (maxiarum i r r eve r s ib i l i t y ,  high 
ou l t i y l i c i t y j .  If t h l s  is ;Ire case, we ffiay sketcll s e t s  of indifference 
curves, loci of equivalent preference for acceptability of waste nanagziaent 
optiocs. In  the  absence of mul t ip l ic i ty  as a c r i t e r ion ,  these would sinply 
r e f l ec t  s i n i l z r  de~rces  of t e ~ t ~ i i i c a l  i r rcrers . ib i  1 i zy .  
When both c r i t e r i a  are considered, rie suggest tha t  an qpropriate 
resul t  of, incrcasiiig site r : ~ l t i ? l i c i t y  uould bc i b ~  acceptance of a sornexhat 
less ice:-crsiblc tisiwszl rx thx? ,  s ince  rnltiplici t\- reduces thc  conscq.tences 
of crror. I t  is thcrciorc s.igg\?stivc t o  rcr)resct;r ally l i n e s  cf C C : : S ~  prcfcrer-ie 
as a rcs  upon t h e  diagram, re f lcc t ivg  thc  jo in t  e f f ec t s  of the two c r i t e r i a  
reducing r i sk .  As with t he  location of any par t icular  disposal nethod, these 
v i l l  be s o a e ~ h a t  fuzzi ly  dcf ined. 
Where Docs <;ace Disposal F i t  In? 
As may be seen from examining either Table 2.1 o r  Fig. 2.1, space 
disposal is an "extre?lcw xet!\od when judged acconling t o  our two c r i t c r i a .  
It is completely and totally i r revers ib le  i f  the solar  escape cissicn is 
chosen. As was argued abavc, it i s  not c l ea r  t h a t  s ~ c h  coxiplcte irrevt r s i S i l -  
ity would o r  v i l l  be the choice made by society.  I t  is  st i l l  within the bounds 
of poss ib i l i ty  t h a t  a high earth orb i t  would be selected,  a s  t h i s  provides 
what mounts t o  re t r ievable  storage, and retr ievable ordy t o  a highly tech- 
nologized society, But t he  s t a b i l i t y  of these o r b i t s  would have t o  be 
careful ly  analyzed. 
Returning t o  olrr previous zssmption t h a t  so la r  escape would i n  fact 
be the dosen mission, it'is clear tha t  space disposal presents the greates t  
degree of long-tern protection against social  and t e r r e s t r i a l  uncer ta int ies  
of any disposal cetf;od. This i s  not a surprising r e su l t ,  nor was it =ant 
t o  be. The purpose of t h i s  exercise has been t o  place space disposal i n  
context with other  suggested ~ e t h o d s  f o r  nuclezr waste disposal and fron 
this t o  c l a r i f y  the reasoning that  night lead t o  tke space aption being chosen 
in the f i c e  of its clearly higher cos t  and operational hazards. 
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CHAPTER 3 
technical charac te r i s t i cs  of the  nuclear pouer industry over the  next f e w  
decades. A precise determination of t he  quant i t ies  and character of the  
wastes t ha t  t he  space disposal option night be requested t o  handle uould 
be d i f f i c u l t  under the best  of circumstances, given the  uncer ta int ies  i n  
even the  nost  accurate of forecasting methods for  the growth of nuclear 
power. 
The large lead t i m ~  rcquired from the original  conmitxent t o  purchase 
or construct a nuclear facility zo its cc;:pletia:1 docs provide scjne 
a b i l i t y  to forecast over f i v e  t o  ten years w i t h  a modicum of confidcccc. 
Longer tern trends, however, a r e  harder t o  es tabl ish .  Present nuclear 
- power plant designs are.very cap i ta l  intensive.' A continuation of t h e  
2 
current combination of in f la t ion  and plant cost escalation tcgethcr w i t h  
very t i g h t  c a p i t a l  markets might r e s u l t  i n  continued delays and cancella-  
t i o n s  i n  new p lan t  construction.  On t h e  o ther  hand, t h e  Gevelopent  of 
increasing c a p i t a l  l i q u i d i t y  and s t and :~d iza t ion  of p lant  design (which 
could counter t h e  t r e n d  towards increasing costs)  could acce le ra te  
nuclear  power growth i n  the future .  Oth2r f a c t o r s ,  such a s  intervenor 
s u i t s  against l icensing,  the p r i c e  and a v a i l a b i l i t y  of coal  and o i l ,  
and t h e  n e t  economic growth i n  o ther  sec to r s  xay a l s o  exer t  considerable 
influeace. Table 3.1, adapted f r o 3  zn econozictric study by Joskow and 
~ a u ~ k a a n ~  well i l l u s t r a i c s  the s e n s i t i v i t y  of  n u c l r ~ r  powr growth pro- 
j ec t ions  t o  such ex te rnz l ly  determined fac to r s .  
Even 1 1~ a?scncc of such c@nsiC~rbtjc:!;, p r o j c c t i x s  for  t h e  g r ~ . i t h  
of tire U.S. n n z i c ~ r  p.scr i:x!.lsir)* \.;1'). cons i? i~ .~bl ; : ,  as  
 ti;^ 011 Tl; : .  
3.1. C-u;.iPe Aon this f igure  i s  t h e  loiicst gfsr t l i  ~rojec:icrt ( C z s c  A) 
of  WASH 1139(74) ,4 the l a s t  of  a series of projec t ions  made by the  AEC 
before it was s p l i t  i n t o  ERDX and the  XRC by the  implementation of t h e  
Energy Reorganization Act of  1974. This was a pessimistic. project ion as 
o f  1973, based on t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  construction and l icens ing 
delays then plaguing t h e  industry would continue f o r  sone time. I t  d i d ,  
however, a l s o  a s s m e  t h a t  there  would be a considerable i .nstal lcd cap~ .c i ty  
of high-tcmpcraturc gas-cooled reac to r s  (HTGR) and l iquid-ncta l  cooled 
fast-breeder reactors  (L'lFCR) by t h e  year 2000. L'ith 197-; bcing a yer-r 
of increased d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  t h e  nuclear  industry, many rcactor  ordcrs 
being e i t h e r  delayed o r  cancelled, t h i s  o ld  'low1 AEC casc was substan- 
t i a l l y  t h e  same a s  the  highest  projcc t ions  used i n  t h e  f i r s t  fo recas t  
made by ERDA a f t c r  its formation. In ERDA-48,' the mandated f i r s t  repor t  
TABLE 3.1 
SENSITIVITY OF PROJECTED GESEWTION CtfPACITY TO 
SOCIO- ECO!:O;\IIF F,\CTOKS 
(GI CAI':ATTS ELECTRIC) 
MTAL BASE CASE CASE CASE CASE CASE CASE CASE 
CAP. CASE # 2 8 3 # 4a 4b I S  8 6 4! 7 
NUCLEAR 
CAP. 
C.GE CIuL: $l?/hSl.  o i l ,  ~ ~ 3 1  3t ~ ~ 1 r ~ c n t l ; ;  CSF:~(~:! 171 i c ~ : ; ,  !:.? ;l;-j ;:?- ci-.';:j ~ i - .  L; 
CASE 2: No O.P.E.C. Like base case, but fticl p r i c e s  esca la ted  a t  2'i;/yr froin 
1973 pr ices .  
CASE 3: High Air Pollut ion Restr ict ions.  Like base case, but  with increased 
cos t s  of  2.8 mills/kwh f o r  coal and increase i n  coal ar,d o i l  p l a n t  
costs .  
CASE 4a: Peak Load Pricing.  I n s t i t u t e d  i n  1975 with load f a c t o r  improved 19" by 
13s .  
CASE 4b: Peak Load --- Pricing. I n s t i t u t e d  in 1975 with load f a c t o r  inproved 20% by 
1985. 
CASE 5 :  -- Decreased S t ~ c l e a r  Lend Tines. L ~ a d  timcs redl :d fron 10 years  t o  7. 
--.--.--.--- 
CASE 6: Hig!~ - Costs of -;C a ~ i  t n l  . Utj.li ty cap i t a l  char:,c r a t e  incrc;.scd f ro in  156 
t o  18%. 
CASE 7: High Costs of Uranium Ore and Enrichment. The cos t  of U308 i s  a s s u x d  
- 
t o  rise from present  $8-10 pe r  pourld t o  $20-25 PCT pound by 1935, 
while enrichment incrcascs t o  $80/SWU. By 1995 cos ts  w i l l  have r i s c n  
t o  $72/lb f o r  U30g and $138/Sli'U i n  current do1 l a r s  ($2Z/lb and S43/SI.U 
i n  1974 do l l a r s ) .  
Figure 3.1 
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of ERDh on the  s t a t u s  of  its programs, Scenario I11 -- intensive elect: i f i c a -  
tion--closely approximated Casc A of  WASti-ll39(74) except f o r  a small 
reduction i n  t h e  estimated LIlFBR capacity.  
He have chosen t o  omit t h e  M B R  a s  a source o f  radioact ive  waste 
i n  t h i s  study.6 ?he ne t  amount of  i n s t a l l e d  M F B R  czpacity by the  year 
2000 rmuld not  be l a rge  enough t o  a f f e c t  waste management decisions made 
within t h e  t h e  f ranc  we a r e  considering. We have a l s o  chosen t o  omit 
both t h e  HTCR and the  proposed l i g h t  -water breeder r eac to r  (LIVBK) from 
t h i s  study. The 1ffGR has suffered a nuniber of  setbacks t o  c ~ ~ m e r c i a l i z a -  
tion.? There is a t  present  no vcndor of fer ing  a n h  a u n i t ,  and only a 
s i n g l e  l a r g e  p lan t  w i l l  b e  operating i n  t h e  near  future.8 The LNBR is 
still i n  the  conceptual design stage,' alld not being too a c t i v c l y  prhilotcd 
a t  t h e  moment. I t  w i l l  c e r t a i n l y  cont r ibute  no s ign i f i can t  capacity by 
t h e  year  2000 unless t h e r e  is  a s i g n i f i c a n t  s h i f t  i n  ERDX and vendor 
p r i o r i t i e s  over the  next f i v e  years .  
The oiaission of  these  th ree  C ~ ~ S S Q S  of reactor--LhIFRR, FITGR, .,nJ 
LVRR--from cons ide ra t ion  considerably cases our cvaiuat inn of the  tec-lnica 1 
determinants of the  waste n~anagemerit problcni. l l le LMFBR would produce 
a markedly d i f f e r e n t  mix of isotopes i n  i ts  waste s t r e a ~ ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s o  f o r  high atomic number actinides.' '  The tnYiR and LWBR run on Jn 
e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r c n t  nuclear f u e l  cycle-- the Th~rium-Uranium cycle--than 
do standard LWRs ( l i g h t  -water reac tors)  and proposcd LFIFBRs , and \foul d 
present  a d i f f e r e n t ,  although re la t ed ,  s e t  of prohlcms f o r  waste 
disposal .  1 I 
As a r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  cons idera t ions ,  we tiave choscn :o r e s t r i c t  t h i s  
study s o l e l y  t o  t h e  wastes  produced by commercial 1 '  ;-water r e a c t o r s  (LIi'R) 
s i m i l a r  t o  those  now i n  opera t ion .  Even i f  some LMFBK o r  NTGR capac i ty  
exists,  t h e  LISRs w i l l  i>rovicie t he  bulk o f  the  wastes t o  bc  dispased of 
during t h e  1975-2000 per iod  analyzed i n  t h i s  s tudy.  Curvc 9, t h e  no5t 
o p t i m i s t i c  of tlie ERIIA-48 pro jec t ions  i n  t h e  absence o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  cDm- 
mercial  LLFGR capac i ty  by t h e  year  2000, nay then  be taken a s  an upper 
lilcit p r o j e c t i c ?  f o r  t h e  purposes o f  t h i s  study. I t  corresponds t o  both 
Scenar io  0--business a5 usual--and Sccnar io  11 --estcnsivc use of  synthetic 
fue ls - -of  ERDA 48.  
Curvc D is  t h e  enci-gy co~rse rva t ion  sccnai.io jC ERDX-48,  Scenario I  
f o r  improved e f f i c i e n c i e s  i n  r-.~d use  of encrgY.l2 'fiis p ro j cc t ion  is  
f a i r i y  low f o r  ERD.!, bu t  corresponds r a r h e r  wel l  t o  many p r o j e c t i o ~ l s  made 
by morc conserva t ive  o u t s i d e r s  such as the Ford Foundation Energy Pol icy 
P ro jec t .  Although t h i s  czse  is driiren by co t~scrva t i , :n  alone,  a comhjnation 
of  more modest conservat ion cf f o r t s  and cont inuing cconorni.~ d i f f i c u l t i e s  
fo -  t h e  nuc lear  power i ~ l d u s t r y  could riel1 have a .- imi l a r  e f f e c t  on reducing 
t h z  use  o f  nuclear  f i s s i o n  power even i f  to t31  e l e c t r i c  power grows some- 
what morc r a p i d l y  than t h e  scena r io  p r e d i c t s .  
ERDA-4s a l s o  contai l is  an  u l t r a - l aw  p ro j ec t ion ,  shown a s  Cunre E .  
Scenario I V ,  reproscnrcd by t h i s  c.urve, is mcnnt t o  
r ep rc scn t  a sudden dec is ion  on thc  p a r t  o f  soc i e ty  t o  te rmina te  all new 
cons t ruc t ion  of  nuc lear  f i s s i o n  power p l a n t s  a f t e r  1985. Ille sharp  knee 
i n  t h i s  curve i s  derived from t h c  assumption t h a t  all p l a n t s  p re sen t ly  
ordered o r  plnrrncd f o r  conplct ion before  1 3 P '  Jrc cons t r~!c tcd  a s  planned 
and on sclledule. This scems u n r c a l i s t ; ~ .  As an a l t c r n n t  i vc ,  r~c have 
constructed Case F as the loucst conceivable projection f o r  nuclear 
power t o  the  year 2000 uder  thc assuaption that  no completed plant us11 
be forced to sbt  h a  or reduce its -rating capacity, hut t h a t  a social 
w po l i t i ca l  decision te teminte al l  fur ther  develop~ent  of nuclear f i s s ion  is 
made i n  the next year o r  two. We assue tha t  these plants for  which a 
substantial  P ~ G W ~  of site work has already been donc w i l l  eventually be 
completed and opcratcd, a lbe i t  at a gradual pace.that reflects delays 
for core caaprehensivc enviromental and site surveys. The purpose of 
taking st-& a case is to examine bitether t he  spzce disposal optiou c m l d  
reasonably be expccted to play a role i n  a s&io-poli t ical  decision t o  
t-inatc a l l  use of f i s s ion  pwer as soon a s  possible and t o  reaove a l l  
hazardous bypraducts of the ~ ~ t l ~ r  fuc l  cycle as c o q l e t e l y  z; possible 
t he  hurean eaiviroaaent during the operating lit'c of the exis r ing plants. 
Case C, hweucr, is tlre central  pro jc t t ion  t o  be used f c r  the  purposc 
of deteminicg waste disposal praneters i n  t h i s  study. I t  mst bc 
esphasized tha t  t h i s  is not a * p r o j c c t i ~ n "  of nuclear parer growth i n  the 
usual sense. I t  is a hear i s t ic  device t o  allow thc c.zlcrrlation of types 
of quant i t ies  of wastes tha t  spscc disposal might bc cal led upon the  deal 
with. IS it corresponcls f a i r l y  sell t o  sever:cl o+.hcr growth pmjcctions,  
such a s  Scecario I of ERD.4-48, it is a not unrcasonsble projection; 
furthemore, i t  is a l so  wi th i lk  the r a g e  of -rl'rtnt econ=etric cst imrtes 
that r e f l ec t  the trend t o  lncrcasing cost  c swla t ion  awl further delays 
i n  plant construction sdlcdul es. By taking a mid-range project-on, we 
avoid the poss5.bility of appearing t o  bias  the case f o r  or ~ ~ a i n s t  the 
spocc Gisposai option by a:suaing uareasonably high or  low valucs. Yet, 
the values we do chose a ? c  not s o  different  from currcnt hi& projections 
as t o  preclude the  adaptation of the r e s u l t s  o f  this study t o  them without 
doing violence t o  the assumptions w e  make. 
Given tha t  a projet t ian i n  t h i s  range is desirable, Curve C has 
cr-rtain advantages for 'analysis. A l inear  growth nodel for  ins ta l led  
ldlR capacity f r c ~  i3215 to  2000 is used, &ic! s inp l i f i e s  estimations of 
wastes. From t!!e point of view of impact analysis,  t h i s  is a l so  a con- 
servative estimate, for not only the s i z e  of t5e  industry bur its r a t e  
of grovth present social ,  cconamic, and po l i t i ca l  probicas . By assuming 
a constant growth rate, ue l i m i t  the  e f fec t s  o f  increasing scz le  of 
operation largely t o  those a r i s ing  i n  tile waste lcanagenent i t s e l f .  
The precise end p in t  of the  nodel--430 W(e) i n  t!!e ycar 2000--was a l s o  
chosen to siicplif;. estimates. ?his i n b t r j -  s i z e  is identical  t o  tha t  
used f o r  detai led analysis i n  Ir'ASH-1527, the Graft Generic En\-ironrarntal 
Statement on t he  Use of Nixed Oxide Fuel (canoonly known a s  CESNO) . 13 
Many of the relevant calculations nadc i n  the  draf t  GEWO can therefore be 
take3 over d i rec t ly  for our purposes. The one major emendation is the 
s t re tching act of the t i n e  scale  t o  correspond t o  our &el calculation. 
Ihe -.nalysis year of 199C pradicztcs more rapid growth than uc havc 
asumc:d here. CIur model asswaes a constant p;l~~;"th rate cf 17 Gu(e) 
i n s t a l  led ca:,~ci.ty per year between 1985 and 2000. Me a l so  assume tha t  
the  mix of URs w i l l  tend t o  2/3 prcssurizod watcr reactors (FAR) t o  
1/S b o i l i , ~ ~  watcr reactors (aKR) by the year 2000. 
The other factors  regarding LXR opcn t ions  arc  of s m c  i n t e r e s t  t o  
us i n  estima:ing quant i t ibs  and types 05 waste. The ava i l ab i l i t y  factor 
of a react  -,urer the t o t a l  f ract ion of timc tha t  3 plant is capzble 
TABLE 3.2 
CAPIZCI~ FACXIRS FOR LIWT-WATER REACTORS 
Pre-Operational Pnase 404 
First Tko Years of Co~cncrcial 
*ration 65% 
Years 3 through IS: 
High Case 759 (790 m(e) by 1995) 
Lab. Casc 70% (445 (;li'(e) by 1995) 
Yeas I5 through end of 
Gomuercinl Life decline at 21/yr. 
Source: Energy Research artd lkvelo?nent Administration, 1976. 
of generating patter. The capacity factor  (C .F . ) , on t he  other  hand, 
is obtained by dividing the t o t a l  nunber of har-hrs delivered during 
a given year by the  rnaxinum obtainable energy (the t o t a l  e l ec t r i ca l  
capacity a t  f u l l  power multiplied by 8760 hours/year). Table 3.2 
lists the  expected C.F. perfommnte of a typical  Lh'R as  a functiorr 
of age.'' Unfortunately, t he  C.P. of  nuclcar plants has becruc the focus 
af sme controversy crer specifications,  and the  consequence has htcn 
scne juggling both of mnbcrs and oC dcfinitions.16 Ne take the  f u l l  
power r a t i r g  of the  plant t o  be definrd ! I : .  the  core size and parer density 
and the fue l  bun1 ( t o  bc specified b e l w j ,  i d  define t h e  capacity factor  
accordingly. 
T&le 3 . 3  lists the i;lztaIle,l !#It capsci iy a t  t h e  ciid of c-zch calendzr 
year to  the  )-i-tir 2000 for  Crtse C of Fig. 11.1, otir prinary tcst cast. Ti;c 
capzcity fac tors  l i s t e d  extrapolarc frw prcscntly k n c n  f i g ~ r c s  fo r  past  
17 years to a projection s l i g l ~ t l y  Rore op t in i s t i c  than nid-range EXDX 
values. Ihe LkX "burn*' column lists the  a\rcragc electr i :  pmcr actual 1:; 
dclivcrt-d during t he  l isccd year ( that  is, in:-alled capacity x czpacity 
factor) .  Although not comonly rcfcrrcd t o ,  t h i s  nu2ber has profound 
implications for  fucl  cycle and wastc mr.agene;lt since, uith appropriate 
operating conditions, - the fuel burr. s i ~ d  q u a n t i t y  of ftrcl rcno-rcd each 
-- -- 
year shwld  bc detcmincd by  t h e  delivered ,?oric.r rzt!ler r!lan thc  ir.stallcd 
- -- 
capacity . 
T!lc K ~ x l e a r  Fuel Cycle 
-
As with othcr energy tcchnologiss, thc  gcncration of e l e c t r i c i t y  by 
tKRs entails t he  p r d u c t i c n  of eff luents  and wastes a t  many y i n t s  i n  
TABLE 3.3 
CASE "C' PROBABLE NUCLE-IR GiXKlH TO I l l €  YEAR 2000 and NASTE PROJECTIOZJS 
&! M&! MS Mt! annual 
LhR C.F. UI'R spent spent spent spent reprocessing 
mP bum fuel fuel fuel fce 1 capacity 
YFA!! Gh'(e) Cl\'(e) annual cum. annual cum. (%) 
138s 175 .63 110 4650 26850 3300 25400 2C00 
1986 192 -64 133 5230 32050 4 100 29500 2500 
1987 209 .65 136 5800 37 850 4 300 3x00 SO00 
19sS 226 -66 149 6 350 44200 4 500 38300 3000 
1989 213 -65 163 6900 Sl I00 4700 4 m00 5000 
- - 
* Assums annuz\ refuei for design base of 33,000 mci /Y9  at 100; C. F. th 
* Assim=s s h i f t  *XI f u l l  33,000 Kqd /Kg burn by thc year 1930 th 
# Actual data compiled f m m  ERDA and industry reports 
# #  Data obtained fron ERDA-25 
-. 
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thc cycle fm *$c -xtraction of ore t o  t he  ultimate disposal of high-level 
wastes. .b.ctst c ~ ~ i p e t i n g  technologies, however, use a "throw-awayw fue l  
cycle, i n  which the energy source is  mined o r  extracted, consumed, and 
t h e  residue disposed of: In contrast ,  t h e  incmple te  consuxption of 
f i a s i l e  *"u and the  production of f i s s i l e  239~u i n  the  operation of LKRs 
has led t o  proposals t o  *'close1* the  nuclear fuel cycle by repro- 
cessing the spent fuel  t o  extract  valuable U and Pu and recycling these 
back i n t o  the  reactors. Such a cosnplete fue l  cycle is il1us:rated 
s c h ~ t i c a l l y  i n  Fig. 3.2. Table 3.4 lists tlle Cef'initioilq and sources of 
various types of w z t e s  from the oper-ation of this conceptual fuei cycle. 
For s i ~ p l i c i t y ,  a l l  fucl  an3 waste quant i t ies  i n  the cycle a re  
~ i ~ n s a l i i c d  by rcfcrring then t o  n h)-;athcticc?l "a0dtI" iYS having a 
thcmal  cff iciency or' 32 .5G, a spccif ic  core ymicr dens i tj. cf SO Xi;(th) ,':.!g 
(30 Bkgattatts thernal/netric tonne of fue l ) ,  and an e l ec t r i ca l  power 
output of 1 Ct![e). Thus a t o t a l  e l e c t r i c a l  capacity of ,  f o r  instance, 
200 m(e) can be modellcd by considering 200 such "nodcl" reactors.  
Fig. 11.3 is a flow chart  fo r  such a reactor.'' The quant i t i es  l i s t e d  on 
t h i s  figure assume a capacirp factor  of 100: (:hat is,  operation a t  f u l l  
power for  8760 hours during the  pear). The spcnt fucl f igures assucc 
tile annual turnover of onc-third of the  PtiR corc. For a K i R ,  only onc- 
fourth of the core i s  replaced znnuallg. fiowcvcr , as the core i t s e l f  
i s  roughly 413 the s i z e  of a iWR corc, spent fuel  composition and 
quant i t i es  w i l l  be roughly the  samc, a d  no furtiler d i s t inc t ion  between 
the  two types of UU'R need bc drawn. 
In  actual  practice,  reactors  cannot be operated a t  capacity factors  
. 
of 100%. The l imiting ava i l ab i l i t y  fac tor  is estimated t o  be 80 t o  85?, 
TABLE 3 -4  
UHAT ARE THE hlASTES? 
FISSlCE PRODUCTS: 
From f i s s i o n  of uranium or  plutoniun. About lOkg per h*(e)-yr. 
Short to  intermediate ha l f - l ives .  Beta and gamma emit t c r s .  
TRAh'SURAY ICS : 
From neutron capture by uranium o r  o t h e r  t ransuranics.  Quantity produced 
depends on reactor type and design. Long ha l f - l ives .  Nphz s n i t t c r s .  
Froia neutron capture by and transmutation of nos-radioactive material s. 
EFFLLEXTS : 
l i qu ids  o r  a i r  ccntaining radioact ive  n a t c r i a l s  or gases i n  s n a l l  
quant i t ies .  
Fission products and t ransuranics  fro8 leaking fdel ,  ac t ivz t  ioa p d u c t s  
and mater ia ls  contaninated with these. Lou t o  intermediate concentration. 
Fuel containing res idual  uranium, p lu ton im,  t=.ansurmics, f i s s ion  products. 
FRO$! FUEL PRGCESS 1%: 
H i g h  level wastes fron solvent  ex t rac t ion ;  concentrated f i s s ion  pro&zcts 
with residuxl  uranium and plutonium and the  rer.ai:lder of  the t r a l s t ~ r ~ m i c s .  
Intermediate l evc l  wastes; l c s s  ccnccntratcd f i s s i o n  product conrsnin~t.ed 
chemical wastes and products froin eff luent  c1ertnup. 
CladdLng h u l l s  and activated fuel coz~onents .
Evolved gaseous f i s s i o n  plrdtlcts as effluents.  
No l i q u i d  e f f l u e n t s  w i l l  be allcwcd. 
FRO$! FUEL REFABRI CITION : 
Transuranic contaminated so l ids .  
Liquid effluent treatment sludges. 
FROM ALL: 
LCw levcl waste> from contacinated gloves, wipers, boots, t t c .  
- 
due to rou t ine  maintenance and re fue l ing  schedules. A s  we wish t o  
determine the industry-wide average capaci ty  f a c t o r r ,  we should include 
an e f fec t ive  reduction owing t o  t h e  operat ion of LNRs a t  less than f u l l  
power during the i n i t i a i  s t a r t - u p  and towards the end of p lan t  l i f e ,  as 
i n  Tsble Y -2. The c a p c i t y  f a c t o r s  sho~sn i n  Tablo 3-1 rcl.resent a f a i r l y  
op t imis t i c  judgrrcnt oZ i1.c: arinual hvcxagc c a p c i t y  f s c t o r  bzscJ on pre-zio.~s 
experience and the mix of  ncw and old p lan t s .  These f a c t o r s  are someh-hat 
l ~ w c r  than those i n  s o m  iadus t ry  docments,  and s l i g h t l y  higher than i n  
some ERDX estir;~l:es, but  cur r e s u l t s  can e a s i l y  be scalec! by an ap2i-o?riate 
mul t ip l iczr ive  f a c t o r  since they are within s few percent of  other predic- 
tiofis. 
).Sore iin;iorL::rlt for t h i s  st:rd,- is dc t  .::--,:ining t he  bes-- xay t o  cenvcri 
t h e  data pivan i n  Fig .  3-3  on the  hasis of 3 0 0 L c n p x S t y  Factor into  actuzl  
q u a n t i t i e s  of  spent fue l  and waste, a s  chis  depends c r i t i c a l l y  on o e c i s i o r s  
that are madc regarding rcfi icl ing operat ions and p lan t  rnan;lgcmcnt. The 
c m o n  consensus Lions ER1)A and indus t ry  docimcnts is  t h a t  present  and 
f u t u r e  Lh'R fue l  is adequate f o r  a fticl burn o f  33,000 Bll\'[th)/:.!~, 
corresponding t o  a f u l l  opcroting t i a c  o f  1100 da;::~ a t  a s p e c i f i c  porier 
of sOE"'i(th)/;!g of fue l .  Thc spec i f i ed  core tui-nolrc.r of ;/3 ( for  a PKR? 
or 1/4 ( f o r  a SNR) of the f u l l  cnre every year then r e s u l t s  i n  the  anncal 
ktithdrawii, of 33 ?1g of spe. t fue l  per year, i r r a d i r  tcd t o  th-2 f c l l  burn  of 
33,000 f-n<d(th) /Fa,. 
G ~ v e n  t h e  lower capac ' ty f a c t o r s  in  ac tual  prac t ice ,  tuo  fucl  rnaqage- 
ment decision; could bc madc. Current pra - t i c e  is  t o  refuel  t h e  rcactor 
and rcmove t h e  spent fue l  lurit 'g annual inspection ,hutdowns. I f  t h i s  


annual r e f u e l i n g  to  demand r e f u e l i n g  begins i n  t h e  year  1982 and is  
e s s e n t i a l l y  completed by 1990. 
I t  should a l s o  be noted t h a t  t h e  q u z n t i t i e s  of  spent  f u c l  l i s t e d  i n  
T ~ b l e  3.3 a r e  entered ,as of t h e  year they  vould be shipped t o  tile reproccss ing  
p l a n t .  We have used t h e  usua l  a lgori thm t o  t a k e  i n t o  account or , -s i tc  
s t o r a g e  for  i n i t i a l  decay o f  sho r t - l i ved  i so t cpcs ,  shipment t i c s  and 
schedules. e t c .  and t h e  waste q u a n t i t i e s  l i s t e d  ref lec t  t h e  i n s t a l l e d  
2 3 
c a p a c i t i e s  as of two yea r s  e a r l i e r .  
A t  t h e  prcsc:nt t ime, t h e r e  i s  no rcy~r~ccssing c?.jlacity a v a i l a b l e  st 
a l l  i n  t h e  Ui~ i t cd  S t a t e s ,  and cu r ren t  spcnt  f u e l  is being s t o r c d  2 2  r e a c t o r  
s i t e s  r;ci~?ing 3 decis ion  a s  t o  f u r t h e r  s torage  o r  i n i t i a t i o n  of  rcprocess ing  
operztions. Thus, a l t h ~ u g i l  t;ic nuclcai. 'ii?: cyclc i s  no t  a t'Ct~rm:-a;zz).-w 
opera t ion ,  it r z j g ! i t  bc lie1 1 c:isracteri;cL! a t  prese~i t  3s a " S ~ L W - ~ ~ B  ). cycle .  
Currcnt opinion wi th in  and ERDA, ?;KC, and tllc j-adusti-y i s  that t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  va lue  of t h e  spcnt f u e l  as 3 resource  f o r  U ,  I'u, and o the r  
p o t e n t i a l l y  v a l u i ~ b l c  i so topcs  is such t h a t  it w i l l  continue t o  be s to red  
f o r  fu tu re  use even if t h e  a d v ~ n i  -f rcyroccssing rci:i.Ccs i n t o  t h e  f a r  
f u t u r e .  
For t h e  time being, then ,  no wastes from t h c  cnnmcrcial nuc lear  
fue l  cyc lc  are  being produccd i n  t h e  conccntrntcd,  h ighly  toxic f o ~ ~  t h a t  
24 
would lcad t o  co::si2craiion of s;)acc disposa 1. llic only  prcsent b ~ y ~ ~ c 1 u c t  s  
of nxc lear  power opera t ions  are cff l u c n t s  and t a i  1 ings  , lot;- 1 cvcl a:id 
transuranic-contaminated wastes,  and spent  f u c l  clcmcnts . Of t h e s e ,  on ly  
t h e  spent  fue l  begins t o  approocll t h c  condi t ions  of high s p e c i f i c  a c t i v i t y  
and r c l a t i v e  conccnt ra t ion  t h a t  might lead t o  cons jdcra t ion  of space d i s -  
posa l .  There is,  of  course,  , p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t ,  should reproccss ing  be 
decided a s i n s t  c n t i r e l y  o r  should a l t e r n a t i v e  energy sources appear on 
the horizon, a decision aight be made.to t r e a t  t h e  spent f u e l  as waste 
and dispose of it permanently. A s  can be  seen from Table 3.5, t h i s  would 
involve t h e  d ispos i t ion .  of between 2000 and 10,000 h!g of  spent fue l  per  
year, together  with associatcd shielding.  Althoagh t h i s  cannot be  s a i d  
t o  be an Inpossiblctasl ;  for spzcc d isposal ,  i t  most c c r r ~ i n l y  excccds 
present  L\,FX plans and c a p s b i l i t i c s .  
Towards the  very low end of the  rerlge of nlrclear F;c:ctr groxth 
projec t ions ,  hor<ever, there i s  a margin:!l p o s s i b i l i t y  tiizt space d j  sp3snl 
might be used t o  el iminate the  l a s t  vcs t iges  of  a nuclear f i .  s ion  power 
C C O I I O ~ ~ ~  tl:,::: is hc ing  p!~ased out.  In  our Case F ,  f o r  ins tance ,  rile 
dccisioll to tel-nfnstc! ~ . i l  1.1:;e of f j s ~ i ~ i l  ~ \ : C T  12;ght I,? ~ C C C I R P ~ I ~ ~ C ~  by 
, ... a dcterr:jn:it i o ! ~  to di53c.c.c of a l l  s i ~ c n t  f ~ c l  ;IS r:c;i. illc rcn,r;i:.c;;.ci:t.: 
fo r  a wastz disposal @perat ion rsould then renai9 a t  a  re la t iv( : ly  co:lstant 
f igures  of aboct 2000 Kg pcr  year f o r  man). decades. This case w i l l  bc 
examined b r i e f l y  i n  t h i s  r c r o r t  t o  d e t c m i n e  ~ h c t h e r  s l~ch opcraticrns 
could be  implemcnted cvcn i f  thcj. t*:crc des i rcd .  Nevertheless, a s  t h e  
probabi l i ty  t h a t  t h i s  t-rill occur i s  qu i t e  low, rqc may s a f c l y  a s s u m  t h a t  
t h e r e  w i l l  be no role a t  a l l  for snclce djsposal  opcrotions i n  t h c  absence 
of operat ing f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  the rcproccssing of spcnt f u c l .  
Rcproccssing 
Owing primarily t o  the  buildilp of f i s s i o n  products ir! the fuc l  elements, 
they a r e  renoved from t h z  1-esctor before a l l  tne  f i s s i l e  material is con- 
sumed. A s  can be  sccn .'rom thc- data of Fig .  3.3, t h e  considc.ral>!c cxpcnsc 
and e f f o r t  t h a t  goes i n t o  producing f u e l  f o r  a U-fueled 1,IfIt by i s o t o p i c  
enrichment of n a t u r a l  urnniun from 0.7% 2 3 5 ~  t o  3.59  2 3 s ~  produces about 
1100 kg of f i c s i l c  mnter ia l  in a t o t a l  anfiual fu21 charfie of 33,000 ks. 
Everr a t  tf f u l l  f u e l  burn of 33,000 :.fit'd(th)/Ng t hc  iJ i n  the sycnt fuel 
'is somewhat more cnrichcd t h ~ ; ~  n a t u r a l  uranj~lin--2bout O.S5';--and b . 3 ~  scrle 
value a s  a fced m::tcrinl fo r  enrichnlent I f  i t  cal; be  scpar:ttc~l f 1 . o ~  :i:c 
f is.sj.cn proJucZs and t h e  otlicr a c t i r ~ ; d c s  . Furthcr~.: .~re,  narrro!l n$so:.bt ion  
238 
by U pro3!lces 239~u, which i s  a l s o  a f i s i l c  ~ x i t r r j a l .  \\hen a l l  t h e  
neutron absorp t iun  ~nccharlis~es and s:1 j rii 3c ch:i i its nx-c sn:~~~.i  cd, t1ici.c z!-t 
&out 210 kg of f i s s i l c  t'u cont?incd i n  t h c  :~nnu:ll spent  i u c l  d i s c ? ~ . ? ~ . g c  
. . 
of 33,C;3C! E;s roug1;ly t h e  ssnp r.:nl;:; .:s t ? i n t  c . f  I!;? rzm:31 :-!1:12 f j ~ s l  1 ,- 
23SU. 
'Plas, f o r  sil  ant:unl cb:.rgc CT s!)oi:t ll;:0 1.:; c.f Ci s s i l c  r . , : i t ~ ~ - i  :;! , 
. . the rc:!ctcr s i>r ;~ t  f:li'l s> rm co:l:r--nj:, 3 ,?::.;n:?. >:':I T:; c:f <.i?si lc I~..LL:. i .:: 
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which could bc recovered and recyc l rd  b3cl; f ~ r  1 . 5 ~  i n  rt .3ctors.  ?'iris 
is an apprec iab le  f r a c t i o n  of t h c  i n i t i a l  charge. 
If t h e  spent f u e l  i s  rcprocessc.d t o  s epa ra t e  t hc  U fra:n t hc  o:hcr 
matcr ia l  p resent ,  t h e  r c su l t i r i g  U stream could e a s i l y  ht. i c d  bncf  jrlto 
t h e  enrichrncnt p l a n t ,  dscrcas ing  t h c  req~lirc~r ,cn+ f o r  mini-n::, m i  {I:, 
and concent ra t ion .  171c i s o t o p i c  co;aposition cif :?)c lJ i n  t h i s  case 1s 
such t h a t  t h c r c  would bc no r ~ d i o l o g i c a l  probJc.,=. i f  t hc  U streail  .cTP 
kept  q~ii;c pure. XSSLLT~.~~:  t ! l ; i t  0711y t h e  U i s  rccyclcj 1.,:ic1: f o r  rib-*i,c, 
1 f. 
this \ ~ o u l d  mtc-n a reduct ion  of  a:)our 10$ i n  r:.cjrri.  cc~cnts  f o r  U orc:;. 
Reduction i n  enrichmcrt requi rcncnts  i s  q u i t e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  the hctua l  U 
as:jay, bu t  would probably be only one o r  two ~ c r c c n t .  37 
the primary non-toxic dilutant,  leaving a laixture consisting of -a small 
fraction of mextracted U, and Pu, the balance of the other actinides, 
end thc highly active f iss ion products. Almost none of the radioactivity 
goes off vi th the U, and l i t t l e  ui th the Pu. The result ef t5is process 
frora t h e  point of view of waste naxageaent is a roughly 20-fold concentra- 
t ion of the hazardous colc~poncilts of the spent fue l  into liquid high-level 
28 
wastes. 
Carryiw aart such a process without also extracting and separating 
a t  the Pu is held to be undesirable for several reasons. Pu separation 
has been practiced for  decades as part of the nuclear ueapans program 
and is a well understood process. Xf the Pu were nrrt re~~oved, its c o x a t r a t i o n  
in the uasta stream would be sufficiently high t o  raise the possibili ty 
of a c r i t i c a l i t y  incident .29 The whole waste mass would have to be 
handled m o s t  carefully. I t  would also have to  be safeguarded against 
possible diversion o r  theft .  On the other haid, extracted Pu could be 
recycled back in to  reactors without going through expensive enrichment 
stags,  or could be used t o  fuel breeder reactors. In ei ther  case, it 
has a high value. For these reasons, a l l  reprocessing plans t o  date assume 
- ----- 
tOat tBg PI1 vill atm be rrrtrPietes fm tBc spat *l &lag ~ s f ~ ,  
decision .oa its further use. 
Bg tae large far the space disposal method to be of interest, =-sing 
the future of The fuel qmcess ing  industry is, ha9ver, suffici- 
uncertain so as to  p:lude any appeal to authori ta t ive  outside saurees 
for timetables rad cap.~city.  Ihereforr , a heuris t ic ;  but not unreasmable. 
estimate of the g1~1*2!1 of the reprocessing industry over the years 1975-2000 
has been constructed far the parpse of genont ing  a set of nmbers t h a t  
can be used for furthei- analysis inethis study. Again, re aphasire that  
these are not predictioas, i n  the  ordinary sense, but rather a set  of 
j d g a e n t s  that all- modelling to proceed on t he  basis of %hiat if 
.There are a Xew f a c t s  _about the potential  fael reprocessing industry 
that are A d a m  w e l l  e n q h  to  allow the  generation of short  term predictions 
k s e d  on fiw planning., Table 3.5 is a list of elitant and planned fue l  
reprocessing facilities i n  the  world. The only reprocessing plant 
presently comraitted i n  the United S ta tes  is AGNS i n  Banmell, South 
Carolina. The reprocessing portion of the  plant is completed and under- 
going t es t s ,  although waste handling and other support f a c i l i t i e s  needed 
for licensed operat im are not yet i n  place. Start-up time f o r  corasaercial 
operation a t  ACS depends an the s t a tu s  of ERDa and NRC decisions, regula- 
tions, sad hearings, and are the  subject  of some debzte. We have taken 
a moderately optimistic tack and as-e that w i l l  s tar t  ccrarslercgal 
a.8 .A. 
l l B s t W l 1 ~ ~ N . Y .  NFS 3W 1966-72 shut darn fbr expansion 
a ea a?) 19110s needs new constructitm ptrr dt 
k - h , h l ~ .  CE 5oO - - -- inoperable im p m s e ~ t  an .  
- ~ ~ r ~ e l l ,  S-C  ACMS IS80 1988 asaitiag GES).lO decisim 
fnwdar, Tam? Exxal 20@0? W-80s marrain at pzescnt 
U. K. . . -  - - -  . 
- 
. . 
- .  
BNFL Windscal e lS00-2509 l964* -- - i' ;:ag,$ m I y ,  scar full capacity 
99 300 1972 oxide p1ar.t -~s-.& &ir% after incsde~,t  
a' oxide plsnt w 400 1938 - .. ? n ~ $ i f i e d  oxide pt an t 
neu o-xid- plant 1000 198$ ' . , r&-it:%rcls~i, for domes-ic use 
new c.xiCe plan: lo00 1987 peniflag, Tar overseas c-ontraczs 
Prance 
La Hague CEA 300 1 9 G G f  U actal only, to be remodeled 
18 IU 150-SO0 1956 oride, to bc phased in  
@a I) 1000 1985 neu oxide plant, p'ianning phase 
brcoule CEA 900-1200 19S8* old military U mta1 plant 
ss!!?Sz 
Karlsruhe WAK KEWA 40 1970 pilot oxide plan: 
-.--- ? PIIK/KEW 1500 1984 commercial oxide, design stage 
Tokai Ehra PNC 200 1976 non-active: dcmnstration plant 
-.-f PNC 1000 late 80s commercial, r.c site found yet 
Belgium 
Mol Eulochemic 60 1966 shut down; f<lture i n  doubt 
Italy 
Saluggia (Eurox 1) CNW 10 1969 p i lo t ;  shut down for modification 
India . 
-
w a y  IAEC 60 1965 p i lo t ;  natural U oxide 
*~heee plants do not process cotaraercial otride fuels frosr light-ater reactom. 
issmasiag azmaal c a p 5 t y  ia SW Hg steps, 
The oafy other f d f . y  planned reprocessitlg fac'litr is proped _ 
Eu- aperat ioa at Laxbaa 'femessee, A s  a0 fcrnstmctiuft Bsrs yet been 
ct.ses&tt& en this plant pending Exxm *s &tera&r;?~ion sf profit&ilit)t 
agd fie-ability, est5sates of stasbrxp f i ~ e  are B i f f i d t  .to a&e, &k 
sg;ai.R t;tb a reasonbly up%hirtic stance, assxse that pmzsertt ERQA 
esthazes of a 1985 s e - u p  dzte are eomect, -As w i t h  =S, it 5s 
ar-ed that this plant w i l l  hawe a capacgty of 1500 @ per )+ST,. a d  
thst it wif f #zse in by annml 590 3:s steps, 30 
Tine planainz cf c z p c i t y  is expccfe6 to Be delayed -rmti f  K Z 5  
is tf cmscd and 6przting experiezce is aqzircd . Taking m r  cstirates 
for the date of EECC operatioits and al lwing for a~g~ropriare f eaiJ and 
wnstruction times, we estimate that the earliest date for additional 
reprocessing capacity to case on f ine m i l d  be 1990. By this t i r P e ,  
pressure on spent fuel storage would be considerable, and the rapid ctia- 
struction of new facilities would undoubtedly have high priority.31 We 
estimate that the next installation ~ould be a plant sf 3000 !.lglyr 
capacity starting up in 1990, followed by mother 30W Mgfyr unit in 
1995, As with reactors, it is most convenient to treat this capacity 
in terms of a iquiaiel*~ plant. Here KC have taken a 1500 Plglyr unit 
similar to AGS as our model. 
This amount of reprocessing capacity c a t s  V e r j  close to  closing the 
fuel cycle of Case C2 by the year 2000. As sham in Fig. 3.4, additional 
capacity would be needed ta handle the additional reactors beyond 2000, 

k-ffr9 -ti- uf tapity ia tbe last f a  years d at 
stflecteb B975-2606 perid Bar Zfttle, if m y ,  effect m~ sirr results, 
8x& as we expect that the situstion r ~ g a x d h g  &e wsleax &e2 v f e  
vifl be radically afzexed twords the end of *h century by the odven-t 
& fesion p e r ,  breeder r-mrs, trr ot;frer sources oE epergy, w e  terslrnate 
e w  h z k z i c  @el x-itfr tke 1955 instaflation, 
Ewtn thou& there is a zszzt& p p  tictween the estizsated reprr#scssZng 
capacity and the atwant o f  spem fuel generated by Case C1 (*hi& 
represents current pra~tice)~ a caspzrison of our f i j p ~ s  e t h  st;tte%zeaZs 
frost industry aild g o v e m n t  sources indicates that our ertinates of 
reprcxessing capacity am nrtt l i k e l y  to be exceeded in the absence og a 
32 
crash govemt?nt pmgrzz t c  rch:te spent feel backlogs, AmS sfone 
t;oufd provide suffiziet\t 3u ro start u;~ w e n  a qrrite rapid f3iF58 prograz, 
so the level of co%ritEent to the 1l-FBR over the stated tine period is 
of little import. 
As with the projections made for total installed nuclear capacity, 
the estietates made here for reprocessing capacity have the additiotral 
eonverLience of corresponding, in  the year.2000, t o  the assumptions used 
t o  aqalyze the test year of 1990 i n  the  drafr GES?-D. Oncc again, t h i s  enables 
us to take arer  their 1990 results directly for our year 2000 estimates. 
I t  is inporant to note that t h e  high-level  waster [Ht'd) are pro2ilted 
at the reprocessing piants, not ?tie reactors. Thcrcforc, it - is t h e  
assunption as to net  reprocessing ca-xicitx* that _go's_cxnns the waste pro- 
- ,,,,-- - ----.-- -- L --> d---- 
jections to  be used in -. this  study. Under the  further assumption that no 
attcrapt w i l l  be made to  dispose of undifferentiated spent fuel or other 
wastes from the nuclear fue l  cycle via space d i s p s a l ,  the distinction 
- 
- 
k t r ~ a  Oset C1 and C2 above is of little relevance to  the vrsta err  to 
be handled, 'the differertt fuel burns a s d  in these two cases dll, 
bowever, =Ese a difference i n  packaging the sasees far disposal, k%i& wS11 
affect the &er of sfpots to be wde, 3'hi.s w i l l  be-discussed in  Betait & 
furtks on in this report. 
Other Wastes 
Tfic types and quantities of wastes to be generated by an emire,- 
closed nuclear fuel cycle have been listed i n  T ~ b l e  3 .if. It is unlikely 
that the conbinztion of relcZtively high 'olme and activity for wastes 
orher thm high-fwel fmzi zhe repruzessing plazts will be suitable for 
s ~ z c e  dispossl ,  Tne possible except5 c:t 20 t h i s  rulc rnigI.t\c bc tllk dispcszl 
£5 
of radioactive noble gases, such as  Kr or P~ .j3 %xc tAnspurt, 
packzging, and safety requirements for these present a quite different 
set of probleats than for conventional HW and, i n  the absence of present 
- .  
indications that space disposal would be used for the disposal of noble 
gases, they are not coasidered further in this report. 
Characterization of H i  &-Level Ibstcs 
l n  order to exmine the heat production a d  radioactivity of -the 
HLW, both of &ich are critical for consideration of packaging for space 
disposal, some assumptions w i l l  have to be made about their isotopic 
.. 
composition. This w i l l  also affect their relative hazard to life and 
therefore the effects of accidents on land, in water, or i r l  the atmosphere, 
The ~ s s e s  &=be dealt with, h e v e ,  depend m1y on the iwta&led repmces- 
sing capacity and cati be calculated using our previous es t imtes ,  
According to federal regtr5at50ns8 the HLB f m  reprocessing can be 
held as liquids for w bre than five rears .34 They must be solidified 
wit hi,^ this tine d ~tay &en be held for an additional period [tat not 
f-er thm ten years from their date of production] before being sftipped 
f ir  gterage and dispszl , For the purpses of this report, tce assume 
that €he wastes are held at  the reprocessing plant for the full ten years 
before being shippd,  'Phis is a particulzrfy reasurir;ble assumption for 
space disposal, since the s a t e s  continue to decay and get easier to 
hanrfle as each year goes by, 
55 Skxrerzl- pacesses have been su.,ncs ted for so l id i f  icar lrrn of Hfir;. . 
Agair!, xe mke a set of asstmptions for tF.e p r p s c s  ;tf tfiis study. 
iOe will ass- that the s o l i d i f i e d  HtBJ w i l l  have a density of  2, imt-p~. -3t 
3 3 of their fom, and that 0.057 a (2 ft f i f  so? id  yaste are produced per - 
Mg of spent fuel .  This corres~onds to the GESXO assrwpticril that 3.14 big 
of spent fue l  reprocessed w i l l  generate the amount of sol idif ied HLR to 
3 fill a standard 0.18 m (6 -28 ftS) shipping canister. Figure 3.5 shows 
the quantity ofIiL89 solids rhat would bc produced by the reprocessing 
capacity skom in Fig. 3.4. The solid HLW l isted for t h e  yeasof shiprecnt, 
1990-2010, correspond to spent fuel reproces scd ir! the years 1950-2000. 
The total  mass of HLW as stated above is relatively insensitive 
to reactor operating conditions, but the specif ic  production of s a c  of 
the more hazaidous and d i f f i c u l t  to deal with transuranics is not.  Making 
the usual assumption of 99.5% extraction of U and Pu froat the spent fuel, 
there will be about 5 kg of U and less than 100 g of Pu i n  tho HLW per 
Figure 3.5 
&'WAL Pr,ODUCTlO.tj OF HIGII-LEVEL PASTE SOLIDS; IdAiR-U: AGED 10 YEARS 
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tome of spent fuel, c a p r e d  to abut 29 kg of fission produets (if the 
fuel is buxned far the full  33,000 ).Wd (th) b f g )  . When the masses of the 
various reprocessing cherrticaLs and mterials used in so l id i f ica t ion  are 
added,36 the HUI froa 1 ' ~ ~  of spent fuel a-nf t o  about 115 kg. For 
Case C1 i n  which the fael is burned for an average of only 23,OCO ih 'd(~) /$fg ,  
the so?idified-HLk: =SS muld  be expected t o  be solawhat less per Mg of fue l .  
How much less is not clear. I f  all msses are proportional t o  fissiort 
products, =d f iss ion products are proportionzf t o  burn, rhzn we would 
expect a reductioa of &out 30% i n  the t i t N  prcduction frolif the s t a t e d  
reprocessing capzdty. The reduction w i l l  probably be less than this, 
but cer ta inly  g rea te r  thzn jus t  the few kn, reductias in  f i s s ion  p~oduet 
mass. As the oxly ~ o o d  caicataziotis availallle to ES are f o r  ~ L ~ I - R S  of 
33,000 ;-iXd(th)/2:g, ue w i i l  continrxe ta use this figurc as a benchaark, 
thus implicit ly accepting the va l id i t y  of case C2. Should case C. prove 
A 
closer  t o  the mark, we suggest t h a t  t h i s  would reduce t h e  t o t a l  f1LW mass 
by 20% 2 10%. 
Tables 3.6(a) and 3,6@) list the  composition, a c t i v i t y ,  and t h e n a l  
power of spent fuel from a LkX-U cycle per tonne of spent fue l  fo r  HLW 
aged 150 days before reprocessing and f o r  reprocessed fuel s tored  fo r  10 
years afterwards. The f i s s ion  products cons i s t  primarily of '%s, and i ts 
dvugllicr "Y, and lS7cs and its daughter 1 3 7 ~ a .  Ihesc data,  based on the  
37 ORIGEN code developed a t  the  Oak Ridge National Laboratory, arc fo r  
arodel Diablo Canyon LII'R-U fuel  burned a t  the specified 20;-8J(th] /big f o r  
1100 days. The data f o r  t h i s  fuel are available for a l l  shoyter bum times 
TAB= 3.6. (a) 
WSS, ACTIVITY, AVf) RIESt9L POtYER OF 1PmTA:YT ISOTCfPES CALCUMED 
10 BE PRESE?Ff Ei PfOBEL LIGHT-ITER REACTOR EFEREYCE UWVIEf FUEL 
PER bIETRIC 90s (big.) OF FUEL CHARGED TO ?HE REACTOR: 150-DAY A E D .  * 




Cui- i  ua 35.3 17,400. 638. 
Americiu~ 153. 226. 7.3 
Plutoniua 9,080. 118,000. 123. 
Neptunium 762. 17.9 0.005 
Urai~i urn 955,000. 0.9 0.002 











Stmn tium 896. 173,OCO. 445. 
Krypto~ 373. 11,200. 1s. 
Othcr Pxoducts 18,800. 1,840,000. 8,340. 
Total Fissioil 
Products 35,000. 4,390,000. 19 ,NO. 
TOTAL 1 ,GOO,OOO. 4,526,000. 20,070. 
- - -  
*Source: ORIGEN Code, R e f .  37. 
TABLE 3.5 (b) 
MAS, AcrIvrrn, ARB WIER OF I ~ ~ R T ~ T  ISOTOPES CALCUUTED TO 
BE PRESENT If1 MODEL ?,IGKF-WATER REACTOR REFERENCE FUEL PER METRIC 
(Mg) OF FUEL CHARGED TO TrfE REACTOR, BASTES PROCESSED AT 150 DAYS 
WITH 99.51 EXTRACTIW OF PU AiVD U, AW STORED FOR TEN YEARS.* 
MJCLIBE EWSS ACTIIr ITY THEMAL 'POWER 
- f5m Ci. watts 
Curim 21.3 1,730. 60.5 
Anericiun: 145. 200. 6.4 
Plutonitim 58. 452. 3.6 
Neptunium 762. 17.9 0.005 
Uraniun 4,780. 0.006 0.000l6 
Total Actinide 5,760. 2,405. 70.6 
Europium 
Samriura 












Prodnc t 35,000. 
-- -- 317,000. ---- 1,030. - 
* 
TOTAL 40,760. 319,400 1,100. 
Source: ORICEN, Ref. 37. 
and may also be used t o  generate d a t a  f o r  cases such a s  C1 where t h e  
assmed burn time is shor ter .  
Table 3.7 lists some important hazardous isotopes pl-cscnt i n  t h c  
s o l i d i f i e d  HLH, a s  ittell as t h e i r  ha l f - l ives ,  decay modes, arid t o x i c i t y .  
The t o x i c i t y  is  measured by trco r e l a t e d  hazard indices:  t h e  m a x i m  permis- 
s i b l e  concentration (MPC) of t h e  given isotope i n  a i r  o r  i n  water; attd a 
rec iprocal  index,  t h e  volwt:  of 2i.r o r  xatcr needed t o  di lut -e  t ! ~ c  acotint 
of t h i s  isotope generated i n  one year of operatio:? of  a vmodelu 1 (GIS(e) 
38 I.KR reac tor  a t  300% C .F.  t o  the allo:.:able CiPC levcl . Figure 3.6 is a 
cu>\prehensive p lo t  of t h e  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  !is?,' s o l i d s  froi:~ t h i s  model 
reacror  as  a fuilction cf t im aftcr d i sc t~s rgc .  I i- shou:d bc noccd t l - ix t  fo r  
. . ji;;~ e : < c c t : ~ ~ i ~ ~  a f?;; hui?tr:;js of :.c.~-s, t ! :~  ::C.tt.::it?' i n  \ i n S t t . s  i q  
$5. 
Ic::lji~st.cti by ' l l lc rer.!:li:lixg ial and f'u :in2 by ti:.,! Eir,sj.ofi ;;~.o:'r?cts f :  
1 'In 
arid --'1. 
The HL\J const i tuents  d iv ide  f a i r l y  neat1.y according t o  t h e  type and 
dura t ion  s f  the  hazard presented. With t h e  exception of  9 9 ~ c ,  with a 
5 129 h a l f - l i f e  of 2.1 x 10 years,  and I which presents  ra ther .  speci2 l  
problems, f i s s i o n  products have ha l f - l ives  t h a t  a r c  shor t  enough so t h a t  
i s o l a t i o n  from t h e  biosphere f o r  o ~ l c  o r  trio tk~usi-ind years should rcducc 
t h e  a c t i v i t y  t o  near-background l e v e l s .  Furtbcrmore, the Rccq* modes are 
primarily be ta  and gama emission, wllerezs the? longer-lived act i t i idcs 
24 2 
are strong alx~ha-cmitters. With the notable cxcepzion of Pu, xtlich is 
a strong beta  emitter with a 13.2 year  h a l f - l i f e ,  ritost of t h e  ac t i a ides  
are rad io log ica l ly  hrrzardois as emit ters  of 5 t o  6 MeV a lpha-pa r t i c l e s .  Per 
C i  of a c t i v i t y ,  carcinogenic effects ir, s i t u  should be rougllly t h e  same 
for  a lpha-ani t t ins  isotopes of a l l  the  ac t in ides .  The grea te r  attention 

FIGURE 3.6 
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given to  Pu i n  most l i t e r a t u r e  is due te *e greater  quantities of hi 
i.11 current iaventcries, t b  additional amount of hzitd1iz.g and shipphg 
: st w i l l  receive, and cmmn recognition of its existence and properties. 
Figures 3.7 and 3.S are more detai led p lo t s  of the transuranics in 
HI# from annual operation of an LtjR fueled with iso*,opi&lly enrick& 
6 
uranium, for tines up to 10 pars after discha~ga E m  the r2nctor. 1% 
carp be s c e ~  that t h e  h m.d h d ~ d n a t e  the actix-ity for fong -thes. Pu 
- 
- decays by alpha-ztsission t o  U, and the t w c  ~ o s t  ~ i ~ i f i c a n t  loag-fired 
isoto,ps, 2 3 g P ~  and 240~i.t docay to 235tJ and respectively. The 
l a t t e r  are a l so  alpha-enizters, hiit with very fr>??z lifctigtes; the activity 
of the Pu deczy daczhters is rhercfore net sufficicat to apf?.e~r on these 
Figure 3.3 shws  die relationship hcttz:;teea C:;.c vzricus actii:ides. ?!IZ 
1cadi1:g isotope cf &I aa $first is 24it%3, uirk a h e l f - l i f e  of 45s yfars 
237 for alpha-decay t o  Np. The l a t t e r  is also an alpha-emitter, with a 
6 half  l i f e  of 2.1 x 10 years for  alpha-decay, A storage tine of roughly 
4 
.\1 years is. needed for the  2 4 1 ~  t o  decay away; i n  this case, the 
combination of original  I\m ac t iv i ty  and daughter decay t i m e  is  such chat 
237 
the build-up of = Kp does contribute a measurali!,fc a c t i v i t y  t o  t!lc wastes. 
6 " For times ayilronching 10 years or greater,  the 2 J 7 ~ p  w i l l  d o i l i i ~ a t ~  the 
23 7 
zlplia-itctivizy. t!ouever, xhc Np insentory a t  dischn~ge fron the 
reactor is alreaciy quite large, so the increncnzal contribuiion froa 
subsequent 241Am decay i s  small. 
The primary contributor a t  t i ne s  a f t e r  the 241h as decayed away 
is 2 4 3 ~ *  with an 7,950 year ha l f - l i f e  for alpha-decay t o  its short-lived 
daughter 239~p, which quickly emits a beta and goes ovcr t o  239,,, 
F i g u r e  3.7 
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The net result of this decay is the production of additiaraal quantities of 
237 
24,400-year hal f - l i f i  239Pu. Unlike the case of the  2 d 1 ~  decay to Np, 
the net effect h e n  is qui te  v i s i b l e  as an i nc rease  i n  the 2 3 9 ~ ~  activity  at  
4 tiaes of roughly 10 years after discharge.  As t h e  h a l f - l i v e s  of sother and 
grandaughter are sirailar, there is only a moderate reduct ion  i n  net alpha- 
activity. Storage  tiaes g r e a t e r  than 10' y a r s  arc necessary f o r  
the rozghly equal azounis  cif 239h r e m i n i n g  i n  ;he vaszcs afrer r e -  
processing and ~snerzted i n  storage by Am decay t o  be reduced to near- 
harmless l e v e l s .  
Pie i so topes  of Cm are sho r t e r - l i ved ,  and decay away i n  times com~arzble 
to f i ss ion--~~wducr d c a y s .  tioxever, tllr 244~m pizys n d a d l a  ro le  je t % c  
. - xastc rnzn3,c.c:z:z: p&'et, ;he tir;,: of shir;::c::i; of t h e  !ip: scljds y~::;,;il2- 
- 
potcnLj.2; $or (a il,i:a-neutxil) rr::~ct i n n s  i ~ : i t i t  F-iuo;.inz or Oxygen iil the !f t'd 
solids rc:quires ccns iderable  s h i e l d i n g  against the high-energy ~ ~ e u t r o n s  
produce?, a n d t h e  244~m i s  thc primary source. Fur themore  ttlc buildup 
of 6580-year hal f  -life 2 4 0 ~ i  is due to t h e  alpha-dcc: y o f  244& . Thus, 
although long-term waste rnat~zgement concerns focus on t h e  ib and Pu i n  
t h e  HLW, it should be reco:frrized t h a t  the  rslc ~f Cn as t h e  ~otftcr o f  the  
bulk of t h e  Pu i n  reprocessing wastes a t  times greater than  100 years is 
far  f r o a  neg l ig ib l e .  
In fact, decay-product Pu so doztinates t h e  long- ten  activity 
of t h e  tlLW t h a t  increas ing  the  e f f i c i e n c y  of Pu extr-aczion from t h e  
spent  fuel would have l i t t l e  impact. Complete r e w v a l  af t h e  
F i g u r e  3.9 
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Pu from t h e  HLFi a t  the tine of reprocessing m l d  only reduce t h e  Pu 
alpha-act iv i ty  at times longer than a thousand years by about one-f i f th .  
hng-tcm waste manzgerient problems are insensitive to the ef f i c iency  
of Pu remval as long a~ t h e  f r a c t i o n  going out  i n  t h e  HLIS is  less than, 
say, 2%. 
Although the sass, activity, and thzraal pmer of the f i s s i o n  p r h c t s  
clearly dominates tftc klUr' at  t h e  tinre rjf proditcfion, niidl of tfie coccern 
about proper waste nanageaent has  centered on t h e  alpha-emitting ac t in ides .  
mere appear t o  be two reasoras fcr tl-tis. Ftrst, there is less c o i j c ~ r i ~  
over t l te j i t tegri ty of wzstc disposal  sites for thc thoussni: year storage 
t i!:~cs i~ecdec! for most of the i r s i . 0 3  .;a,rcc!uc? 2c t i v i t y  t o  die P J ~ .  Ceco;ttif --7 2 9 
- .  * * \.!kf;i snai l  q u n 2 t l t l e s  zrc i;:ger;.r< c:- i:;:~;! ;:{ i:lc zjp>n-acrit.l;:; of t ; : a  
act in id;.^ prcsenys s~-:.::x-E.zt. cf x :9~e:.t~~ ?.1:2r6 to ?l?:-;la I ~ z l z h ,  r.;: a 
per Curie basis, thzx does thc beta GT ga-ixz actiiriCy of Zhc f i s s i o n  
products.4o The precise value for t h i s  increase  i n  r e l a t i v e  hazard 
depends on t h e  model taken and t h e  ass~mpt ions  made, but  estimatcs t h a t  
arc many orders of rrignitude higher than those used tu derive t h e  $!PC 
values l i s t e d  i n  Table 3.7 have been made.41 I t  is cer ta in ly  not x i t h i n  
our con?pcteiice o r  the scope of t h i s  rcymrt to dcai t.;itft such mai;ters a s  thc  
residence time of various isotopes i n  the hcman body, which a f f e c t s  the 
hazard presc:~tcd by a given r a t e  of radioz:tii-e decay, o r  t o  attcm;tt t o  
refercc t?rc coiitrovcrsy o v e r  t h e  t o x i c i t y  of I'u. f'zc do mention tha: thc  
hazards we discuss here  a r e  not those  due t o  d i r e c t  r ad ia t ion  fx-om la rge  
masses of wastes, but of ingest ion o r  inhala t ion of released radionuclides. 
In t h i s  context, t h e  concern ovcr t h e  ac t in ides  is  most c e r t a i n l y  warrantcd. 
&st of tke controversy presently raging *mt the toxicity of &&aled 
hr arises fr& the question of iccaliznt irradiation owing to the vsr)r . ~ 
short range of  alpha-particles in tissue, The effects of radiation on an 
organ are usually estimitd by taking the titae ktegrated flux incident 
u p  the organ and d i ~ i d h g  by its laass. For beta and gaatina rsdfation, 
and even -re so for energetic neiltr.ons, this assmed distr$.bt1t5rm of aose 
over tissue is  an a c ~ q t e d  profedwe, a d  radiation standard:: are frequentfy 
quoted in  terns of whole-body dosage. In ~tlodels t l ~ a t  lead f.o fie very 
high estiinztes for Pu toxicity, it is ess-sed Eftat: swll pri-ticfcs of kr, 
when irthalcd, deposit se lec t ive ly  oa certain vul~erable places in the 
1urtg I.:!XTC they rezzin for fsrig t k e s .  As  he range L of ti?e a3-&a-~)ar~P;illcs 
11zSg:;50ri,ng tissce. Sic integrated dose airer Ehc tis~7;: v-o i~ae  defined 
by tire alpha rrmge is  said to be very much greater tha-1 o.tc would expect 
by dividing the total  a c t i v i t y  by the entire m a s s  of king t i s s u e ,  Thus 
the concern over the carcinogenic properties o f  the :~lgha-emitting 
actinides. 
O f  course, it is a l s o  true that some 'of  rhe fl.ssion products, such as 
' * ~ r  (which deposits in  the bone) and the varioic rad~oisotoges  of iedine 
(which deposit in  the  thyroid) are not only fair1 y mobile i n  the cnxriron?cnt , 
4 2 but se lect ively  dezosit in s o ~ c  of :fie niost vul~erable organs of the body. 
I t  has been argued that there is l i t t le  chance that Pu would becoxe available 
in a form wits3le for inhalation eveil if  a waste disposal site should f a i l ,  
md that exc - ive  attention is being focused on the actinides.43 I t  has 
a l s o  been pointed out that the dist inct ion bc  tween the thousand-year storage 
times needed for the f iss ion products and the far  longer storage needed for 
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the ac t in ides ,  a d i s t i n c t i o n  which is a nat-acal one in physical terns, 
is hardly a aeaningful one on the t h e  scale of soc ia l  er p o l i t i c a l  pre- 
d i c ~ a b i l i t y ,  
Nevurheless, rhi s' natura l  separat ion of the HLW e r m p o n ~ t s  according 
to  hal f - l ives  has st imulated the  idea of separating the  long-lived s c t i n i d r s  
out of the baste streare and dealing with thm separately, The I1LW would 
then be separated in to  two streams. One, c ~ n s i s t i n g  primarily of the 
fission products, wotild be hazardms "only" for tims less than one or 
two thousand years. This cmpsnent  could then bc sicre3 or disposed oi 
in terrestrial geulogical sitcs i n  \ sh id~  we haw a high degree of coa- 
e j e c t i c ~  in to  outer  space. 
Pa r t i t ion ing  
Processes which would scpara te  t h e  ac t in ides  fron t h e  f i s s i o n  products 
in the HLfJ strcan go under tllc general  naae of par t i t ioning.  Various 
chemical separat ion methods by which t h i s  mig1.t be accomplished have bcen 
suggcated, although none of tltce has been proven as yet  .44 I t  i s  not clenr 
just where i n  t h e  rcp~.occssfag cycle priz.:j t i m i n g  night  occur. For our 
purposes, it makes l i t t l e  d i f ference  whether this takes place as an i n t c g r a l  
f inal  s tep  i n  the reprocessing operation o r  is performed afterwards on the 
l iquid wastes p r i o r  t o  t h e  s o l i d i f i c a t i o n .  It does appear t h a t  once t h e  
waste is so l id i f i ed ,  there  $ . i l l  b e  no further p o s s i b i l i t y  of pa r t i t ion ing  
ir ,  wing to the  inso lub i l i ty  of presently suggested HLW solids. 
The part i t ioning decision must, sherefore, be made fa i r ly  early ir. 
the history of the reprocessi~~g plants.  Altcrnativelj, t h e  prospects 
for later par t i t ioning ,might prove s o  a t t r ac t i ve  as t o  corivirrce the !;.;KC 
t o  relax the present 5-mar rule for HLW l iquid conversion t o  s o l i d s  so 
as to l e t  a partitioning operation s t a r t  up. Mother possibility is t-hat 
the first reprocessing plm:t s (AGE. ;nd E x x o ~ )  sil f r,ot have pa-tit- ioilittg 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  bu: later plants w i l l .  A l l  of these poss ib i l i t i e s  will, of 
course, haare an effect 02 the v i a b i l r t y  &rid s i z t -  of rke spzcc disposal 
option. Far the pVar?oses of t h i s  stu2y w e  restrict mrselves  t o  two 
czses: either there is ED par t i t i sz ing  a t  a l l ,  or a l l  reproccssi~g 
-- 
fac i f  i-ties ere equipped $5;- pari;itioaing. As czn Zte seen from Fig- 3.5, 
a dccision sade no latcr ?.hart about 1390 to r ~ ~ r c f i t  X,XS nix! Exxor, 
with parti t ioning f a c i l i t i e s  \<auld make l i t t l e  difference i n  t he  total 
mass to  be disposed of.  For only the very sriall quant i t ies  o f  solid 
wastes projected f o r  t h e  years 1990-1995 would not be part i t ioned,  
As with other chcaical processir~g procedures, the seyarat ion of 
f iss ion products from the acti.nides w i l l  riot be  perfect, and some r e s i d u e  
4 5 
will remain. As part i t ioning is, a t  t h e  moinene, a hypott~ctical  arid 
cotaplex procedure to be undertaken by as y e t  u n i - d e n t i f i c d  processes, KC 
t.!ill malie no at tcc ;> t  t o  lifcxltify the  probottlc e~t;~tiion faczor for fissim 
prrxlucts. Gjvcn t he i r  lar,ne thcrii~nf poxer and a c t i v i t y ,  a 
very high extraction factor would bc necessary t o  achieve 
large reductions i n  package specifications.  Previous NASA studies46 took 
99% and 99.9% extraction factors i n  calculating required package configur- 
at ions.  I t  would seen t o  us t h a t  even 90% f i s s b n  product separation 
would markedly decrease  t h e  waste thernal  power and mass, r e s u l t i n g  i n  a 
reducticm of perhaps a f a c t o r  of f i v e  o r  t en  i n  t h e  amount of HLFJ 
containing the  long-lived comp~nents. However, as we u e  i n  no position 
t o  attempt t o  recalccllz'te waste packnfing f o r  space operat ions fo r  this 
set of condi t ions ,  we s h a l l  dea l  with them only i n  terns of  rough e s t i h a t e s  . 
Ue sl ls l l  +lso assume t h a t  99-lc is sepsrpred as u e l l ,  and p x k a  ;:cd r.iiil 
the o the r  very loi~g-1 j.17ei.I wastes . 
h Recycle 
To t h i s  po in t ,  vc halre dcalt so le ly  with an LiCR-tl fue l  cycle,  irssu-nin; 
that the ?u ~z-o>::ced in t h ?  ~ - = r n ~ ~ c c y s S r - + . ~  c..;vr3t .i QT::: 2s src,rcri zTi;ay f~:* 
Zm'ihi=y use, i:~iri:j our C O T : ~ : C Y Y ~ ~ ~ C ~ - , S  ~j 'iF? y j f j  ous ~f f icj  als of LRG,A, 
KRC, c?:?~? i i ldu~trj* ,  it sccii1.s very unlikeiy that t l s i s  Pu u i l l  ever be treazcd 
.as waste t o  be disposed of ,  although the masses involved a r e  not beyond 
the  range of space operat ions t o  deal  with. 
Shcnild t h e  decision be made t o  recycle  this Pu back i n t o  the nuclear 
fuel cycle, t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  (although not  t h e  mass) o f  t h e  HLW would 
be markedly affr?cted. The J c c i s i o r ~  as t o  whether or not t h c  recycle of 
Pu w i l l  be allot.+ed is expected soactifilcs i n  1977. Tlic msjor issue is 
determining the  t radeoff  bcfween t he  increased hazards o f  3 f u e l  cycle 
which circulates Fu artd the prospects of  lower U ore rcquircmc-r~ts by 
roughly an addit ional  10% (coinpared t o  recycling only U) and reducing 
enrichment service  demands by abaut the  same amounb. 4 7 
In  an all-LWR nuc le~m energy system such a s  we have r e s t r i c t e d  t h i s  
study t o ,  +here w i l l  never bc enough Pu produced t o  e n t i r e l y  s u b s t i t u t e  
for  enrichment services,  ( tha t  is, by mixing it with only na tu ra l  uranium). 
There are severa l  a l t e r n a t i v e  paths  by which t h e  Pu02 could be nixed with 
UO t o  augment i s t o p t i c a l l y  enriched f u c t .  I t  cvixld be blended i n  v i t h  2 
sorrrcwliat less enriched U02, e i t h e r  i n  t h e  e n t i r e  f u e l  cycle  o r  il: s p e c i f i c  
reac tors .  I t  could be mixed with U02 i n  which the  U i s  e i t h e r  na tu ra l ,  
OF deplctct! {Irorn ex- i ch ien t  plallt t a i l s ) ,  or the  s l i g h t l y  cili-ichcd I! fro3 
r l~e  rcpro:cssing p lant .  These ~sixed-oxide (:.I35) fue l  rods co~.~?d be
assigned t o  specific port ions of the  reac to r  core, with cot;vcn+ior?al 
c~lriched-U rods rcaking up tllc bulk.  Spocifjc reactors catlld bc i d e n t i f i e d  
f o r  t h e  %se of iK)X rods, while o thers  use oniy UO 2 
Sirrce WE f l a ~ e  fuL\~13 i2 convenient i n  dca l ing  \:.itii cit!ler pa r t s  of otir 
sn~3y.r.i.s to n,?!:c cut rsti-atcs si~:~i!;ir tf iu .zc  oc t:~;? G!:S:;!'t, si.:-;l] 
i n  bjih tlic 2rzft1' a!ld f i n a l d 7  versions c ~ f  t l io t  docuiucilt. The analysis 
is based on designating a specif ic  number of r eac to r s  f o r  bfOX f u e l  use. 
This nul!!hhcr i s  i n  tu rn  based en ca lcu la t ing  avai lable  F:OX loadings. It is  
assumed t h a t  the t yp ica l  reactor  using WOX fuel w i l l  contain a load of up 
t o  40% PlOX fue l  pins,  with t h e  remainder being ordinary i so top ica l ly  
erlrichcd UQ2 pins.  lile anottnt of Pil involved ir. recycle i s  then ca lcula tcd .  
Not a l l  r e sc to r s  w i l l  use PIOX fuel. A mom precise  ca lcula t ion  jnvolving 
t h e  r a t c  of p r o ~ h c t i o n  of I'u aild t h e  r a t c  oi-" ex~n;isir>.-1 of the  LX!: inrfustry 
shows t h a t  :435 pins  t i i l l  aiaoluit t o  about 112 of t h c  . o t e l  fuei fab?.icc?ted 
4 7  
a t o  t h e  year 2000. A s  we have used amorc s l o t ~ l y  expanding L1:X ecorlomy 
than t h a t  assumed i n  t h e  GES?IO, t h i s  number i s  an underestimate f o r  our 
Heverthcless, as the upper l i m i t  on t h i s  number is c e r t a i n l y  less 
th;n 155, and as r a t e  of expansion of reprocessing c a p a b i l i t y  ljmits 
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Pu avai labi l i ty ,  only a . smal l  error w i l l  be incurred if we a l s o  assume the 
GESZIO estimate of  11% for this report. Again, t h i s  w i l l  allow the use of 
analyses perfolmzd by othcr :,roIlps t o  f i x  nu;nbers for our study. 
The recycle of Pu'\iill  markedly a l i e r  the character of the HLW produced 
as a result of reprocessing P?QX fue l s .  Xie c y c l i c  re-bu:n o f  Pu will 
ajtcr t h e  iso!opic br;lanc.c toizards s>sr:er five: and ?!:or<: i%:tit t<= is i ; tc?rs 
and greatly 5ncr.zase tlie qur;ntj.ties oC t ransui ; lnics  prcsc i t t  as cozipa~cc! 
w i t h  LiCR w a s t e  from UC2 fue l s .  i'jgurc 3.10 the hp2t rrlcjsr  as a 
func t ion  . ~ f  t i c 1 2  a f t e r  130-day reyrocessji.ig f o r  i :~ t ; fcS i:--.xi1 U9 2 f u e l ,  
equil ibriua~ >:OX f u e l ,  and an average mix of 6% isotopicnlly enric1:-2i UG2 
2nd 1 . I 2.S 3 1 s t ~  r i ,1s:~rf i j . -5 ;7i:4 : : f t j y  j i i f i j ;  of i , , aSr i~  
. -. ,,, * ,- :slj?-a;>i pi ; ; ; .sc ,c -~ :  :9 :?>;? syp::i; f:;.. j i l s t  7~;~:: ~ ( 2  y( ;>:<)tf::;s: ;is> z-,? 
*J,. I..] p 2 1 - 9  s;j<,-,.;s tj;? :!l:;j~:r '.Q];?--,.j ,-;; > ;o : ; ; Q  l . . ? . b ?  <:,---, .A - - , : " c - L  e L 5 * L o . : T j o ~ ~  2s lC;-\.c;:r :,.,,'. 
wastes for  tii<:se sai;is t h r e"  fuel  injxes. 
'The assuqtior, made i n  GESkfO a;>d re lated  docunlents i s  that the Coil- 
sidcrabiy higlrcr heat output and a c t i v i t y  of the  vastcs  f ~ o m  NO!; r c . p ro r css in~ ,  
will not present severe problrms i f  tlicse are nixed back with t h c  u a s t c s  fro;;: 
reproccssi~?; ordinary UO fucl ,  \chic\ coniprises 89% of chc t o t a l .  7 -ere are 2 
reasons t o  doubi: the v a l i d i t y  o f  t h i s  assurnptlon, whicli dcpc;~Js t o  soiile 
extent  on ;.he r:ay in wliich tiic rcproccssing p l ~ o t s  a rc  eannped.50 Sex-errhc- 
l ess ,  ss KC aye i n  no p o s i t i c , : ~  Lo rc:alcu?a'cc t3r: rc!cv3r1t j:ca:-a::..2t.=;-';, :.-c 
will st iyulat .~!  that an ";..crnge wastc n:ixW i i r l l  c;cc\ir i n  p r a c t i c . ~  sr:;! not. 
just as a conccptial device. 
As can be seen from cxaminirig Tables 3 . 3  arid 3 . 9 ,  the i r ~ c l u s i o i ~  of 11% 
of equilibrium recycled !{OX fuel dramatically increases both the a c t i v i t y  
and the thermal power of the transurarlics i n  t h e  HLtJ stream. Although this 
Figure 3-10 
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TABLE 3.9 
(Source: Draft GESO, Ref - 13) 
ESTI%k'\TED HEAT @!!PUT I X  HZGfl-LEtXL EASTE 
(mI S: 33,000 $~i'd/b!g, 0.5% LOSS OF FU 
3'0 UASTE AT 150 DAYS, W T E  AGED 10 YEARS)* 











-a 4 1 &=* * $ 
A-3 5.2 
-, -L'13: _ 
ti+, G.GG 
24 '~n 0.26 
244- 57 
+ F.P. 1010 
Toral 1080 
W I , ~  PER CAXISTER' 
3900 
-* Calctl2arcld fro3 J.O. Elotnzke, C.K. Kcc, and J.P. Sichofs; "Trojcctioils 
of Radioactive i$astes to be Generated hy the  U.S. 3uclcar Ixdvstry, 
ORXL-*E4-3965"; February 1973; T~bies 5.8, 5.10, B-1, and B-2. 
** In addition to the rs:lis;.-..clidcs 1 ist.;.J, a??otlt 5C3O gra;>s of ~ r c . n i a 3  2 ~ 3  
20 t o  200 grass of other act in i5zs  :-e i i . i  :.he xbstc. Tiese c o i i ~ ~ i h ' i ' c c  
1 t o  4 0  wz t ts .  
*** On the basis that fuels processed are about 110 mixed oxide, remainder 
is enrichcd LO2 fuel. 
3 + Excluding t1,noblc gases and 99.9% of halogens. Thcsc arc rcmovcd from 
wastc during reprocessing. 
3 3 f On the basis of 2 ft of wastc per metric ton, 6.28 ft per canister. 
only incrwtentally increases the p m b l e ~ ~  of handling undifferentiated 
HW, the waste heat is no longer so cmpletely doiainated by the fission 
products. The a c t i v i t y  an6 thcxa l  pxer oE the fraction containing the  
actinides will increase-by aborrt an order of nagnitude. I f  partitioning 
is also t o  take place, this has quite serious implications fcr projections 
of space dispos31 operaricns. fn psriicu'izr, tkraal  psItcr !;as trees a 
lialtirz ftlztor in pactige design, w i r h  z grrat  d c ~ i  05 the =ass ~f 
hypothetical disposal pckages bezote2 to high themal conducti;rfty 
caferizl tcr ccrilvcy iiitsi-xsal tieat to the pai?agc ~cr f zcc .  
b.5 %.-as the case ccr the  G-FuelcG L'.:i:, t h e  io*~gt-st-li\.-td cu3~:snent c f  
. . 
+,ke ti:,.?: js t h e  Pc i;r;:r',uced 5)- Cci & c c : ~ .  ~ $ 2  c,.-- rc::e.kre t I x e  efftrz-s 0s 
t h e  jz; .72~ c:.: j , :  ,-.:-.!:c:-~- .:z :.:! 5::;:; :;:; 1:; ::? ;:*:: ;;: 6 Zj-;-=?. ii;gTz::- 
. . c. 
. . t:*ci ?::it -;,. -.-..+- ,--*- -; - .. . : C L,::: * '  . . . :-; :;: 5 - E - - , ; ;  *.:...:. I-<:<.; j :. * ~r~:;:,z-: .:7 il 29 <.2-,'?:2. ;.t:c.z: - 
:' .; :;
factor 0; krc-cier ihcn j.n s,;er;t U f.,~:. ,is a!i ~ ~ C C ~ C ~ S C  i:i U:;i 
inventory alone is about ten times greater than t h e  increase in a-active 
Pu, the s e n s i t i v i t y  of k3ste rjanagcslent reprocessing plant cfficiensy is 
Iokkcred slightly. O f  course, one must rezeaber that according to the 
GE32?, only 11% c.f the reprocessed fuel  w i l l  be W X .  Yet, the ~ a s t e  mznage- 
sen: pl-itbfen ~ i ! l  be dui=iaarcJ by this fracticn. k; an cxa~iplc cf cross- 
scnsitiriCy, thc: to ta l  zzolmt of Pu activity i n  bXlX HLtr' a t  tiroc5 greater 
thnn 1~' years g i l l  r.st be r::i;h a l icrcd by increasing the zzou-l; of Pu 
going iz';o tke !ii.i;' jf;-e; t h?  !.:;< it]ont.) f ' ~ ~ : ; ,  0.5c: t o  3C;. 'fez, adCi t ic . ; i r . l  . *L 
3 WX Pu in the average fiLW izix at  times greater than 10 years will eqsaal 
the total contribution from thc 89% of the wastes th3t  cone fron the  re- 
processing of isotopically enriched U fuel. 
I t  e t  be emphasized that the mmbers quoted in G S E X )  and reproduced 
Bere arc fer eguilibtiun ht recycle. One mason for choosing 1990 as the 
test year f o r  the GES3B uas t s a t  t h i s  was the ear1icst year for a-hich an 
e q u i t i b P k  recycle c d l d  be established. In t h i s  study, we would have 
t o  defer the expilibrim year to 2000 in order t o  be consistent v i t h  
cut other as-ptions. I t  dscs, however, take nany yczrs 60 pZi452 in t f ic 
Pu recycle, arid =n)t atore years before cquilibriui conceatraticn of 
actbtide isotopcs is achieved i n  the reprocessing plants .  Over most of 
the period b a g  considered in t h i s  sttidy, the ~ ~ ? E Y S ?  ind?astry-:i'ide 
"averzgr ;;iixm of IiLtr' uonfd start at t h e  values foZ UO fuel alone and 2 
f 0 3:31 fr2tzia?,s &ove zhi- ':-.- - -  , .s-:-': f ~ r  z l f ~  Gzs.is CG- i 3 =i>r:..- . t:- 2 . , i s.1z 
-.*- 
51 
% ;- a,-? : . :Tiis ir.~:-;:$o.:e ;.-,otlitr -s*:-~j.x51e i E y o  s:>y zttp;l;;: to -xc.--"*-.. ;.--a I-'L... 
a +'z . . - .  L L ts - st.::;-zy~ z ~ : . ; :  t - . ~ j  5 c.: ;--:!*-. ;;;;ti? 2 ;  s: ,." -,? - . 4 2  L..:h - x ,  -, * % :Q:>, j 5 ~ x ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ L Y ~  ., 
seriws :or ~ e t h d s  uch as spsce d isposa l  vlierc pis f  itioning i s  a1 -ro 
assmcd to  occtlr, 
Tzile 3.10 lists the ra3ioacCivity and ti~crnzil peer of ID-ycar aged 
partitioned IiL;? vith and without Pu recycle for se.s7cral degrees o f  
parritioni~g eff ic iency.  It should be noted that the t o t a l  ac t - i v i ty  that 
arises f rn these it-astes i s  not s o l e l y  d;?c to direct c-izects $:-9% ri:c 
list& isotopes. R c  solidified Ililv' will contacn o the r  clezi;zn:s vhicfi 
1-3). ...- iij:cr~c: ~ i t b  p:-iczry 2cc.z). zci iyj .ry ;-I.zJi:':~ o:? ,c~ S C C C . :  bl-Y 
radiation, 
For i n s t a ~ c e ,  one o f  thc'most scwere problems for  the shipping 
of alpha-emitters such as  2 4 4 C h  is the production of high eqergy neutrons 
by (alpha,n) reactions. Ihcse rcactions occur uhca the alpha p a r t i c l e s  







































































































































































cwygen or fluorine and release neutrons: for example, t h e  interacticin of 
in alpha with 160 to create "R plus r neutron. nis can markedly increase 
the neutron mission f a  t c  . 239 k~, for instance, nas a spontaneous 
eaissioa rate of about -2 r la-* n/scc per grm, dlercas 2SDpl,~4 has a 
3 1 rate of 4.3 x 10 */see per gram, and 259nd) a r a t :  of 4.5 x 10 n/scc 
Z 
per grim. f<ectrons from jaf ?ha ,n) reactiars i n  Ca in  zhe speiit fuel are 
the prirary soilrec for *ich t h e  casks are netttroti shielded. 
Cmc f us i  02 
'ihe nuizhcrs derived in this ciiaprer are 'ihe bzs ic  tecfixlcal data n.t.cdcd 
coiabine t hcm i ; i ~ h  E.-'tS.I-sui)?licd ii..i-'orcia:. i o ; ~  en s i . 2 ~  i? sf.;ut  3 c 'cc~kiiolopy 
to generate a set of cstiaa2es of mission frcqucncy and packsge character- 
istics. 
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Notes to Chapter 3 
1. As of e a r l y  -1376, c o s t s  as high as $1,135 pe r  kw sere being quoted. 
See for example, "1s hbclear Too Costly?" by R, Stttarr , K-2t.i Yark T h e s ,  
October 5 ,  1975. 
2. I. C, Eupp, J .  C. Derian, 14. P. Donsinoni, and R. T--eitc-f, Treads i n  
Lighr-Kater Reactor C a p i t z l  Costs i n  ' i3e 'jnier,d St,-.rcs; ~a;:scs and Con- 
sequences," Center f o r  Policy A1  t e rna t ives ,  WT, Cambridge, t-lass., 1974. 
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I n t e r i o r  and Instilar A f f s i  rs, Seria l  94-16 Part XI, U .S . Garcnl;?cn?- 
P r i l l t j ~ l g  Off j c c ,  :: 'rt~t:ii?~.~?::, D.C., 1375. 
Breeder Tcst  Rcactor, and considering t h c  long lead times l i k e l y  f o r  
co:nmercial devclopncnt i f  present  t rends  contiriue, we bel ieve  t h a t  it 
is  unl ike ly  t h a t  tirere w i l l  be any s j g n i f i c a n t  i n s t a l l e d  1-:.IFBR capacity 
by t h e  year 2000. The first commercial LMFBR would come on l i n e  no 
earlier than 1985. Given the  t.c3 to twelve year period before 
P C .  
11. 
12. 
wastes from eren th i s  first rcactor would be available, the case 
for space disposal could confortably be reconsidered at the time 
when UfF6.P c @ m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  on an extens ive  scale  looked proftable. 
hbclear - Hews, - - 18, P4, November 1975, at p. 112. 
itltl!:ruzfi G!rlr"-Geileral A t ~ z r t i c  has suggested that ERDX pick up fl:e 
r a r i s f  co~~e-i-cial 1ntemc.t i n  the IiTGR in the next few years. 
T. I'ig:firJ 2; .  Y. ATi;, i!cai t f :  :':;-.-sics 23, GSi (f3?5).  
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Ib id .  
The net nuclear capacity for this scerlario i s  incorrectly stated i n  
Tab1 e 0-2  of Ref. 5 .  The correct figure, as qvoteci i n  this report, is 
derivable fron Fig. B - 4  of  the appendix. 
D:-;,ft Cc.nc=.-ic E r n . i r o n ~ c r ~ ~  :%I Ftzttnent c11 t h e  use of Bljs-d -0.-id= !-11cls 
- -----+- ---- - - 
(GESMO), report t" ttkSIi-132?, U.S. Atomic Energy Cox~iss ion ,  August 1974. 
T;erc is soiiic r?oubt csp:.csscd a s  t o  t':hcthar RiYR rc!rlerration w i l l  r c ~ a i r ?  
!2rge cnougl; t o  essilrl: r h e  2;: t o  1/3 r r t j o ,  ;;s eurrcnt  t r e n 2 s  ate  
favoring WRs. Our modcl implies a market share for BIi'Rs of about 
4 to 5 BWRs per year of the  currcnt 1 .1  t o  1.3 CIT(c) size (that i s ,  
about 1/3 o f  17 Gki(c) per year). This i s  about t h e  minimmi nur;tbcr of 
annual reactor salcs necessary t o  maintain a vendor i n  thc business 
for any length  sf time. We argue that the a l t e r n a t i v e  to  t h i s  levei of 
BER s a l e s  would be the cozplc te  disappearance of General E l e c t r i c ,  t h e  
only prtrtteyor of Bli'ib at  the  moRsnt, from the dr.inestic reactor marker, 
This seems highly  unlikely. We a n t i c i p a t e  t h a t  only two PWR vendors 
will s u n r i ~ c ,  In any case, these assrmaptions do not serioilsf j' a f f e c t  
ccjr ar:alysis r:i:cn corip~rzi? ~ i t h  ot:;cr assmq>tic.;:s we have beer: isrced 
cr ::"S:I l f 3 9 f 7 3 )  (Ref. 4) .  
1 .  See, f'uc eximplei ti?$ discr;rs i~ i l  i i t  Critical >?i!ass 3, #12, f.izrch 1976, 
---- - 
,\tc;izic Sc;cr:ti::-;r; z.5, 6s , (;:<ci:.:.:>.r. , .. , 4 
-. 
I ~ :  '1. 
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Annual Review of Euclear Science, Vol. 24, 1974. 
19. - IXR Spent File1 i3ispositian C~pabili 1-ies 3975-1984, report t ERM-25, 
G.S.  Energy Research and Developnent Adainistrat ion,  1975, 
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f a c t o r ,  and should be mulziplied by t h e  appropriate f a c t o r  for lw~--r' 
C.F. ope ra t i c i~ .  %,is is ::;13~ i n  Ref. 10 to tlic cxtcnt: c? ~:1:til!!>.jzg 
not only e f f l u e n t  and t a s t e  f i p r c s ,  but a l s o  core s i z e  and annual  
re load so a s  t o  maintain annual replacement of 1/3 of t h e  core,  but  
r e t a i n  f u l l  burn a t  lower C.F. This does not  seem t o  agree with 
present  industry p rac t i ce .  We hold t o  t h e  assumption t h a t  r e a c t o r s  
w i l l  continue to  have ares  sized for possible operation at C.F. as 
high as 90 to 100%. This would seem to us t o  be a necessary precondi- 
t ion  for achieving an industry-wide value of 70%. 
21. There is an excellent discussion of this i n  Ref. 6 .  See a1 so, "Reneging 
on Uranium at Vestingbouse,~by Reginald Stuart, New York Times, Feb. 1, 
1976. 
22, The figure of 35 Pfg/Gl;'(sj-yr. is, cf course, no? sensit+:e t o  such 
questions as designed core size or questions of core turnover, nor 
does it depend on insts l fcd capacity for th i s  casc. 1t is a!ao 
possible that fiigher fue l  burns will 5e besigned for aod ac!iie\r& 
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24. According to  a statement of Pir. F .  P .  Baranoxski before the J o i n t  
Cornnittee on Atomic Energy in  Novcr;lbcr, 1975, rh.;rc are about 500,000 
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s i t e  i n  West Valley, Kcii 't'ork. X.rcsc are residues of the Ct3G b!g of 
fucl reprocessed from 1966 to 1972. There is no sol idi f icat ion 
facility estr;nc or plr,:t?:er! a t  t!ie f:FS site, end tiis ~::istS C:<2;l*:~i be 
- - 
slti i>?cd as liqi:ic!s undcr presen"LNi~C rt.51: z t l o n s .  
25. A t  l w c r  fucl turns, l e s s  2351J is consumed, and l e s s  2 3 9 ~ u  i s  produced, 
but thc effects  arc not linear owing to  t h e  increased f i s s i on  of 2 3 9 ~ ~  
as theZ3'lJ is consumed. The optimal rat io  of f i s s i l e  Pu production to 
fissile U s ~ n s w p t i o n  depends cpon the design of the reactor, but 
w i l l  occur at burns considerably lower than those considered 
here. The quastion of the quite 1 ~ i  burns tlscd far  proc1uctj.o~ of 
ueapoas-grade PU has to do the isotofiic coiiiposition, a d  is of 
no dircct relevance t o  this study. 
26,  nroft GZSI!D, Ref. 13. 
27. Ibid,  
28. The ca~centrarion factor for spent fuel alone i s  roughly a fzctjr of 
ti:enty, but tl;el-e is 21% a ~onsiderabl e E ~ S S  of T ~ ~ S O C C S S  i , : ~  f : i ? : ? i f . % l ~  
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f izsion pmducts 5s a sexisus pro51mi that has received l i t ~ i e  attentlm . 
Unless 'fie Zegrcc ef separation is such thzt only a 't-ery tiny z w S & ~  
resizj,g+, par+,it3ming sill not ta&e space dizpasal nore attractive. 
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49. mat is, the sfcwer expansion rate used in  Case C means there vil  l be 
fewer new rcactors t o  fuel each year zhan in GES!-!@. As Pu is derived 
fraa past reactor opzration, this sloecr g m t h  t-zte increases the 
perccatage of Pu availabfe for fuel fabrication cmparcd to annttal total 
&nand s . 
SO. In cosucrsations xi th  representatives of AGS, agency officials, an4 
. ozfier k ~ i ~ l c  ;.=;-sonsl it xas s t ~ t c d  thzt AGS does h n ~ c  25s 
i ~ h e r e n t  ciiy-lcity to re9roccss 1bI31.-: as i:ell as  isotop%:a! l y  enriched 
fuel. Howc~er, sme reluc'iancc to actually reprocess i D X  was indicated. 
It is possible t b t  only one of the proposed reprocessing faci l i t ies  
would be assigned to  handle kKR, which presents additional radiological 
aad safeguarding pr&lests Ze the repmesser. Under these conditions, 
the '*average &xm of nuelear wastes is of rcle~ance only when calculating 
ag-gate p ~ a i e s  ofthe waste. However, ERDX or kXC cmld require 
if each reprocessi9g p l a t  is assigned a distributed share of iiaCfft t o  
- 
51, Even after aie ratio of Rr to U i l z  the Puel cycle reaches quifit;ri:~a, 
the isotopic. c w p s i t i u n  of the Pu arrd other transttranit-s docs not 
Fedtaps t b e  z2st p r s l i r c  - zsp*ct of distussior~ r r ts l rc~~t i~tp  space C i  9psaZ 
ctge;azi~as, b z h  i ;~ pgzzl.'-r k::-Lzinz cia k:;sPe msna;-,cszent a d  ia gczsraf G Y - ~ T -  
v i a s  by idustry =d gav-ent rcprcscntati~es, is tite frcqucat failere 
to  distinguish it sharply a~ugh frcrsr tcrresfriaf methods of kziste atanzgc~senZ. 
As is shok'~ in Fig. 4.1, dr-zailed an33yscs hy EWX 2nd its ccr.tracZars clcarly 
separates rran-tatitm and space disposal frov other methcds.' B;rt their 
distinction is not aadc prirarily on the basis of end result, that is, the 
degree to which the *mites are resowed pernmenf-ly from any possibi l i ty  o:I 
re-cntcrisig the envizonsent . I t  is r ~ ~ 3 c  on the basis of t ! ~ e  prior conditior~s 
that mst be met before transisutation cnJ. spce  dispasxl can be i ~ p l ~ c z t e d .  
Camercializatior: of these procedures would require the  existence of an in-  
dustry or gcrverment capability for the removal of virtually the entire 
inventory of fission products fraa the high-level waste stream, leaving behind 
a product that is very rich in the long-lived actinides. Sithmt such mste 

pmt5tfdag, s v  disposal asad trumtatiitn are held t o  be to 3 expensive 
;bnd difficult to implasent in any fareseeable ti= f-e. 
Terrestrial sth~~es, on the other hand, hwe ia cum03 a great deaf of 
flexibility i n  mteriaf kanrtlisg t zpb i f i t i e s ,  hadeer catfadish ant! cxpeasive 
they ma)- be, =st., if not af 1, of these ~?cth&s m l d  rqt5re only mudcrate 
iecre~eiital ~ d G i z i ~ ~ ? f  isvestzsents t3 adapt to a t ~ i d e  variety C& m s s e - t ,  
densities, a d  c1;zrzstezis~ics QF fiLi:. Eve3 the ~npracersed s p f t f i i - h ~ f  =i@t 
be ezsilr dealt r i th .  This is not true for space disposal.' W h a t  interests 
rts here is tlte qaestisa of ~3ether thcrrc irotcpes :;hose texicieg a d  fir'c- 
tisses ax-e coasidcrd to present a seri-ms cncsigh b a r d  to umant  z ~ c h  
bgi;.-te:bcie2v - a f.:e;;a;i~g iikcit* tc !to =el:! e2cr:;gh sc-par~ted f r ~ a  "r:c 
fzr greater ~~~~ 3f + p : 3 t  fi:ef k=y 2e:iz~z'~iz:! FrsceSses 53 2s to j?resLi'.g, 
3 - 
L*; r .xi, .-a - -- + .- = . -- .r:>tt ~ C C ' - C I O ~  C Z ~ ~ .  ---= C * :  ili "'.?;'.F+"; *:'-- a tr-ytl ;;zss ': - - -  is .;.;r;it-. - ?  - - 
Eitbcut gcici; too deep: j- i.nto the precise teshaical detcils, ~ h i c f i  ~ i l l  
be discussed else-%ere in this rcpr?, we assert that the net sass of very 
lortg-tive4 trznsirranics is s ~ a l  f enwlgb ovcr the 1975-2300 ti= period 
ctxtsidercd that present a d  projected launch vehicles are capable of 
r e m i n g  thm pt~~anentfy frm tl~s planet.. Tfrcrc still r-in tm iaprtant  
conditions char cast  be s t i s f i e d  before space disposal caa bc considered a 
viable option. ?here %sf bz rufficlent separation of the f i s s ion  prodzcts 
artd ozfrer natcrials i rm t h e  trazs?ir-znics so that  f t ? t  n.l-SS, tf~ernsl Ft i txr t  
and 2-ztivitj- of the rtstilrz;:~ pack-;aze r w a i n s  tiitftin tflc scope of ~ossibis 
launch capacity: the various szprarion proccsscs mst be efficient enough 
to  guarmte; that all bttt a very small remnant of the transuranics actually 
end up in the final. disposal package. If the first condition is  not met, 
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tht? program is not possible; i f  the second conditim is lzat m e t ,  the program 
A mrtin- recfui-faaent for simltancj?ts f i*l f i f lolent of these trso 
editions is the existence of a fuel reprmessing industry capable o f  
expanding rapidly enough to deal with all of the eoetnrereially p d u t e d  
spent fizel. f x  xmxlf: izak-2 little sensc to initiate spate dispsa!, operatims 
t o  ftazftlt ?5e ou',ptt o f  r? reprozessifig capacity projcczed t o  be inrdeyxite 
to reduce the nation-wide spent f u e l  inverttories i f  these spent fuels are 
to be stored ir: retrievabf e cr 'ieqarsry starzgt: fzcil if5cs. Nigh-l we? 
wastes are separated, not created during reprocessing. The ha=rdws 
isczopes sre .no less Laagcrous diltited in t::e spr.rrt fuc: . 
trez;l= P i  separzted ire:: the sisezt: f-'t:cf duxing regroccssi:;g tts ca;t.dit:ii;e 
wastes for u l t h a t e  d i s p s a l .  But presently ccnsidcred Htt f  disposal ~etftods 
arc  not tteifig shaped entirely by cc;~ccm over the Pu reanznt i n  the IiLt;'. 
Assming suf f i c i ent  reprccessing capacity to deal w i t 5  a l l  spent fuel, 
about 988 of the Pu produced i n  comercia1 nuclear power reactors w i l l  
either be stored ir. fpresmiabf 1. fcdcrz?) Pu rcpcts i~ories  or rcc>-cl cd back 
into the paa'er s y s t a  as ;ZIX-Lk'R or t 3 F D R  f ~ e l .  Of the  rmaining 2% or 
so, only one-focrth will bc Six  thc t ILX.  
The questi.on of  uhzc hzppeits zo thc rcnriinii.tg 1 112 B of tf.c Pu is s 
c r i t i c a l  one for establishing the "sensibility" of space disposal ,  eve3 i f  
concern about PU is not the determining factor i n  se lect ing an ult imate 
3 disposal system. By one widely accepted set of estimates, the d i s t r ibut ion  
of Pu losses in  the CESbD f u e l  cycle would be a s  fal lows:  0.5% would go to 
t g  stated, but another 0.59 would be lost to low and ister- 
cediate-level wastes at the reprocessing plant, Additional losses of 0.5% 
t o  t~anutranic-col;i',mi~ated vastes  ill ciectilr b-th ZZ the ~ t i x e d - O X ~ ~ C  
emversion plant and at tfre fuel fabrication faciiity, Fur a l l  except the 
H I S ,  the Pu w i l l  be rixed in  with large quantities of other material. 
These Pu-cct;;ta~inated wastes x ~ u f d ,  therefore, noz be candidates fsr otfief 
than terrestrial disposal. Xe anticipate that t h i s  Loss prsble;a voitld be 
s;ngirefy confined to h, and take for gran~ed the ststsTcnts that "all" 05 
4 tfic otfler tya;lsupanics s c a l d  5e (:x'irsi~ft-~i zs IfU.;', ~ i i t h  t10 10:s to ~ i h ~ r  t ; & 5 t ; ~ S .  
It wwld E e  I T P ~ S ~  com.cnicrtt i f  t~e  cmzld esta3f ish a f i xed  bench-rriatk 
for the *.;;clear i:isas;ry Z. Lo 5;::cifj- tho f<:v;:? of t z f i ~ i ~ : i ~ ~  i n  kfqiirt;: ~tr-:~ck 
. - .  .- - . . 
of r; 2; \:; ; c% 5;-:: zLLk; &sj32i3;;j 55 g-~::--.;.-%*% . .'~ ---. .* *= c 5 * s  3 . - L C - .  < - - . - y 2 ; - = 3  %.-:':. 3 e:3r cxi.C.cric3. 
.. . 
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relnrive %eights assignqrl t o  ~ h o r " i - t ? ~ n  versus lortg-tern concerns. Tie 
as yct unresolved question of the relati-~e hazard of inhaled alpha-esitters 
versus biologically mobile Fission proOucts of so hecozes a factor. k'e m y  
at least begin t o  exainc this problau by treating three separate possibi l i t ies  
for the nuclear fuel cycle: a m+&row-at%-ayli cycle i t 1  which a l l  spent fuel is 
treated as k-aste; a wstox-a~:z3-w cycle in r&ich Pa i.'; kept availz3lc for 
possible reuse at a farer tine; and a c~mplcre recycle ecr;nmy 9 la GES:-$3 5 
Thc sthrci~-zb:.-iyFf cycle prescnts t:ia inpctr'ianf czses . I t  is pussibf c 
that spcnt fuel will never be reprocessed. In t h i s  case, it is unlikely that  
space disposal will prove to be' possible a t  a l l  unless the size cf the nuclear 
paw- industry is very small or XASA develops an extremely heavy-lift vehicle. 
There is also a smll, but f in i t e ,  possibility that reprocessing would be 
proiaotcd pristarilg for the purpose of faci l i tat ing waste ranagaent. Izt 
$his u s e ,  a l l  Pu rould foilow the HLW.~ There wwld still be  recycle of 
U, loser ing  the  d m n d  for aining and em-ichncnt services s l i g h t l y ,  particu- 
larly if the nuclear idustry continues the  present relaiiveiy POSF fuel  
burns. :. present low c k p c i t y  factors, considerably rgre 235tJ .mains i n  
the spent fuel  than in  our analysis of Case c . ~  As no attempr muld  be 
as the  other trznsxra~ics, =Z there ~ o u l d  be l i t r l e  Fu l e f t  e a t s i d e  
the WLg strears. Tiz ktrsx process for  extracting U f r o z  spent f u e l ,  as 
of srrch high purity that zilere is tto cotlccrn over fractional losses of 
t~; ;~sr.ra;t i~s :o tl:e f f - q c f  22 1:. >-?;hpLTgil ..-;>:2.-;..cc d j ? ~ e ~ : %  j nn";-:-.: ~>:t:;+ibf 2 
for t h i c  c-~P, i: k;~;if,-i ~ . ~ z t : ~ i r : l > -  1Jc ~ ~ z ~ i t i : : c  fro;: ti;: ;:sj~t t.f \.ic:;' Q$ 
- - - .  . + -  . . 8 
3-.. -. r-. ;;, z.ii,. . *-. ! .: $ 5  5 : : - 3  : * . . & -  . 
The '*stou-a~ay= cycle prcd j cares die existence of reprocessir~g capscity 
adequate for the separation of al! of the  Pu i n  the spcnt f u e l .  Again, there 
are two primary czses cf interest for w s t e  nzrzgmsnt. In thc f i r s t ,  the 
hr is separated and stored, but the I~LP: are not further processed before 
disposal. In terns of poss ib i l i ty  of the HLW, tliis case is very nuch like 
the second case disc1.s: cd for the  q'ti~row-ah-ay" cycle. Table 11-3 sllows that 
almost all of the Pu actirity at' short tiaes is fzw;n beta-csit:ir:g 
2.: 1 - 3 
2% r r i ~ t i  a 1 3 . 2 - ~ Z P  hnl: ligc. T h i s  r t : ~  bc trcaicJ a s  if i t  i:cic 2- 
f i s s ion  product for crrr ;..;rposcs. Tl~ercforc, the  remcval of Pu frua H1.E 
that already contains large quantities of f i s s i on  products makes very l i t t l e  
difference for wastc management ss far  as total mass and a c t i v i t y  arc con- 
cerned. 
However, if we stipulate an 0.54. lass of ht t o  ather than Htla: a t  tire 
reprocessing pf ant, an appctiable fraction of the origiwl al@a akt5vity 
sill retrtain in lctwer level wastes, For the fract io~lesz  l o  the lei+ levef 
wastes, the alpha activity over tilne will decrease sirsfily - according to *e 
hali-lives of the varims isoropes of Pu. The alpha activity in the HW 
years or so--tfte actp,iity of $3 z~;d G s  da3i:wzcs. Hn::e;.cr, as these decay 
10 am). the decay pro3tzc: s are us.rlally ~!pItzi &~it%.ers  a s  VCI 1. A t  very tong 
times, the MLK rtctivicy is_dc~*:k.; t irc  ' ~y t h e  Ptl lircLuct.6 fty &c?y rf Cq, a ~ d  
h, Ifetsils vary a c c ~ ~ d i n g  re tlcc t p e  cif fue l ,  a d  w i l l  be discussed as 
the). bccnac. rc-2-j-\ranli. For ",kc al'-!! i.':;i: rye]-=: being px;dqincd kt;<;, tifte 
rcst;lt 2s ti?.st the ej-,':? ,~+~cPci;.t- %-?;zc EQ t!:~ Tf .59j 05 t F t ~  f)g 1,?3t re;;-,ai;ls ir? I -=-. 
1 ;:;: ]ei:21 c:zst-.: k:iij. i;?. rci:;$l)- +!>.. i. ' Gjh ~ 1 ; ~  i . 0 ~ ~  z$il:i ; : < m ~ ~ - ; ~ ~ * . -  . - i' 
of the liEi ar 10 years after relzrocesslng, about 5% at 1000 years, altd k : i f l  
continue to increase to about 259 of the activity in the HLK at 10.000 ycars 
11 
cx more. This  poscs a scrims westion as t o  t h e  efficacy of space 
disposal for this case. The purpose of space lisposal is to markedly 
reduce the inventory of alplia-mitt itag isotopes at  very long ti:::cs. But 
the Pu Iost to other-than-HLK t i i l l  be dis~osed of tc~rcsrrially.  Uclcss 
such losses can be rcduccd, it is not clear t h a t  sllacc disposal of t h c  
The second case for the wstow-awayft cycle is t h ~  possible separation 
of thc shorter-1 ived fission products frm the longer l ived transuranics 
and "TC by partitioning. This m u d  reduces the mass and act iv i ty  of that 
portion of the ItLW that contains tfrc transuranics, and makes them more 
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mentbfe to space dispsttf .  We shall drisfuss in Chapter 5 the 
v a r i ~ s  degrees of efficacy in rmrttting fissian yraducts and the affect 
t h i s  has QE space dikposal operatims.12 For the present. lei us merely 
suggest that about anorder of ~ g n i t u d e  reduction in necessary thra * 
OLuvic~~sly, this markedly increases the pssibfl-itjt sf space dis~usA 
~ O P  rhe czse uadcr cons5deracion. Eut the effect-sf  Pu losses "t oear than 
Hig; ergues wen suz-e strongly against sas ih i l$ey .  To see this, fee us 
. - 
greater thzn 10,000 year tiae scrrfes. €&er t h e  first thousand years, the 
atstluicy of the lar~g- l ivtd  traqsrtrznics r5f be less i h ~ n  the het-e-sct iv i ty  
24 1 
of Pu, 2nd far less tkar: thz ac t i s i ty  of t h e  Tiszitin prCr;!t;zes. fn  Eer;:s 
years or sz by pzrtitio3ing and disposing of the 3ong-lived f r a t t i m .  As 
with the previous case, the alplta-activity o f  the 0.5% Pu loss w i l l  be small 
compared to  that in the HL?:, r i s i n g  to  about 5% at 1000 years. But space 
disposal is nat generally held t o  address waste managc;scne over t h i s  t i m e  
scale ,  even i f  concern ovci transuranics dozinates.  Over the far longer 
time scale of PLI decay, an zpprcrriable f r z c t i o n  of t:iz t o t a l  aly.!tr: 2cTiv i ty  
u i l l  r a a i n  on e a r t h  i n  low le-el wastes. By our prcv io~s  cclcu!ati on, o i i l ~  
;1[5 of t?ic fons-fil:cd zlph::-o:it;ti~g ?raits!:r.anics uill b e  st*:aif:!?!c ttt h e  
d i s p s s c d  of by t?:c co::5i~atior! rf psrti t icr , i i tz a!;& sy:?cc cfisp..>szf. 
A s  t h i s  second case for the "stow-auay" cycle i s  the  f i r s t  relati .vely 
possible one discussed, it i s  worth pausing to  cstimatc the level  of Pu 
rnanagnent that would increase its s e n s i b i l i t y .  Properly, an absolutc 
criterion for tlac total inventory o f  long-lived alpha mirters should be 
I 
est-iibli W, B e p a d a t  m rhs tyire of wastes in ~%Lleh  he^ glre cipaedn& 
.od thc r e i d  of disposal of %hose vrstrr. If sueh s rider (or set 4 
~tlf~bers) could be dexpised, ooze scctzrate c s t 5 ~ ~ t e s  sf the requir* aecmat%%%g 
of Pu i n  l o w  level m s t e s  could be c&stru+ral. Even to attempt such~an 
. . 
estimate is be).ond the  -5 ef +his studi .  
k%zt xe can suggest is ne&sary (but not ncccssarity sttfficient] 
~ri€eri  c:.:.l ?>ascd selely en t h e  perccntzgc of the lorrs-l ivcd alpha cmitt &rs thkt  
be rezm~ed f ~ o r a  %he plaaet br the ca3bimtiw of partit;iuzLsg and spcs 
dSspra3.. T t w x i t d  be rekarkable if t h e  total alpha curies to bz y-dace-;? 
by the nsclear i~dustr)r wulri be  jusc exactly -at the revel dlere z5e rme~al 
of 809 of the activity soulct Iuser the r i s k  to acceptable t eve f s ,  Garriag 
- - rci*iicc ' ;-.; fo:lE-lii-cd alcita 3ycntC.f;- 
- - %A*., by ~1.c a ~ 3 : ; - ~  <.: ;;:a<<T?i c1 z;!Cr:. 
For the  case under ~ c n s i d ~ r a t i t t n ,  \i.e m t e  t!.at the effect of the decay 
of Cm and AAt i n  the HLW a t  long tiaes i s  to increase the inventory of Pu by 
roughly a factor of four eyer that portion attributable t o  the original 
fzaction of Pu at I f  99% of the alpha a c t i v i t y  at tines 
longer than a few thousand years is to go off  with thc fiLn', t h i r  i: p s e s  
a co~ditii in that; ody abo;lt L12S of the a;;lor;nt of Pt! i n  the tiIX ax the time 
6f rep;-occssi:rg be  last to other tastes,  ccrres~ond i~~g  to  abou"r.023 of the 
-
total a::o:l!lt cf Pa in the spent f u c l .  i 4 
Industry soilrces have suggested that  the loss of Pu t o  other than I!LR 
is in fact avoidable. At~tcknated machinery to detect segments of sheared 
fuel rod that are  sealed off into their insoluable cladding would help, and 
t 
does not appear to present insurraountablc technical d i f f i c u l r i c s .  Careful 
attention te the cleaning and design of ski ~a5-t  that tmes %ate -ttstlt 
- 
- 
with Pu atfght prey=* ether f rtsse:, f t  is m.t etwr whether these fixes 
wifL be akferdatfe er pussibfe a2 the requffecf level, ht there is a clear 
need for z&ie reduction in the &&&a% l& of hr at the reprocessing. . 
~ 
plant in  any case. Otherwise. it would hardly sees rorthvhile t P ; q ~ d ; ~ ~ ; ~ .  . . .~ 
.. . 
:. 




eawaous sms of mney and talent to b ~ i s a  my irrevcrsibEo ~e&Qc-i Em 
dispocal of fiLF;', k&ekher the requ5red reduction :ran: 0,s; to  0.0% that 
we have s e ~  a p  as a trite,-ion can f>e accoiaglishe3 is a mre difficit lr  
question to ansxer. 
?he third major scr;~firio we ~:taXf consider is the G E 3 Q  i-Zr recycle 
tasc, AS iz; tliz GZ%t'r'], 33"; of t h e  fuel in this cj'cf e is crrdiwqE istup5caf fy  
. ~
enr5c:tcd U ,  &$if c Z ! ?  j s '13X made cp of Pu ar:d natural ti cs.irtes. 73e litass 
2;s toezi sc-l;i:*itr of j - 1 : ~  ~ i ~ t  p ~ t t ! ~  ~ ! ; z ~ . ~ ~ i f .  - AS ii.;~.: clls2;~i i n  Table 3 , & ,  
the uveraf l inventory of alpha-esitting transuranics, uill be considerably I  - 
5 
z - 
= ~ increascd owing tr  ?he very high transuranic content of equilibrium hl€l]i Spat fuel .  l l  
5 .  
z - 
t~ 
- For times on the order of a I1undrt.d years or less, the  alpha activity w & l l  
f -  
be dminatcd by 244Csn, which is increased by a fscrcr bf sevel i n  the average 
' I  
waste nix over the inventory for an equivalent ai l -U fuel cycle. A t  longer ! I 
' t h e s ,  t h i s  clrops to roltgl~ly a factor of  four, priittarily front decay prodt:ct 1 = 
Pu . 
The ilzitial invc;;.,rurjis of pu 531 Z!;C ziyeriI;e mix I!!..i;' xi1 f z;ct iiicreazc 
240 greatly. *"PU will be up by about 10% and PU by about 1/3. ).!ore inportnriily. 
the act of recycling the Pu will entail greater losses to other than high level 
wastes. If we take present estimates as reliable, then i n  addition to the 0.5% 
l o s s  a t  the reprocessing plant, at~athcr O . S % w i l l  be lost a t  both the oxide- 
conversion facility and a t  the fuel fabricatiott plant. Thus 1 .S% n f  tire Eu i n  
spent fuel will be lmt to low and lr~terllicdiate lwef wastes as cmpared t o  
the 0 .~"eh& Qollows the 1tf.K. The absolute act iyity  ef this *tto5tM Pu nf 11 
be &@at four times &at it would be for an '211-u fubl cycle. 
15 
P ~ a d ~ x ~ ~ ~ l y ,  eltbtttliffi the absolute loss of Pu w i l l  increase, the relative 
sfficacy of space disposal for zaoval  of long-lived alpha activity w i l l  rewain 
~Gmst. ~. untlPtange frotil efie px*e-vi ,wsl y cons5dered "sf ow-awayw eylce, This. 
is becausc $he such Iat'gcr k and Cm ir~~catories i n  the KOii spent fuet 
mrkcdly irtcreased the quastities of decay-produci: Pu produced in fie 
average wEsfe n ix .  very 32ng t incs ,  only abwL*- om-fiftccrtrl: of the 
3 
L39~u and 2 4 0 ~ u  i n  tlre H!.K v i  11 be undecayed rcnnanis of the original Pu 
iwcntory at rclirocessin2.16 Tlza eA. c--fillei: .. pzrl  o,C ~ i i e  Pu pve.-r?t ( a ~ d  these 
isotopes dosin:+ tc the 1 .I ?-.ten:! 3 ljihz :ictivS.~y] eili 1 2 9  ir'r~s: c t - - - - t v  -  =-* af 
2 3 4 .  323,  C: , :,goki-j?,. = =c* 1:;. f jie dif:it-.l.i'-' df-c;2)r : i;.:r;s hlis let2! ;i~tj,-;: r ;i ~5 - .  
of the tuo isotopes of Pu, %:e may cstinatc that  the  total  alpha-activiey 
i n  HLl? from zn "average nixH of wastes in  the GESBiO equilibrium FfOX recycle 
casc will increase by rcn~ghly a factor of four over the all-U case. 17 
Therefore, the - ratio of Pu i n  the lILii' t o  Pu remaining i n  lower level waste 
streams is, at long times, about t h e  sane as For t h e  -wstotd-zwayi' cycle cven 
tftouglt the amount of Fu lost in t h i s  way is incrcascd by a factox of foil?. 
The arguments made for the prcviotls casc can thcrt bc sizspl;. extetldcct 
tc.tl;t. PU rccy..le case, ~ i c i P ,  %he c a v c ~ t  r l t n i  t hc  j;.icr:jst:,! \ p a n t i t y  of ru i n  
o"ihcr than tiLhr ray placc an evcn f t ighcr  f-.crfon.rtrtce crjteri.on of 191 accou:~titt;? 
when absolute activity standards' are established. On the previous assumption 
that the minimum condition for space disposal to make sense is that it reducs 
the mount of Pu (at long times) by two orders of magnitude, the requiresent 
ROW bec~tnes that losses of Pu to lower levcf wastes b e  held to 0.02% at 
each of the thres steps--reprocessing, oxide prodiiction, and fabrication-- 
-
or to 0.06% rota1 for al l  processes. 18 
The iaplications of these scenarios for space disposal can perhaps be 
seen more clearly if we reorganire them in terns of the handling given t o  
the ELk hefore d ~ ~ l i - ~ e r y .  The tltrec px.siGlc ctlses fur flu4 hand1i:lg are 
the disposal of; undiffercntiatcct sjicilt ft:cf ( i + ! i i ~ i i  is not rczf?y !;Lii' in 
Space d i s p s a i  of undif fa.cztiatect syei:r. fucl. t;o~t:d be possi'iile only vn:icr 
effec tivc iri removing them parEianzrrtly froin the  e n v i r o ~ ~ e n i  . 
Space disposal of IfLlv from reprocessilig \;.auld be achievable i f  o~: ly  a f r a c t i o n  
of the spent fuel were seyrocccscd to extract Pu--fox- i:lstance t o  gencrrrtc 
fuel for an experimntal b~eerler reactor program. Ilo~~~cver, +-I great dea l  more 
IJu rcould remain in rhc unprirccssed sj>etlt f u e l  thzln would ap;>ear i n  t i ~ c  lit!". 
Tile 5% o f  fllc spent fuel  that rannins would conl2in ter, t incs thc ax:otlni of 
Pu that \itould follot;. the fjLtC. Eve11 if Pa rime not r?rtr?ct.cci, <?ti3 of tile 
Spent f t i ~ l  t:r)uid h a  s.2 r c p ~ ; ~ ~ ~ d  to ;it!:ik>;-i: t]-Ll cl*:Cjl ii! ~ ~ - , ; i : ;  ' Li.,:f , 
Pu invcnror)~. Tnercforc, rcproccssinp, of - z1 1 spcrlt fue l  is a mj.:lin:~l;;! 
precondition for the use of - any expensive, high-technology waste 'isposal 
procedure t o  be sensible. 
if h is not extrixted in repl-ocessi..g, trut follws the HW, no further 
conditions need be aet. When Pu is ex~racted, k-hetfier to  be stored fcr future 
use or fa iwmdiatt applicstion, za additiozml se3sibility criterion is 
iqmsed by the lasscs t t f - h  fO utbei: than high level wastes at various stages, 
I f  oru r e i n i ~ ? ~ ~  mrd i r io~  for rhe 2331 isatioif 0,' -xpensive, high-techrrolo~v 
Gr?e  dispas-:l is z c c e ~ r e d - - t b t  is, 2 rt.r:a-t iar. 5 2  h i  I;?~z-storiet; in  ;of a l  
waqtes by ts;r, orders ~5 - pitz&--ri;-z p:-f-se:it ert3hrt::s t>f 99,5* ecf ir.icr.ty 
in retaininz fa  &rhg prr;<css f;;zn9! t:~uld h~*:c to be i ! Z p Y &  to 49,935 
G s  - - - ,&c 3 r-.hl -! e . 3  i:? . - -9G-i- ~~t~2.1 :  f:f;h it, 
&+sswing thr; ?~ztiti~niz~ -- CE fiLV tz~iilb result i n  no addit iaaal  
'"% o< fi; C'-- o'.'--.'' ' f  ..L7 L-.* A, .~-- a -.. ,_ ,i, .:~--ti,ci=.e $:;=~f_i:~ +,Q ~xf;cr ti;zn f&c gonceat1-ate3 
* * 2- .,. ;. . .-- .,' - , ,..*-- . -. .;, -r . --.. .*-; >-. -:= s> &I. . , -  --=*C:S ~~ ---~--~~-~:-a~j:- , , , ,,- .,. ;, ,:, ~ 2 ~ s j f . i  ! $tt; cr'+ ter.io2 gp;cn 2b~-~?t: 2- i~  
. t -.- s r l :  ;i . ' . .<-y<~. C Z C S  <-&=, - L; y ;-z;;:-L-z zz:-cs ;--:/j z=;:>-: z - -  1~: *: c;;;:: -<-:: - <>< <:,= . 2 -%-=r~ 
.- f --i.,S.. .= -~,**- 
fisrcri fraction ~ m i d  rake spzce C i r~osa !  operzzions prae;ics'ufc a*er a PGZ% 
widcr rznge of instalfed wclear capacity, 
The case discussed i n  rzost pre~zions s';vdZes of spstc disposal is that 
of partitiosrcd tiit;'. Tnis sztisfics zhe pri~riry cons'lierztions of technical  
pss ibi l i tg .  From the dirrussion a!~ove, it may be seen that technical 
criteria aiom arc necessary, bur fiat s i f f ic icnt ,  for Geteminins thc b c s i ~ -  
ability of spice disposal opcrztions. The p s s i b i f  i t y  of achic~ing  rtrpiired 
I<:;-cis cf i12).5~r::z22c:: i;: r t f ? ~ ~ f f . - + 5 i 1 3 ~ ,  k i * ~  ~ ; r l z j l t j ~ i s  P 3 LI:.-j ~ ~ ~ t l ; ~ - ~ * ; ~ ~  - s . - . ~  .+ - . . c C  ,--+ .-t .&A 
bc: dctcrziricd bGo:e probzhilit2 t i l z t  a;i~ f?. jch-ti?::' 0 :*?logy exogic xcthc2 
of nuc. car waste wznagwent w i l l  be usable a d  cffccti*.:. can be estinatcd. 
Gi .n the present state of Knariedge concerzing tkc pi -:sses in~*oltrcd, an 
accurate dctcminztion is not possible, te'e can only r generic csriraates 
based on cxtrapIstions of present practices snd predictions by ethers as to 
achiev3ble fci-els of perforwince in the next few decades. 
P,r the ;?resent rise, i:bcre is no corxercia? rrpreccssing ca~acity 
operating in the United States, The only optration31 reprocessing plant, 
;:'S i : a  rr..t Yzlfey, Kcu York is shut dnhn at the present, ostensibly t o  
rr:;*x;:& < z cz'.;.?:<-~i. ar;rf \~t;css;.Jt i'q32,p2.=.iit. 39 
- Accc?r&ng to zhq cp"rators, 
ca;:z,i';y of !iFS is b e 5 : ~  .i-:x-as& to ascat 753 l-:g of spent 1 scr 
- ~ 
r Officiirl accnunts, h ~ ~ - : e ~ r r ,  play dmm t h e  technical ai-3 $~-3Iitic21 r 
fastgrs t,i;zt r-s;ljtzi i n  :it: ~ ! : 7 s i ~ g  9; pfz:l<. ~ e ~ ~ : i ~ e  Eg$:t; cstjnzrs=< -- >
i i i  GLSZF3 an2 otJicr d ~ t i a m t s ,  that EFS wu-uld resuzc oPxaticns smetiwe in 
.- , . ..-'C. . - - .. - 
.--:.,:. 5: ..:.s :-i:::-.- ..: . . . . . -. .- :.;> 2. . j  1 ;-- . .'.... - e  a .  . . - .II - - . -  , . :-: ' r-:: -.< 3 h-; Cc::...:z- . 
- , I If  itrsis k2.s beer1 ~5 rtmf jj. ~52;liiirseri. Ibis p:sil: F Z S  ElcctrSc i n  $:grr.'is 
designed - find an waq:taflors* process that had ~arkcr !  diffcrcnccz fro2 t h e  
scale, and GE experienced great difficulties in process operation and 
plant dcsig11 t ine  Fcrc ishercnz in the  cor;str!~ction of the  process stages 
a t  H F E L  Pa very liirge investneat t;ortld hc  re%!zircd t o  mo3ify the pf ant so 
as t o  o:>tai;l successftil opcrr:tion, ar;d the capbination of eias and money 
f C q g i i - f ; G  zi.< thzt CE --: ,. L1 1 s;l;::rc.;::f!;t ?Sziizr,:1 !-IrEP ra2':t.r "clan :ryi r : ~  
?l t o  modify or correct it. 
In our view, then, the oilly coiilnitted reprocessing fac i l i ty  i n  the 
United States at this time is the AGKS plant i n  Barnwell, South Carolinn. 
This plant i s  also beset by a zlumbcr of isstics that must be resolved before 
22 koares ful ly  operational. The p m f i t a b i l i t y  of A N  has been called 
into question by a n y  sources. The NRC will not make its decision on the 
condit,iens under uf;ich Pu recycle +:ill- he  alla:cd unril  '1917, 2nd the AE;:i3 
operators are reluctant zo open the plznt until Pu recycle is allwed. 
Solidifed uaste f z c i l i t i e s  h a e  not eve2 hzcn designed at t h i s  tine, and the 
a e t h d  used for s~ i ld l f icat iozt  t..zs r.r.: yt.",becli agrc.-:< T ~ e r f  5s $c2,2 
~uestio:? as tC whe"i!i<;r AG:iS *:ill 5c nflc5~.:cd to s';c:=-;-t ~ j p  b e f ~ ; ~ - ~  ',lie 3;aszc 
ssl idif~ca;ic?i i  issue is setsted, As &i?t;;s 2x2 +f.e:;1j-s s.r?:=ii;iy, t-;-ir-re h z f  
Exxon plant. It is krerj. douStfcl rbat Eaxcln ;;a?2Id initiate cctnstrdctica 
on t h i s  plant u n t i l  ssae of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  x i t h  AGSS are c l e w e d  up. I t  
is cc-rtain that or.1). successf~f. 2nd profitr:3lc o p r r z t i r ~ ~  of AGXS \i.oi:ld j::Gocrt 
other private conpanies to consider t h e  construction of tile addit io i~al  re- 
processing c a p c j t y  that m : f d  >e requircd t o  close the  hack end of the 
nuelcar fuel  c).cic and rc&ce iittrenrorics af spct:tt ftzcl. 
Fra? the pojii-of of t h i s  study,  t ;owr~cp,  the decisions that ~ioufd 
ci..a:,]c the corplete f'tl;;DC25:;j.;:in G$ 2: 1 .c.Tc~;: f~:-:. t j :z:  is 3 --,. l._~t:.: ,- -,-.-.., 2; y i  :..> . zPl- t. 
the usc of c-xpt..tsive, high-:c-zhrtofogy t a s t e  disps.;zi ~;teriiti~t:.:s "c be ;i 
sensible method for Hut are indipendent of whether or not space disposzl i s  
considered to be the most d c s i r a b ? ~  method. Other considerations are  far 
more iaportant. The d e t a i l s  of waste managtmnt a t  thcse plants, ha~evcr ,  
c2 raot be idependently detemined by other cmsidcaations withcut serious1 y 
interfering with any supposedly independent derision on tit# disposal. 
Partitioning is still, at  is t i G e ,  a hypathetical process ex-en or, 
an experlsiental scale. There have been ss~erzf studies that ha\-c e x s ~ i n e d  
the technical ftssibiiity of repmessing cprntionsD2' and they have 
geologic dispsal  is k j d  te be  zdeqsate, 
i n  t h e  future, it  is very i 1 r o 5 a b l e  that ~ ? ? c  orhcr prccozditlons for space 
d i s p s a l  oprrztioils u i f l  be aP,et zither, Thcre is no profit to be had frox 
:caste satlagciasat, and thercfo;, no i3ce i l t ivc  r,o do orf;cr tharl ~:cc-f ncces;:ii-y 
regulatory rquircntrrts. Although i r  m y  bc psesilzpttzoiis for us to zsstlzc 
s o l i d i f y  the HU't in to  a g lass ,  e i t h e r  by the French process or by comparable 
U.S . processes. This rould preclude any possibi 1 i t y  of subsequent rcdis:olving 
and partitioning, but, as vc have pointed our, there is no reason to p r t i t i o n  
unless a decision t o  dispose of HW by a method requiring partitiming has 
already been chosen. The additional requirement that Pu be kept out of the 
loucr level vaste streazs t o  an accuracy o f  0.025 or better uould trtiail 
consiiferabf e additiofial p g i n c e r - i z ~  atld cos ts .  O i i l y  zt pzior decisi o;i €2 
restrict transuranic d i s p s a l  to a ccthcd (sttch a s  spacc d isposa l  Etr transautation) 
Elsat i-ezwcs i t  fro3 2:ty cf:;litt-e of et't71- re-enrex-ing the e;;uiri?n!.:ent 
~9::13 ,=ye:. to i i !~fat$r>a @ f  s2t-h ?i.-- ac.;lg~fi"~tabi ;.i ftir i ' t?  
- 
losses. 
J t  j_r, ~Ir,~refsre,  ~ 2 :  co;-rpcp, ;@ =-.---cl*.p ... L. A ti;.;;it:- ij:.: v-r.IJ7F * ~ I l i r i ? ~  ' Z L - 2  
- * tk:.e necesst-iz-j* pre~c;&2rl~~r.ns :;.Ill s:cr a::d f r : ;~  ti2esc Try to proj,jcct rfie 
mini- requireaents v i f l  be espcillcd. This t i i f l  effectively foreclosc 
a ntmbzr of %ations for t f ic l  nanagcrrent of nuclcnr &:as tcs that  might !,e t x s t  
I f  a high-technology oprion such as spacc disposal i s  to  bc  selected, 
-- ------- 
a p p ! i c ~ b i l i r ; y  ~ r i d  e f f i cacy  of the c h o s e ~  r-.cri!~d m:st also he  altcrc.2 t o  
-. ---- ----- 
disposa 1 a s  a des irable  fircthod wonld entai l the construction of the  necessary 
reprocessing plant to separate HUJ from otilcr coapaents of the spent fuel 
even i f  recycle of tllc U was ecottomically unprofitable. 
For the pertraps =ore l i ke ly  case of an extensive IIlR econany with Pu 
recycle, a decision to  dispose of the long-lived transuranics by space 
operations would require the  fulf i l lment  of t he  previmsly mentioned con- 
d i t i ons  of complete reprocessing, high PLI sccountabil i t y ,  and par t i t ion ing  
of a l l  Hut. A l l  of these s teps  should properly be considered t o  be part of 
t h e  waste disposal ojlcraticn. Jwt as t14e GES:biil t akes  i n to  account a l l  
portiens of the  nuclear fuel cycle f o r  canputin.; the  valuc and cf ficacy 
of recycling Pu, a proper s t a t a c n t  of thc possj .b i l i t ies  for nuclear 
waste m.;i;age;ncnt. cust ii?cluclr? a l l  otl:cs operctlo;ls t h a t  siight lzave t o  bc? 
performed at other steps i n  t h e  cycle t o  ensure the  valuc and efficacy 
of tile ~cthccl under ccii... i2erzt . 
The cy~es:-?on+, thrr:, zrc t:lcsz: ?:frat is rile ps:ci:nbility ':t.2; tine ~ e t  
cc ~. .>~- , .~ lg : : : :  > -  - a tl;?;. \,p::lc: :. <, LO 1.:. j ,  ,.'.-% 7.a <ri?: 1 l :2 tc~ c~t-t-..; di  .;PC: 4 <,-;?.:-.. 
- r '  
a t ions  would ir, fact iikcme properly l i nked  ;in;, i f  so, ha: probable is 
it tha t  the  consequent decision would favor space operations? A t  t he  m e r i t ,  
the  probability t h a t  eitlrer one of these questions would be answered 
affirmatively appears to  be very small indeed. This docs not necessari ly 
imply tha t  no furti.er at tent ion should be paid to consideration of space 
disposal. Concern over the Jispcsitioil of iILK is r i s i ng  markedly as  i w c n -  
t o r i e s  and projections increase and pub l i c  concerns become more c l *  lr ly 
articul-red. Over the nr? .u t  feu yc-f:-s, it is p s s i h l  c t h a t ,  c;n grounck 0 t h ~ : -  
t k a n  cos t - eZf~c t ive i i c s s  o r  m ; i s i i ; t & ~  sjnyrlicity, t l ~ ?  space disposal option 
and other hi gil-technology mcthods w i l l  be  looked a t  far  more closely,  with 
an eye t o  al ter 'ng the operation of other par t s  o f  the  fuel  cycle t o  
f a c i l i t a t e  such operations. The great  danger is tha t  the  linkagcs between 
the  several opera%ions w i l l  not be acknowledged soon enough t o  prevent an 
irxwe~sib1e coal tmnt to a facility that is not capable of perforring 
at the level required. This a u l d  foreclose the optirms men as they are 
being considered. 
It does appear unlikely t h s t  space disposal would ever become i' 
selected method for managing nuclear wastes unless there were a delibbmte 
d conscious social  decision to  F=mnently rcinwe thc! wastes fnm al3- 
poss ib i l i ty  of eyer re-entering the bios$ere a*,: b ~ y  tiue i n  the future. 
Such a d w s i o n  is not t o  be taken l igh t ly ,  nor will it be. 
But even if this dcc-ision vcrc to be srrinusly coi~sidcrcrf, there are 
a number of sgccific questioli; tha: rsould 1.ec4 t o  be ai.sxercd before the  
iispacts c ? s ~ ! r . l !  e prcgrz..: could hc cstS.mntc.2: thit arc t h e  onv-zt j :,:>a1 
hszards ~ . d  risks: K i ~ t  would the sociai, radilCcgic.l.1 :l;d pl i: j ~ a :  
for opcratiotlal r i s i i s X : h a t  t;oril, the r ~ r i a l  oi;d ccc~;o~iic osts b~;? 
These questions are not limited so le ly  t o  the space operatioir i t s e l f .  
As we have mentioned ea r l i e r ,  space disposal cannot bc implescntcd without 
also creating t h e  necessary appurtenances and s u p p r i i n g  institutions 
t o  modify t h e  fuel cycle s o  t ha t  the actinid2 p r t i o n  i s  separated out 
efficiently and effect ively .  As time passes an3 thc cozponcnts of the 
fue l  cycle are increasingly co;nitteJ f o r  the sake of short-term goals 
a:~d detcrzined by avzii  ab! ct an2 ~ r l l  -undcrsroY3 tcch~ology, t h e  p:,ssibili t y  
of havini, the choice of space cii::i:osal zivaj.l;!f?ie if i t  is waz?tcJ 1211 
increasingly be pre--7pted. Large capital  investrents i n  Nastc handling 
and processing equipnent, large po l i t i c a l  comnitments t o  defend the  
selected waste managemcnt system, and large invcntorics of so1idifie.i 
high-level wastes that, can no longer be adcquately redissolved for 
partitioning rould all bc i m v e r s i b l e  steps along path that is At 
ampatitle w i t h  space disposal. I f  the dectsioq to keep the space option 
open is not takm within the next ten yca'rs or so, while: there is still 
. .- 
at YrihJow for a wide range of -waste management choices, we must ask whether 
space disposal is likely to  remain even a possible oprion. 
For thc resa-inder of this study, we sha l l  assm-e thet a decision to  
opt for space disposal has been properly r?::tde, and that the preconditions 
listed have been net, ?he next s t e p  5s to assess the jrepact of a space 
d j s p s c l l  oj-firation t h a ~  is technically- possible arid radj.ologica!!y c-ei~sible. 
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7. For instance,  a t  an 80% burn, corresponding t o  26,400 hllfd(th)/$lg, one 
t h i r d  of the oriainal 23s;1 inventory would remain, corresponding t o  
an enrichment of abmt 1.iP. A t  currently achieved capacity rac.tors of 
brtween 505 and 601,. roughly one-hall of the.  2 3 S ~  would bc discharged 
i n  t h e  spent fue l .  This uould correspond t o  an enriclnnent of about 
1.65% for the  recovered I!. Swrce: ORIGEN cctdc. run f o r  rn~tlel Diablo 
Canyon refercncc- f u e l  a t  SO :f?:(tilj/iig, 3.3@i enriched U LC l . 
8 O f  course, t h e r e  w i l l  be associated losses of various isotopes of  
Uraniun fro21 the \?a1 icis I, hari0li.n: f a c i l i r  lez. . ~ ! . ~ V ; C V ~ J - ,  t I i C  I:UI:I?>C~ of 
alpha-curies prod:~ced is q c i t e  small. Prcsu~anb ly, fuel hold-up t incs 
w i l l  s ~ f : . ' j c i c i ~ t  Tor ?;in y)l01'tei'-1!.y~ii I.st;i.-z~:.;.ye i:otoji~.:; CC U f o  
Yh .D. Thesis,  Departrxnt of K u c l e a ~ ~  Engi nccring, University of 
Cal i fornia ,  Berkeley, Ca l i fo rn ia ,  Apri l ,  1975. 
10. A rather cmplete discuss ion  of tlic decay rncdes of t h e  scvcral a c t i ~ l i d c  
species  is givcn in Cbnptcr 3 of t h i s  rcpo~-t. 
11. A t  t hese  long times, Plutonium is  thc doxitiant contr ibutor  t o  the HLK 
G 
a c t i v i t y .  For times lcngcr t h a n  10 years,  of course, thc longest-liucd 
components of the waste, such a s  237Eip w i l l  dominate, but  by this tiiiie 
12. Perhaps a norc irilyortal~t consjdc1.3'iior1 1,411 ultir;s'ic!y t::1-11 o ~ t  t o I)c? 
the degree of removal of the t ransuranics  Fron t h c  f i s s i o n  product 
f r a c t i o n  of t h e  partitioned Throughout t h i s  repor t ,  we assume 
t h a t  these  losscs are t lcgl igible,  and do not con t r ibu tc  t o  t h e  losses  
of Pu or o ther  alpha-emittcrs t o  t c r r c s t r i  W*gjf$,j,fg. Should 
mrocwwm 
the partitioning process involve a s ipnificant amount of loss of 
transuranics, the e f f i cacy  of space disposal would have to be re- 
considered. 
13. For a graphic display of the growth of Pu a c t i v i t y  i n  HLW, sce Pigford, 
op. ci t .  Tt~c estimate here is b a x d  on the follor~ixle draft GES;.10 estimates 
-- 
per 1 . l ~  of 150-day aged spent U3 f u e l  a t  33,000 Izf,i'd(tl:)/t:fi essuming 2 
0.5% of the  Pu f o l l ~ ~ s  t ; ~  IIL5: 
239~u 24,400 yrs 26.5 g!ns 
11 gms 
>.;:lrc i',C?: i '~:i ,:: ' ,  t l i i s  ~ 2 l c . ; l  i i t j c : n  a>; f0l 10:~~. ;it 1 - h ~  i . i t t ~  02 ~ ' c ~ T ~ ) c c . s s . ~  f ig ,  
assume that fcr every 1030 C i  of Pu that goes to the HLW, 40 C i  arc lost 
to low-level bzastes. A t  the time when the Pu in  thc  1ILW peaks owing to 
dccay of Arik an< Cm, the alpha a c t i v i t y  due t o  Pu w i l l  he equal to that  
of a mass of Pu which had an a c t i v i t y  of 4000 C i  at the time of repro- 
cessing and t l~e  same isotopic coml.rosition as the Pu jn s p ~ t  fuel .  
15. !it l e a s t  fm that period lihcrc 2 4 0 ~ u  activity  don~inatcs. A t  tiliies 
5 longer tllan iO. years, 2 3 0 ~ u  dominates and rllc a c t i v i t y  will be incrr:lscd 
by o factor of aEcnrt 3 . 3 .  
16. 'illis estimate i s  based on the GES!.lO "average mixw estimates per lig of 
150-day aged spent fuel ,  assuming 11% hfOX and 89% UO2. a t  33,000 bC$d(th)/ilg 
assuming 0.5% of the Pu follows thc HUJ: 
243& 7,950 yrs 380 ips 
240~u  6,580 yrs 15 zms 
8 
244~m 17.6 yrs 210 ,ps 
17. Cmpare the P\I in\*cstories in notes 13 and 16 a b ~ v e .  
18, As i n  note 14, ~se use Pu act ivi ty  i n  the H!.Ii a t  t1.e tiale d l en  decay i'.~ 
froa h and Cm peaks to establish an equivcllent quantit) of Pu at  the 
19. Kuclear Fuc1 Cyclc, a rcport by t h e  Fucl C;clt? Task Force, rcport 
I: ERI?.\--33, 11 .S. Ellcrgy 2cscnrc.h and De\-~lo;~:,"-.n: Aclnlnis t rn t ion , 
21. Huclear Fucl Cycle, jb iJ .  
22. li'nl: Street Journal, Fcb. 17, 1976, at  p. 1. 
--. 
23. J. G. Phillips, "Nuclear R~>ort/Fuel cycle prcblms co~ne back to haunt I 
industry," National Joul-nal 8, 268 (1976). Also see Ref. 22, ibid. 
- -  
24. 3. h'. Bartlett c t  a i . ,  F c a s i l ~ i l i t y  Evaluation 2nd RED Proqrcrn Plan 
----- ---- L 
I 
I 
for Transuranic P a r t i t i o n i n g  of Itj.gh -1,cvel Fuel Reprocessing (iasre, report 
-- -------a - I 
b ~ & 3 ~ ~ - 1 7 7 6 ,  Battel le Pcrc i f ic  Korr hres t I.nborai ory, IISAL'C, Ricl~lnnd,  
Washington, Covemtcr, 1975. 
' PART 11 
Tl{E ROLE OF T!{E NASA SPACE SHI.I?TJ,C PROGRI\:4 
IN WASTE ?.!hNAGEh!EST 
. 
IhmODUCTIOX TO PART 11 
In Part. 11 of rhe study, \;.e e..axinc the tccl;r;:ical, policy,  ; P,! 
public er~vircllmcnts in \.:hie11 a space disyosnl  progrm w l ~ l d  opcrcltc. 
Part I l 2 i d  d o ~ ~ r i ~  1:hc p.ec~:13ir!.crnr; f o r  s;~c~.cc~ C ' . ~ S ; : ; \ ? ~  7i.c: 2:: g i ~ i  , . 
c.c,:;idcr:~?-.iol; P S  ST{ 0pt50;!, P : : - ~ - L  I I. c~.:?i.;i:~~?. c(., . 11 i o i : ~  t;iar 1 , ~ ~  ' ' 
);p..t: ;c) i): ~ f : :  f<;; ~ i ~ ~ ~ { . ; > ~ ~ ~ : : ]  i,..c:,;-c>:,: c,::~:':,' rii;(:::* i~.,,'". t .  t~ i ; Oi:: ; ~ . i ' ?  ..'.: 
l imited to the teclmicnl and oycrati9nal r.!:snagc:nznt of t h e  shuttle  program, 
over \chic11 VISA hzs at le2st. some direct control. 'i the hypothesized 
shuttlc-based spzch disposal program is to achic~rc its goal of niarl:cdly 
reducing terres tr ia l  i r lvc~~tor ics  f long-lived nuclear wastes, the r e s t  of 
the nuclear fuel cycle must bc technical ly adjusted and managcd t o  those 
ends. Both i~~dustrjr and govcrnlnnnt policics and r e p  1 iitc~iy c1j.r::'~ te r<oulJ 
have to be compatibl c with t h e  requiremcats of  spncc oper;~tj.ons. Pub 1 i c  
. -  - .  
corii'ide,tcc I.:i t h e  LLS L i i y  of SA.i;< to j:rc.\;c,!l: act ic?cii.L s, 2113 ~)il?*? ic i: : ; I  17:;- 
ncss t o  accept tl1ci.i j f they occur, would b c  nccdcd. Kc argce i n  titis 1 1 ; 1 ~ i .  
of the report that,  in  the present industry, govenunent, climate, these 
condition: arc unlikely to be met. 
Chapter 6 introduces the space s h u t t l e  technology developed by t\SA 
as it applies to cor..ccptua2 spcc disposal prograns. Hission profiles 
an? waste pcka,c.ing Ccsign are adapted frcn pmvibus ?-?=A sttidies. Thc 
mansgartent of the nuclear' file1 cycle is sham to have a aajor effect on 
thc nccdcxl lacnch ratc r"nr the  ~ s s u z d  Space disposal te@hnoXogy. As 
this is noc dcterninz9le, ve choose t o  est55lisl~ three czses: rising to 
10, IOG, ur lO0O launches per year EY thc year 20M.  These brzcket the 
C 
range of c11oi.c-25, frm lw enough tc. be czsily i i t t c d  into projected 
shuttle p x ~ g r m  g r ~ ~ f h  to 132.g~ em=$-to fhrov; F. hlaj3r st.r:iin 0;1 4!ie 
entire U.S. aerospace ifidustry. 
, - 
:. -5:; ;-.:s::;.-, . i-.rc:.- :..!;>. ::L!:.*;;.;-c.?.z :$.I :- ,' 2 y 2  :!:--..---: - -  ~  2 . 1  > 2: .: L.! ... '.- 1 , :+?, I.,. - .  %: I 
as mineral .Although we had nei+ther thc t-he nor thc resoirces ocrsclve;i 
t o  survey the shuttle production requireaents closcly enough to try to 
t 
idcnt icy %act 1cnccls"--3~~3s that arc likely to restrict pl-sgrz;? wpans icra 
a t  the requircd rate of gmhih--we galcrically identify a set of problems 
that 3rc likely to occur, S!iifting rt progran ?re:?::! on csl:crine;ttal one 
b3scd on a fcti vchiclcs to one of large scale cnzails expznsion zt a vcry 
rapid. rate. Plrysical resourccs nccdcd may cc t  1:e cxpz113at~c aL t h z t  rate.  
1'2;.:'2ps I:.c~.'c! c r j t i c ~ l i ) . ,  ~i-;:;.:;j.~.;~j 3,755 and i c:;t-.i::;ii~:?r, ::YC 112: 1 - 1: 
suitcd eii:ler for high grcutil rates (going to scale) GT fbr r r i p i d ' s h i f t s  
'mr highly stinulrt ing cxjc i lmcntol programs to repetitive high-vcilum 
ones (going to routine). Even if pllysical and industrial resources could 
be provided to handle program growth, problems of organizational growth 
might provc insurmounta51? a t  t h e  required lcvcls of institutional pcrfomance. 
I t  is not oaly d i f f i c u l t ,  but impossible with any degree of accuracy, 
t o  predict policy, regulatory, alld public reactions t o  a future space d i s -  
posal progrsr!. t.bt wc hzvc doni i ~ z  Chapter 7 is t o  ex&iil:e the past 
history of institutions tht have dealt w i t h  waste management i n  sme 
capjcity. Fros this history, uc can infer drat institutional issues and 
regplatory r;i l ieus are !il:eIy to occvr i i t  tlic ?:e;!r future, bascJ or? 
cxtrc;>~.:~lr icil of progr2-n f ! i s to~ lcs  sr:i di  r c c t  ' i c ) , : . ~ .  Sinri!.a+l y, r:c ex:r;:? nc 
i n  ch;!pter S t h e  t\:o ez:i;i;lt ?::';I j c  a?:f tttde SL:I-I*C).S that h s \ ~  bepn 
] ~ C ~ ~ O ~ X ; C C :  03 j - p ~ % l i ~  rC-S:7:::1:;p*s T 2 -,I":l . ., C,::.). \ . ' * ~ S ~ ~ :  ; .2ji;;gc:;ici] .i;..: a t  i-C,i':pL LC! 
drzw fron these s o x  cox: l . : i .q i~~_;  ~5c.a: iuturc ~ 1 3 1 i c  att i tudes  tot-iards 
the goa2s ar.2 p i ! ~ o S ~ S  cf govemincrits ;inti the pi!-.lic,  syscc J i s p s a l  is 
unlikely t o  find a llosyltahle climate £or operation. 
/ 
Y l S  SPACE DIS?OSAL OPTZOS S I S G  T)E SHUTTLE 
to renove these wastes fma e l1  possibi l i ty  of re-entering the huwn 
envirunnent. Ibo major issues need to be coilsidered in detemining the 
u t i l i t y  of current or projected NfSlc-developed capabilities for effec- 
t ive ly  removing the bulk of the long-live2 vastes: whether the program 
will have the cspzbility to dczl wit11  the  masses involked for a reasoneblc 
mission profile; and whether such opzratjons can be perforned at a level 
of relic5ility that would lezd society  t o  J s t e m . i n t  tha t  the  risks 
involved wogld he reasonable rind ac.cc;;tr?blc. Fi'c d<-fe;- tkc? issztc-~f safe;). 
adn re l iabi l i ty  to the next section, and address here primarily the  issue 
of the adequacy of present and near-future NASA capabilities for dealing 
with the  wastes a t  the levels currently prcdictcd. 
. In tbe absmce of technical aid  and advice from NASA technical 
pemmel, we are d l o  in 8 limited study such as this to e d n e  poss ible  
future capabilities 2nd equipment, or  independently to  assess presently 
available programs. Ne.relg for our technical information primarily on 
two NASA reports, one dealing with passive waste containers1 and one or 
usinp the w s t e  heat for a tliemmlly drivcn ion-prnpulsins systena2 that 
assu.ne the l i z t  vchlclc to be t l ~ c  spsce shuttle as currently desi21:cd. 
lie s l s o  draw extensively on Section 8 o f  B i i ~ ~ 1 9 0 0 , ~  and ERDA-sponsored 
The bzssl ine technical asstu~pt.iorr for t h i s  sLudg i s  that the mznr.ed 
. - ,., .-c . . t ; , l i  <c;.. .,a-.:.,.- *:.,.-, , ,  , i ?  : .  , :  < f,;".j <.i 2 ' 'T?.,'i: '" . t A i w * x  L . . :  
via Jupiter suing-by. 
Figure 5.1 shws a typical law-ch-to-lailding sequence fcr the space 
shuttle. The lkunch vei:icle is to be bcostccl off the psd by tuo solid- 
fueled mtors that an: subsequent l y  Cxvp3eci for later recovery while the 
orbiter continues its mission on the espendablc crtcrnal fuc l  tank. Once 
tllc shutt le  i s  orbited, any dcs ircd  payload can be deploycd from the cargo 
bay. Thc payload can either ~ e r f a n  its own ~ j s s i o n  or !IC left i n  orbit 
F i ~ u r c  5.2 shows how a waste package w j g h t  he iiial~tlted i n  and d e t ~ l o y c ~  
from the shuttle orbiter. The orb i ter  is capable of somc orbita l  maneu- 
vering, and can be used t o  rctr ievc  a nalfunctioning package prior t o  t ! ~ e  
separate in i t ia t ion  of tho package propulsion system. Upon coitq~lction of 
its mission, the manned orbiter returns t.: a landing sitc on Earth. 
Figure 5.1 
t 
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each Shuttle orbitcr- can f l y  a minimum of 100 missions and carry 3s macP 
o s  29,4841 kg (65,r)OO p v f i ~ ~ f s )  of c n r j o  .?nJ ti?' t o  -1 cl-cw r c n t ~ c r ~ .  ;ruJ 6 
j>assct\p,crs It orbi t .  I t  rsn rciurn 11,515 kg (32 ,000  po :~~ i l s )  t?f cargo 
t o  enrtl~. 
After reviewing the analysis performed in WL-1900, we a m  t hu t  
the cmly missions that would provide appropriate safety against orbital 
degeneration are direct solar impact and ciircct so lar  system cscapc. Table! 
5.1 sunwar5 zes the considerat i ons  uscd i n  deciding amo.;tg the various nis- 
sions. O f  these two, solar impact is discarded as being too expensive, as 
the fuel rcquircd for  such large values of Delta-\r (the incremental rclwity 
thaz must be given 20 an orbiting psckagc by its j'lropfsion Systm t o  dchicf*~ 
t h e  i n d i c a t d  trajec~ory)  would great ly  reduce the vehicle payload and thus 
markedly i i~creasr  the nmbcr  of laxriches required 2114 tho a s r o c i a t ~ l  cost. 
Alrhoug;~ t h i s  is suf f i c i ent  reason for reject ion of the  solar i n p c t  mission, 
cloud o f  luazardous materials back i n t o  the Earth's orbit .  A l l  o f  the pro- 
j e c t d  njssiozls v i l l  have to  take place in  the plane of the planetar;? orb i t s  
to take adva~~ icge  of  tile orbital vcloci ty  of the Earth. Tiie addit ional  
c o s t s  of operating out of the orb i ta l  p16mc arc prohibit ive.  
The CASA-IIyl and Erudy . 
The najor s;u;l;? C ~ I  t he  tlsr* cc the sll~t:-j r f a r  tf:e ~ 7 j ~ ~ o ; a l  i:f r.i;clcar 
. .I' b-asl.er 113s been ti;n: y:+r?cr:::r:r! Ivy ;i;c t;ttSA-l,~, .;i  :, :,c5c,:rc!l !'er?tc;. . 2 -  4 3  (:i.ai;i; iJ 
by Robert E .  1iyland.l Ke refer. t o  it tC rougl~out as tho NrGA-l~yland study 
without derogating the r o l c  pla)-c;i by the other part ic ipants .  
In t h i s  study, it was assmcd that the wastes wauld be encapsulated 
by a acthod that provided adcquatc shielding to protect thc orbitcr crew 
SPACE S N I T L E  ORBITER W I ' I H  l # l I C W  EAS1'E PACKAGE At@ ?W; 
TABLE 5.1 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR VARIOUS Si'IIGE DESTINATIQNS 
Delta-V, 
Dest inatim km./ scc Advantag~s 
High-Earth Orbit 4.11 tow Del ta-V 
Launclr any Iny  
P83sive W ~ J C  c :?r.:kag@ 
Can be rotr i rva:!  
Solar Orbi t s  Via: 
Single burn beyond 3.65 Low Dclta-t/ 
Earth escape Lxtnctr any dny 
Passive wasto packago 
Circular Solar Or!; l.r: 4.11 Low Delta -V 
Launcn any 4 % ~  
Venus or Wars SwSl.nf.?, ;: 4.13. Low Delta-V 
Solar System Escapc: 
Direct 8.75 Launch any I n y  
Passive wastc packas  
Romoved f ro .n  st?l:.r system 
Via Jupiter Swi2,$?!~* 7 -01 Hemwed frilrl solar *s)cskm 
Disadvantages 
Long- tm container i ntegr t ty  
Orbi t  lifetime nct proven, 
Longm -term container f nt egrf t y  ~squfxed, 
Enr:h re-sncourrter p~ssible (may not be 
351% t o  prove otherwise) , 
Abort gap p ~ r i t  Ehrth escape vefwfty. 
Lung*.rorm contazner integrity q u i d ,  
Brbi t stcbi 1 i t y  not proven. 
Rcquircs spnco prqwlsion systan. 
;.bort gap past Earf h escape velocity, 
iohg-torm contniner integrity requiz&, . 
,Limited laurich q p r t t m n f  t y  (3 t~ 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ t f i s  
e w r y  19 t o  24 months). 
Requires midcourse systems. 
Need space propilsfon or hew possibflity 
,. > . - . - .  - . *  
of unplnnncd Dncount er . 
, . 
High Delte-V 
Abort gap past Earth sscap k l ~ i t y ,  
Itigh-Dolttt V, 
ti mitcd launch opp~~%~nS ty (2 Zs 3' ~ ~ h s  awry 
'. < . 
. , .  
13 mqnths) p .  . - , -  . .: . . ; , ,  .,- . . .  ,  
t 
, ; . ' - .  
, rtq~,utns ~iidm~+r-:tyit'k~. . , , . , . , 
. 
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. ud security against aborts and othcr accidents including a re-entry by q e  
-d 
unprotected wste-containing capsule. ~nj6r  components of this p&psal uo 
shown on p i b .  5.3 .  This is a shut t fe / t .~g l tug  nrission, requiring two shut t le  
orbiter lwnehes for wsry waste package propelled t o  so la r  escape. A Ihe 
first mission places a reusable tug into whit f o r  supptying tb major 
. . 
'Ir 
escape pr~pulsion,*and t h e  second carries an expendable t u g  acd ms.t'e parhtige. 
A typicsl waste disposal arission uould Ixi<t: the. follotiing sequccte of mlmts: 
3 .  
1, Lmch shuttle t 1 t o  parking orbit. 
2. %ploy reusable Wp to rendezuou;. 
3. Launch shuttle 62 to -.arking orbit. 
5 .  !.:a. . r t ' t : ~ s a n d  dock in ta~x1c.n. 
7. Expendable tug injects imstc package to solar escape trajectory. 
A representative nuclezir waste package for  th i s  mission i s  shown i n  Fig. 5.4. 
For the package sholtt.., which has a waste paylcad of about 200 kg. f o r  
solar  cscape, it is  assumed tha t  the high-level wastes a r e  part i t ioned,  and 
tllat only 0.1% of t h e  f i s s ion  products follow thc act inidcs  in to  the  space 
disposal  processing. The rmainder of t h e  Irigh-level wastes, c o r l s i s t i n ~  
primarily of thc f i s s ion  products, arc t o  be disposcd of on ea r th  by 
BSNL-1900, it appears t o  b e  inprcrcticablc t o  dispp~sc of. tk.c prwt  b1.11;: oT 
t h e  unpa r t i t i ond  so l id i f ied  reproccssing wastes. The three  cases fo r  
potent ia l  use of t h e  space disposal option discussed i n  BNWL-1900 wcre: 
Case 1: Dispose of t h e  bulk of tlrc reprocessing wastos, solidified 
and cncapsulated as borosil icatc glass.  

, . .  
Q s e  Za: Dispose of qetlnides only. with fission products sepsrrr$e& 
I out to within 1.8% by par t i t ion ing .  - ,  
Case Zb: Dispse of act inidas  only, with fission pra luc t s  scprated.' 
out to within 0.1% by par t i t ion ing .  
Case 3: Dispose of ac t in ides  only, with f i s s i n  products sepratsd 
. ., out t o  within 0.1: and w i t 1 1  995 of the c u r i m  removed as 
well. 
. . 1 -- 
The followin;; assm!ptians concerning the  reprocessing and waste 
handling capabil it i c s  of ttic industry arc made ir. analyzing t l ~ c  rfficacy 
of tllc N.6A-1-lyland optioil fa r  the 1,1':it-urnniun cycle. 
g l a s s  with a dcnsity of 2; 
3 3 3. One 1.Ig of spent fue l  reprocessed will y i e l d  0.057 m (2 ft ) of 
vitrified high-level solid wastes; 
4. One Mg of  spent f u e l  relrnocessed will yield about 5.7 kg o f  
actinide oxides from calc in ing,  assuming a fuel burn of 
33,000 Efli'd (t 11) /big. 
Tl~e t o t a l  mss of high-lcvel h o r o s i l i c a t e  g lass  sol ids  produced by the repro- 
cessing iild:l.<t.ry  growl:!^ K L I S  ~ 1 1 c ~ i r j . c . J  i n F i g .  , as v:as ,.A; ; c ~ . ; c { ~ c . I  1::355 @f 
the actini.dcs conrajncd in it. For any rca~or~: ibl  c amoant cf r a d i a ' l i ~ ! ~  2!:d 
rc-ent ry  shielding,  t h e  t o t a l  mass of the rcproccssj.ng wastes f a r  exceeds 
any achievable capab i l i ty  f o r  space disposal i n  the  foreseeable fu tu re .  
If tllc wastes arc par t i t ioned t o  scp;rntc out tlic long-lived alpha- 




details t l ~ c  packaging t o  be given to the actinldc wastes. Tie boron particles 
serve as lnodzrators to  inhibit patential c r i t i c a l i t y  i-• .-';crlts. The L i H  
is present to mderate ileutrons produced by ( a, n! reactions bctwrc:~~  
actinides and l ight  elenents sach as fluorine and oxygen. The tungsten 
gatma shield is necessary becaus5 of the acti .*ity of the remnant f i s s i on  
products. 'I'he stainless steel impact shicld awl rc-entry sh i c ld  ?.re for 
pr-tectj-oll agaj.nst abort: and se-cat:.>. of' a cap;~?c ,  :i,ld t!-:e cr?l~s;lh c i i:sclf 
has been shaped lo ensure stable  re-entry wit11 ablntio:~ of t h e  s h i c l d  t o  
prevent m e l t i n g  oP the cnpsule. 
Tablc 5.2  provides smim::ry 4 ~ t a  o i l  tf:c corltrnts a~id r~:!cknsc c o n i i g i r -  
a t i o n  f o r  C::scs 2 a  a:).! ?it {lt' !;xi!..-IQc~]. 'r:!~ ;.:,..-li.~ , , ! e:il, :?;i 1 i; i : 1 p :il).>u;- 
of slluttlc iaullches %tint \cutlld h.7\re t o  !PC :.?i!:vi.;cri c , : , : !~  ycnr tn  d.i:;:c.sc 
of a l l  of the ac+.inldes from reprocessing of spcrlt fu\*l through tllc ycnr 
2000 for a nuclear indu~try ;;zc:l according t u the assu!?rpti ons of Chapter 
3. of th i s  study. In generating t h i s  figure, we I l .~ve smooti~cd o:it the 
actinicla mass data of Fig. 3 .5 .  Rcproccssin:~ capacity w i l l  increase in 
500 !lg/yr c!iur~lrs a:co?:rIjn:: lo t : ~ c :  i:sst;:-,pkiu:ls ~iuidc! jn  I:jz. 3 . 1  , btll. u c  
asswrlc that  shuttle cspaciey \soul.d be i n c r z n s u d  Inorc sr.lootl;!y. li'c also 
assume i 1n t  &;a:;. C' d i s p ; 1 ~ ; ~ 1  ~;'i::':;."i 1 cii:: US i . l y   ti,^ sil1.1: : ! c ~ 3 1 1 1  d CI-.? : i.,; ' . r . c  . .,t !; 
begin i n  that year. By the year 2010, we aqsume that available shuttle 
capacity just  matches thc amount of waste produced, and that tllc l>ncklog 




CASE 2a Cme 2b 
1% F.P. residue 0.1% F.P. residue 
Outside diameter (m) 
Thickness of SS shell (an) 
O.D. of i ~ p a c t  sp!texc {R) 
SS ispact shell tfiickncss (cs)  
LiH sb i c ld  thickness (cs) 
Ti:nxstc:i s l~ ic ld  ti;-:ckr.csz- [c. 2 
I.;)'] 91.3 (t:pj 
Act 1i1j.r;~; pel p:i ~l.:.;;?: (kg] 
Fissio:~ products per package (kg) 
Re-entry shield mass per package (kg) 415. 
Inpact vessel unss per pckq.e  (kg) 567. 
Li1i shie ld  mass pcr pzcl;,?gc (k?) 135. 
lLngstcn shie ld  mass p r  package (kg) 1480. 
Mass of matrix per package (kg) . 505. 
Themal pwcr pcr package (kl:) 9.26 13-25 
Fission product curies 4 x loS 4 6 x 10 
'Actinide Curies 3 x lof; 5 l o s  
As is shown in Table 5.3. 244m dominates both th; thermal p e r  and 
the radioactivity of the actinide portion of tlre partitioned wastes. As any 
reductiiln in shielding mass would be icmcnsely useful in reducing the 
Ilrtprber of missions nccdc$, it is welt worth examining more closely the 
prscdit ions far their presence. 
nie dminant radiozctivc h z a r d  frm an unbroken capsu1e xi11 bc 
dui? t o  t h e  g,-:r.iQa r 2 d i 3  tic;! f;'oz t h e  i i 5 ~ i t . i :  ! ; j ' ~ j ~ ~ t  :;::fiqflf, alld ths 
tungsten shield urod fcr blo-,king gam3 radiation sccounts for a large 
eble f@-1- ",:ti!sidzs, 3s ci:;:.y cI:srn;-ccri5-i:i~s ~7 ; ; ;c ;?: : j ; ! j ~ ~ ~  r. l;:st 2-1- 
. . .  
.,.,- i,Ec: - .  . r~:,l(-s 5 -9  ~ - : - j . - , : ~ . , + t c  fr. - j,:,f,.E-. ~ 2 . 1  ::,; :x'  ; -, ;).:-..--,'  .. ,- I -- 1 ' .  '-.- z . - - > : ' i . . : - .  
3 :& e L i 2  s1;:cid lcr  ~l)sc~:-Lj ~r ;";2.:cr6:tizg I:;C i:j.;!: ~ 1 , ~ r ~ y  ~ ~ C : : : T C J I , S  
generated by ( a, n) teactiojls weald have t o  be increased, h t  as  
 shah^! on the table the mass increase h-ould be only about 40 ke. For more 
s igni f icant  i s  the necessary irlcrease i n  th.s rrilss of the nstrix arid of the  
inpact vesscl to allow for the increase i n  actinide thcrml poticr. 
Becalrse ihc hczt  generated I:y t h c  wastcs cocld causc melting or other 
failures of co;~tair~.;i::nt the care of re-elltry, the pacl;.!ge has bccn 
dcsjgncd so :is t o  keep sixfac:~? ZC.:.!-ZI-;?:,UTC:, I::~c.:: c ~ l t i r . 8 1  V;.:LIC~ i:: ti:<: 
cxSe 05 al! ;.I.;>j.t. A ! ;.;:g: ~ 3 l . i j  cq., 0: CLi:? ;:,it;-.i): ;.J~S ta j !s is t~  0: lii_ih 
t h e m 1  conductivity materials to  convey t'le waste product decay heat effi-  
c i e n t l y  to the  surface of ' the  ~ackage and kccy intcrnal tempcraturcs at 
safe levels. 
MWAL 8lUTfLE W I E S  A;W) KiSSIOlS 
PQR SEVERAL SFACE OPTIOBS 
(Basis: tw shuttle launches per mission) 
5 0 0  - -* 
20: HYLMtD tbq!'llSSION; 1% fp; I15 k~;n"iiSSlOAl 
2b: HYLAND h$tS!SlON; 0.1% f.p.; 20C kghllSSION 
3: HYLAND MISSION: Cm REMOVED; 1U13.6;G(3 kflISStON 
B: BURNS MlSSlOtJ (HEITSTAR); 4000 1:r~lttlISSlON . 
~ --.-- - - -  - - ... - -  -- - . - -. -. 
- -.. ";<) 
vv. [E 








10 YEAR UA!iTES, HIQi LEVEL: 99.5% Pu,U RNOVEO 
(Source: ORIGER - Diablo Canyon Fuel) 
NET: 67.1 
29&.,. %7.3 (85%) 
24 I,,,,, : 5.4 ( 8%) 
*3Rpc: 3.1 ( 42) 
Subtetzl 65 .S (?i?*] 
Ihe reaoval of the curiua from tlie wastes thus appears to be a desir- 
able goal as an adjunct t o  space disposal. Curium reduction could also be 
effcc'iec! by ~:tila!p,ir;g thc f u e l  cycle scr;..ev:hat d if f c c n t l y ,  and we shall 
discuss this pss ib i l i t y  latcr in this section. A detailed analysis  of 
Case 3, curim rmoval, was not perfmcd in BXYtL-19D0, as thcrz were no 
availa!)le t rtl~nolij;ies fa- d ~ i n g  so. I t  was cst ii::? tcd thz t  large  incrc.::: 2s 
reurovcd cmplctc1)-. This  \;oulJ z l so  ~ n r r c  tltc ~ a c k a g e  size sl ightly snaller, 
thc  ~ 2 . i i - i : ~  P'OT IIL.:; t r~.:t>i-;il C C Z : ~  kc I Z ~ I L ; :  1-vcl1:~cd. A:; sS;iohn i a  ri~ZIln 5.3, 
..< ;:.; L,r, .- 4 .  -. :,- ,. t h i s  is is . , . ‘%, - ... h ., . . .. T,.; 7 :  x: ,:::. , j k . :  z.:c:.:;:r 5,:  :c iz ; $ > .  -3 
. .  . . - .  
3 , 1 ;*.- :,-; , : ;.,:. f- >z.,;:i-c.<.- i 1 .  ~ ! i >  si;: .-- ;-2 dv?~:: .~:;:~,  !,;,- -L:i:-! ?.;: : c ; - . , i , : , . :  :.-
efficici.cy of p a c k i ~ . ~ .  Fhen a l l  these factors zrc takcia into accrunt, j t  
cla:r?llcd, r c d u c i ~ ~ g  t?lc n~:.'lcr of miss i i ; : , ~  bj. a factor of two. This cstinatc 
~ ~ u l c l  bc on the conscrvstit~c s j d c .  This case  is also Jisp1ayc;l or, F i g .  5.6. 
7hc !::!SA-Gsrns Stl:.!).. 
- 
. - 11 S C Z P ~ ~ ~  S L ~ : ' ; -  O:I ti:.? ,, :-~-~..,;::i c+[ ;!.,c-<;:r i..,;~: < , : :  j i .  s,;.~:: % ; l~  r,%:??? 1 .; 
. .. l>~~.c(.tri\t>ij by 2 LL::~~ !.: d;.! :,,L?,', :.:,??:~j;:!: t ~;>.:cL* i .1  i C C I + ~ C Y  ..L - tr;,? 
2 dircctioi~ of !I, E. Eurns. Again, uz sl~clll rcfcr t o  this  as the N.4SA-llurci~ 
study for convenic;~cc withcmt ncailinl; tr, play do*:tl t1.e roles plsycd by other  
ccn+r ibutors on thc study tczm. 








1 Ringst -:*:I 
2 i.ili 
3 Stai1?1 css 
Stc i 
4 Czrbm 
Unlike the MA-ilyland study, the wastes are nat treated here as 
passive payloads to be mnnwcred i n t o  escape orbits. In t h e  proposed 
vehicle, knoln as SEKSTA2, %he rc t in id r t  decay Rent is used t o  diLi:*e an 
electric ion pruprrls~on systc i~ .  11is is said to be nore eff ic ient  than tllc 
chcmical thrusters suggested. for the MSA-Hyland t i ~ g s .  .rhe proposed vehicle, 
which usc;s mercur:. i o i ; ~  f c r  proplsiar. ,  j s  shot.-n i i ~  1:jgs. 5 . 7  ;;:id 5.3. 
7 , , c  : F- :tjr,:,?c:. ::j.y T L L  1)' ,q:::-2. .-.:! 2 , :  .-;: ;: ;.: c z  (-:.:,,:a,~j:;- cznil:; -1-s s c z r ~  l ; - . J p d  
by radii~t lan shiclds.  11e :!cat fru:"i t3e  iialitt's is cotivcyed by hzat pipes 
. . . - , - ti> 2 C J ?  !!I<:.::, ::lc d ; ~ ) . ! ~  -, . 1 : l ~  cji ; ..yi,:i-7.- y : - . , : . ; . ~ ~ d  is ~ p . 1 ; ' ~ '  .;.j 
. . 
11 jg-1 ; ,Lj l  :,:;? i : ~  j:<-!. :.I. < ~ ~ 1 ~ ; l i  ti ~:i'.i!i; ~ i ? ?  t 5 : l l ~ j   id^^ d tC? ~ Y ~ V C  tile K.2:.Cllry 
j :,;. . 1 . - . -- p,. .- 
, , . .'. .. . . - - ., . 
1 ' .  . ! .. . .-,. r,.- - - .  . 
. j , , . - . . . . .:.. . i ,  ;i:< 5 : i " ~ -  ~ : . i i ~ ~ ~ 1  3 ::I; .t * > L ~  ???<.: 1;) 
. ,.?. : , - -  * .-;. - . . - - c. , , .- 9, - -* . *. 5 . .  . , . . : . ;..- . .  ! ' ...- . - : .  ' . . , . r  1 . ;, .: . . 
. - - 1 .  
t i ~ . _ t > l  oj:. :t ~7i;ic;;J :;.j:<!;:t3i, , .~ , ' i l .~ t:~.: c,? 25 f ~ l  LC,:.,: 
1. Launch s h u t t l e  F f  to przrki.r:g c ~ b i t .  
2. Dctyloy ~ ~ ~ c ! : d : l l . ~ l ~  C)IV~:!~CL l SP?CC . i l l? ti) TC'II~CZVOUS . 
3.  L9unc.h sil~lttl'c r"2 t o  orhif. 
4 .  Deploy A'I,;(STAi: an6 a t  tac!jcd \.:act c package to rcalczvous . 
5. $ ; <  .,i;~*s; t . - -  ?Ji to ~ : i ~ r , ; . C ; i :  F L i x  ::Biz Y C ~ I ? V C  5,il i 2 18%.  
6 .  Siiu'itlc 8 2  rcco~c.1-s sfiicla-?r; a::3 re turns  t o  CsrTIi. 
7. C]lc.;:.ii.si! t;i . - . ) J  r . - - ~ t  L L  &.., . y;!y1<1~! 10 .?;i-; i )  t : ~ : - , > : ~ ? .  
. v  . 
8 .  1;: .,'&!:.!: i~:)  ;.,I-< ; I  : 1 ..; 0;; ;:;:~.~~:.~ ;..t; ;<:,(; tr:. :;!-...:: 5 ~ 1 ;  * r :,,::j :. 
Figurc 5.9 shous t h e  iiEli'S'T.lR package i n  thc shuttlc p a y l o ~ d  bzy. The 
act inidc  payload periilission i s  estimated t o  b; a ~ . a l t  4 Big, as listal on 




However, it i s  not possible to.directly co~npare the number of required 
HEIfSTAR laur~ches ::ith t i lo previous results of the NASA-iIy1 and Study. Wdar 
the i l ~ s ~ l i ~ p t i o n s  ~i:zZe 5.11 the t~tlSti-Buz*~~s rcpor t ,  a rn ther  large po;ircr density 
of 0.1 kw/kg is required' for podering the tl~errnionic diodes. As shown in 
Table 5 .6 ,  t h i s  poxer dccsity is not available at present. 99.5% recovery 
eff ic ic . i~cy  f o r  umr-ill;:, 2nd p! u tcn i tm,  n~ i i l  !jct1 cr ~cpro~essing cf;"j ciency 
would bc required. 
. . Tiie usc of re;ric??:a!:lc? s l , ~ e l d s  as sv;gcstcd for tta,e SEliSc'.?.!! vcl~jclc 
cottlZ r:ls(> be u5::J i ~ r  rill 311-ch2i::ic:rl t:~;,, ar~tf \<o;tIil !>?~!;ci:lj' I::c~ca!;c 1 . 7 ; ~  
payload of  the \.tiij c3 c .  HCJXCVCL., t h c  IXICS?,llZ d?:,j ~n , II!II j ke t!le :<ASA-rlyl a:id 
i L s  I,:,:] 5 . s ~ ; ~  ; ;. r :I; 1.j. o.- :;'>. c,::!:;;? ;?.:jC;;2 C , -  is y , < ) t  C'lm j <; [>A- : I { . ,  [ ;>: . , r < j . Y 4 -  C,' $ 
. . - 1 
1 j ;  ; - - , , -  : , i t  t i :&:  rp::;:Jir..:, 
-,.-. - . - .  . 
. . .  
ji!~,;~;;~.~ ~rkq:; j . ~ ,  >,: * . , k i . , : . . ' . , ,  , , ( .  ; : < . L t , . , : : ,  : - !*.!.!"... '% . ,  . ,  c.,::.- : :.:.: . I . . , . : ,  ,.! 
IIese fc,,. <lcc:\Jzs, For t]lcsc. r c n s u n s ,  t l ~ c  Nl:L.<TAI? i:l:n m115t  h e  trca:cd 
as an intcrcsting, b u t  s t i l l  quite hy)~otltctical, ~1ct1w.i for space cljsyosnl. 
21 -Im Thc Role Played hv 
-- -. 
In botll ti12 }Iyjand an<? ;he Rtirl:s s'i..udi c z ,  cl~rirl!n plays a central role .  
'fhc pri t iary source of tlarh ;~lpIi-i rntfi.atii:i; and i l l  lixl'tiric;1c.3 h i g h - l r v c l  
r..:?stcs is 2 4 0 ~ ~ .  I n  t h o  i I ; . i ~ ~ s  si.-i<ly, t1ii.s lirnt i.s ncc.cssiir)+ iiir drii?l:i.: 
.I::; !.I:#:,; $:;- 
~ ] L C ;  ]j i-.-,;::i isj~;i :,;r::t<.::. I;: 1.::: ]!y].z;;d y : . , . , : ) . ,  Li j:: ~ ~ c . s ; ~ ~ ~ : ~ . ~ j . ! : ! ~  -. 
a great  dca l  of t h e  r.rass of t h c  en:nl~.?rrlr:tion p:c::;t;;c, but  is ;)so 1 ! ! c .  1-.,2jo;. 
\ 
determining factor i n  tllc entire packagc design. The contairuacnt spticrc 
is s ized so a s  to  l~roducc a favorable ratio of packap,~ surfncc t o  vollxnc t o  
ensure that the hcat gcncratod can bc cffccti\rcly dissipated. l c t ,  there  i s  
no documcntati~~a presently availahlc t l l : t t  indicotcs ih:it t .11~ icvcls of 244~rn 
ORIGCVAL PAGE 18 
OF FOOR QU- 
TABLE 5 . 5  
MEIYSI'AR IfEI CIiT S'iBIARY (kg) 
S u b s y s t c r ~ ~ s  scaled f o r  liEII'STAG 
. Propulsion 
. Cmunic;~t  ions  
. Command compuxer/dsia hand1 ing 
. Guidance and navigation 
. Powcr storngc and c l i s t r jhu t ic ln  
. Rcactiorl co:lt~-ol 
. f I%).; i l en t  sys ttv::: 
&ENSTAR uni quc systems 
. 1'C 11:oJt:l.c~ 
. 'Il~cslr,ic~n~ c C O : I \ ~ C Y ~  C.YS 
. High te~i:pernturc? 3 * 3 1 ! i ; r i 0 3 .  
. A-.t b i d e  ~~zcir;t,rj.ng ( i l lc ludzs I;czt 
1.1 PC") 
. t ; f l ' i i t t ~ ~ i . C  
. ,ji,:%\ , t . - ,  . 4 7  C,.-;&j.jc;; 
, , , - J  
. 3!i.s::r.l!.2?;... ..:I:; 
l:, p.- 1.;  '. :;-, - i , < :*.., , -  
Actinide Wastc 
. Polycthyle:~~ 
. Att i tude control kjl: 
. 'I'antal:~i3 
PLscc;ll: Cool i n g  
Cocoon 
Shut t 1 e cont i.ngcncy 
TOTAL 
-  














OF POOR QU- 
pjecterf Eer fititre fiigh-lew'l wastes vifl  k reached, Present amrostes ore 
S f ~ s t  cerZain t o  ceatais far s d f e r  pz8poftimzs than =re caleelatcd ort 
&%e h r ~ i s  of FT,c.f:s 3zC&(',kj$zg 5s f&q';er 3, s 
'IBe difEcrr?ty with_ zhe pmjecricms is that olzest afl waste amage- 
seat d e ~ n t s  pat faeft by the AEC aQ ERiH h - e  based their figures rn 
oder pmcess,6 as six  sepmze neur- cGttires awt occur for '% to be 
accerding to the w~tpzl+, oT thtt CRIGZ3 code. me assmpalons are: a g-etry 
2nd fuel nanagsir.ent schc*&sle (plzcc~ent ; in  the core;etz=.f si~ifar rs  that 
p1anr.d for the  D5ablo Canycn reactor; a neutron flux of 2.92 x LO 13 
2 
neutronslcn -set; 3.9%- e~X'iched uranim fuel; a paier density of 30 %W[~h)~gg 
of h e a y  ;itt."ial, Actinide w a n t i t i t s  arc pZotte,4 as futrction ot operazing 
t i ~ e  up to a fu l l  b n n  of l l 0 O  days, correspnbing to a hsrrnup of 
35,000 (thf ,%g. Betzasc the prcducr:ion of crrrirtia is z high-ox-de~ process, 
it ~~cu!xzfa';cs %refit; s?ot.:l>* a: firsr,  baildii:g tip snxj- at 2 % ~  cni: cf :j?r t.grii. 
As the rate of production of 244Cs. is ris ing very rapidly at the end 
of the burn perid,  the actual quantities of  this  isotope present i n  the 
high-level wastes w i l l  be vei-y sensitive to operating practice. We do 
not have the resources i n  this  study to examine the  cffcct of reducing 
the reactor pawer belo# the s t ~ t d  rating,  of chaagcs i n  core gcotilet-ry, 
0-a PAGE IS 
m - Q u a  
is2 :kt ef f w ~ s  rsf o p r z ~ i n g  p~z t t i . c c s  an5 Eual zz;;sg~%eirs irrsrf -. 
as the$ off- the resi.dezce t h e  of the f u d  i i t  the core, stipulating 
26 f-6,*.2[fi:]f$fg, Z t  222 i3 f z ~ Z  A2eC sEgges;c< EQ ~5 t t i z f  ~-3i iq-s  in Zilc 
uicinizy of 25,000 Ei'id(ti;)f14g k-oulJ be mrc rca i i sE ic  ofer the next r's-c. 
deadc5 ~ f " '  ' ---,--.->L Z_.?7?. I-= -- .-it= . - - - &Lz:* L$>xg -:y ~5 ~ 2 ~ 2  
. . . . . . ;  $ 5  ~f:=t; izf- iy Sfjiiief--; - -  
,z 
5 r;z-;zg $c:z $ 2- % - 2 ---- .I-:-_ -I- , = ~  ,>. ,-,, ~ - A F  :.r, - - . ~ - -  % - ;: Z e  s-;z r?:-- 7;2;:& i-:3*.l:-c:: :;: -. = 
. .  . 8 - . - - +  1-. ,. *is t- i ~ - . t . - -  
.? 
r - :e  ..-= CL3 - --T - - _ .___ . i % -. . . -- - - 1 . - ..--,.-:: - &:.-:--I - ,--<. 
t --. * L- --=.a -- 1 1 r . ; t . . Z -  ; ,&:-. * - : * -  * - . -=~* = :. * ~*?-- . >- 2 :.:.:<:: I *  ~-*-.-.: . % .  
. -
and reS'r?eling ~~zc~r=&sres, :;c cxptl;r tha; l i t t le  of tlte spei;f fuel u i f  l hzve 
been burned to even 28,009 !.ii:d {th)A Ig . 
Thus, e.ger? i f  thc ORfGE:;' coda is z gno3 prdictor 02 t h e  rat: of 
isotope production in current reaczors, we b e l i e v e  that there is  very l i t t l e  
244Gz in present s l ~ e ~ t  fue l .  Actrral fractional iitventorics 244Ca be es 
low as 5-10% of thc ratios used it? the ifyla13 or iirt1.n~ studies.  
If this is the  case, ttie anzlyses ~;rcsenced i t 1  t h e  t i 2 0  ?<:riS:f studies Zo 
i. .; -. - .- 2 drttc - ; ~ s r  Ei:; aftcrr.2 tc! tE:,ftc ir;to a r c o ~ n t  \.cry ~ ~ . g ~ , ~ ; - c r . : l ~  c?fif" - - . -
in the properties of the hi&-1e;;el ~ a s t c s .  TLc conrinurd asss:iption  bat 
the burnup f igijrc of 33,000 :t~~';d'(thf f:4g is correct is more than "just" a 
serious error i n  cooaputing waste characteristics. For if the spent fuel 
does and will have m appreciably lower 24401 content than has bcen 
specified, the NBSTN! v c l ~ i c l e  proposed i n  the  Burns study w i l l  never -be 
0 200 400 600 8GO 2 4 6 8 1 0  
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able to operate, & the cusz figares a d  mdwrs ~f a5ssicms; xx~&red 
 qua^& in the KUA-Hk-land study are at least a fat- ef tm too high, f;T 
. ~ 
th i s  i s  so, ti;m the projectians £er ~ i s s i m s  wde: itr Czse 3, as sbw8 in 
Fig, 5.6, are actudly- a~roprizte  as a u p p  h w d  fez Case 25 i a s t d ,  
k'lt3tm~ the fiecessifiy far. fhe d~velcrp~mt a d  iastta'ilatisn of exzrzz- 
Qies grmcsd.aos. 
cwitt~ pforiuct lo;t Vzre as high as is reate&. Ca the  oz'irer h-arr2, sr: f*-~-=-c _  
s h m  that projected GiX-tt wastes will not have enough thermal pder to  
1-rrn ~ ~ ~ s ~ ; . ~  givcfi rcasr?strh2c assuq:'iioi:s zb@.~= t'iic efficiency of rep:-0, 
cessiz;. I f  the curiua %ere ~ ~ ? 3 i ' ; f t ~ d ,  the  separated fractioil would 5e a 
raarvelcttts sottrce f o r  pot.-zring a !<E!GSfAR. Ol-:ing to tfte vcrj- high themd 
power of t h i s  fractien, it wcufd be ~ossiblc io Pit the  saste pzcka~c w i t 1 1  
a f u l l  set of b a l i i s t i c  re-entry shic?i.?s a d  t5cl-zslly s ink it so t!:at even 
q;lorcd for rile transrrrzfiics, ccr k i ; !  accounts far  less than 1% f ? - ~ ~ t t ~ . l : > g  
99.5% efficiency i n  rmoval of uraniw and pluto~liun during reprocessing) . 
This would require very few i?BSTAR shots. Az interesting proposal might 
then be t o  dispose of the rest of t h e  actinides v ia  passive packagcs ac- 
cording t o  the aethod described in  the  !!MA-Hyland study, but with a very 
ORIGINAL PAGE B . 
OF BOOR gir- 
C d d  be instituted as a fai-.:f y soutise procedure. TZte far awe expumfe 
srd pss5ily sore bzarrims NSfS'FkQ la=mches kxsull be very inf re,yest--&at% 
e m  far wer). ORC hudrp3 crmventional lsmches--md far =ore: e-faberrtee 
safety ehecks, moaitor5ng, z d  contml cmX0 be instituted, The cttn-:cngianal 
in decisioils tftxt ~ m f d  totally preclrtde space operations at any reasombll- 
achlcvablc le~el csen if they xcre held t o  be thc  ~ o s t  desirable z e t h d  
for the disposal of t h e  u=tes. 
For instance, I c tus  consider f!:c curirn problcs ofice mrc. '$he 
purs~it cf the ful l  raced fuel burnitp o f  53,000 EP,id(th)/:>:g is never 
qdestio::cd zs a desirable gcta? i2 Iiizerature rclazinz t o  reactor operation 
or to t i l e  f ~ c l  cycle ;,I g::ilc:-tl. iij?'-..*.- . . . , , i:u;.nr; t;.o;:l;l l;ep tf.te fie1 
e f f i c i en t ly  snd produce s,,alier 'Lotal c,xiitr.ities oi- wasto pet u n i t  of 
electricity generated. Frm both the technical and.resourcc standpoint, 
then, ever-increasing fuel burns would appear to be highly desirable. 
However, the overall reduction i n  ore rcqttircments and mass and volurnc 
of spcrst fuel is achieved a t  the  expense of quantitatively grcatcr 
ORIGINAL PAGE 
OF BOOB 0 ~ -  
pro due ti^ of the Bigher irtinidcs mch as uer Was, wnim. ~alifornfur, 
-- 
- 
ctc.  This weald haye sajsr effects on f i e  opa%it&cm af m y  -waste 6 g e -  
~ e s t  sZzzfirgF rEse r q ~ i r e s  rhe partitimSal~ -of the scTkidss, Wftfimgk 
pfutooius is the ntlcl5ife that p r o d m s  thd -st cmcem rjbr the hclg tern* 
i r  is th% trznspluronic cleaents that present the mrt probless for uwrazion 
i%E the Zf%sps ef 5)*9Zi:F3. 
reprocessing, recgck, and asst especialfj wasre - - iag-~-~h~c m"r 
. . 
,>:<, ..*:=; -:-*; .\- 4 .  .:.= z?..~.. .-- - -. . -  . :. + 2 -  ;: .:!;~-? 2 < -*:*-:, z - ~  : - % 
.tt-=-;>st .- ... .. :..=.L- As %-: -.-- : . . -- - - -~ .  . 2 .- : .>.. t t iqs  c: <;;i2 i t r 3  - . ~~ 
. - 
tkPh high-level t;astes. 
Even the advent of rcproccssing and the associated atte~t ion  bchg 
paid to it and to Pu rec)-cle u i i l  %tot cfianic this. It>c rqrmessors are 
interested prkr i l j -  in the  least costly aethcd of mcczing tfte foxthcming 
regulatory requircmcnts for waste liaanageae~t. They  ill most probably 
choose sulic fora of vitrificcttioii for f!rc it iglt- lc~z? siistes zzd thus prevczt 
an)? possibility of prtrti.tionil:g, at lcast for the unstcs to Bc pruJitccd 
these-conditions even by a dcaonstrably operable space disposal sys tm.  
&at smld be required would he a social and pol jtical dcci sion that space 
disposal was the  rnost desirable and cf f ica~ious methcd of el ininating thc  
a 
long-tern pmblm of high-lcvcl nuclear wastes, and a determination to 




m i l d  w d e  not axerely ippo&sihl-e,;.albeit & l i k ; ~ ~ , .  lur it G.:aot prab- 
- ~ 
able i n  rfic d d i a t e  Eatwe, Nett&r;,hsless, it would Bc ~ & s s ]  rrctt-: ~. t@-gs- tftroitg:; 
- the exeslise of  exassittidg the kspacts of o possible space disa5ipi m~atza so 
that thase laaging the decision gill a t  least be interned as to w k E h e m  it 
I 
S ~ t f r i  Fs cuasidered a"+a13.. 
* 
= = 
C m  Spate Dis;roszf Bcaf :..: ttfl the Yo-Crr?xzit=~ C?+r?? 
-- ---------A 
bring aucl f i z r  pscr t o  a cczr;fcZe h z f r  as soan 2s pract?*cable, and the 
-. 
. . ;a ;.,-;;!? c;-=- c:;y-- 7 %.=, ?-:. <;2 c *-,--.c -2 7- : .-?- -. :- = * 
= f:acs:.j 2, sf::;: i3 - *  ii - ~. .  . 4- -.i; z:? y-<:-> 1 :- 5 .: :.!>:.:; 
case. 
The spent fie1 we2 fox- Case F &ill mount to zbmr 2SOoO>!g/>lc, As 
thc specific p v s r  of tflc spest  fuel u i t l  nsz be adcqtlate for tlte iiESf'.All 
type of-vehicle, we ntusr assum passive disposal  would be used, The high 
a c t i v i t y  of speilt fuel ,  hm:e.,*er, ~ o u l d  not allow paylonds t o  f?c f f i ' ~ ~ ? . ~  in- 
creaser1 over those sl:og+n on Table 5.2. 131c enctraa%s nwbcr of z i s s ions  
invctlvtif b:mtld not allot.! d i spasn l  of undiffercntiaEcd, unl;roci.;set! spent 
. . f ~ : . c . !  21:i.n i;: t1;j.t; i. ..;i.r;';r?i $,li.'..:th cJS1:. 
. 
As in mapeer 3, we s;y t hen  a s s m c  that  the speht furl  is rey~oecsscd 
I 
= g pxkar i l y  to faci l i tate waste disposa l ,  but that only the U is extracted for 
p a B  a +recycle and further use. A l l  of the Pu is then allowed to  follow the othcr 
PbOR actinides into t h e  high-lcvcl wastes. ‘ibis is not ~l togethor  unreasonable, r i f 
as it is the separation of RI f r o m  the othcr cmponents that  T X ~ S ~ J  Tt,e 
greatest concern tvcr rhcfe e:. diversion of  ~ietorjrtf s .  As 1-l~c ns', mass gf 
Pu is still saall compared to the other products in the waste, and as the 
. . 
. z  . . . 
Pu cortribh~hi l i t t l e  of the activity or thermal power, the packaging and 
. - =. 
-o>&at&nai cmr1jtio:ls ~ & l l d  be aezrrly the sa.c as f o r  the cases presiotielg 
- > 
The eajor difference, then, wmld he in the scope of the operation. 
fa; %!re iz&str)- size p & k d t d  by &$e F, as slbt~xn m Fig, 3.4, ZB;I:T 
c-. ei.,&;l 3040 :% uf repceseng  p+*cf~= xauf d k'2 aetessary, in5 ZGZB 3 z%lO1;ET; 
of =high-3et-ef ~; isYes  @BE&, ;iafwhg fur &a-increase in Pu, woufd case 
tt z?,~ziE 10E-250 f y r ,  tdr i~h w m ' t b  s k i l l  reqtfi+,- treei;ec~ SCC ar,d 1GOG 
~issirt;;s [depending on tlte p c ! : a g i ~ g ) ,  or f 000-2000 shtx*tf e launcfrss 
necGssar)t to 2~ to ~ > ~ ~ = t ~ ~ $ 3 z ~ ~ , ~  ".-.*----n f - . .  .+ " t.:::. z ~ i > ~ l . ; b ~ ~   hat^ & ~ ~ : ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
reprocessing cfficicncy or" 99.58 for I f ,  the aslnptotic operati~nal frt~rrls  
woxId be: 
80 wissionsfyr (160 launches) for  Case 2a packngizg; (1% fissiox products) 
SO missions/yr (100 launches) for~Cnse 2b packaging; (0.1% fission product 
- 25 missions f2-x f 40 fcut:chcs) for Case 2b j f t1rcx.e is f i ' i t l  e or n a  cur i 'x .  
Pcak levels xould bc rcac.fi,cri aro..tnd t h e  year 2000 zo reduce backlogs of spsnt 
The Irpact of Pf utonittm -- P ? c l  e 
-
Although we havc held r?tlrselves to exmining only an LKR-Il economy, 
. . 
the discussion of the curim problem requires that the'impact of going to 
plutonium Pucl be considcred. This is one example of a policy decision thtit 
would havc a profound impact on a pctential sp~cc  disposal program. The 
difference between the equilibrim \<aste output of a reactor ecoptosy us- 
. 
:- rmly'urs~iui and that with thc GEsMO plutonium roeyeie oonditi0n's ha$ 
. . 
-- ~i 1i.k GESFIO imci rrlatod dcicuplcnts it i s  usua~ly i tat& that, a:3thougli 
.the . . wastes -.. frm- . k b -  btxrtxing of ZDX fuel will have mnsiderably higher heat 
wrtplt zntt alps activity than those f rcin uri?lrt_a fml, dxiag tila back i n  
. . 
thermal power. and radiorictivity of thc oucral i B$gl~-level wzstes. Ifat even 
. ~ 
trse fo:! c t 3 f i s ~ .  e i c  l:.-crr,itr;n cycle str?rts trjrh I;G isotcpe I?aving T, h ~ g l : c r  
?'i r 24 4 
pss.rt t : 1 3 ~ ,  - - ' - G .  T ~ E  j>;-s>d:;r.:j.o:: oC Ga is t_kfg 3 i; j~uii:-orJ-;- f:;c:rt;-;i?: c-rp;~? -2 
r-. 2-- - - . . .  
, + I ; r  sf;',ii i:.- :,73:< F v ~ l r x  2-cc; .I ~ 2 r-pf y j  :I 2 i.o:ie;L! F 3;: -F--.-~%.-- 
- ->  L L ~ ' a  - - >-- ' -  
.. * -  
.' :: . t ?i,: : ci c , 
- *- . . * . .% -- ?. 
&: --; :. - - 
; : : x ~ ~ t ; ~ ; l  fil i ' l ~  a;.: ~ 2 : ~ : ; t  2s \:ell , ; tr.LiS, p y ~ d ~ ~ ~  l;i0!1 ~f tz ;- 5 ~.~~~:~> ' ,  t* 
a fourth-order process! and the 35% spent fuel rill coiltain about 50 tines 
as much 244~m as uraniun f ue 1.  
In ternis of uastc E',anageiitcirt policy,  Prt recycle my bc discussed rf:us.  
The nature of thc! space option i s  sucli that a choice to go t o  space is 
ur;!if;ely t o  he 2:-ttfe ii:dcp~:;deiit of o ther  cI:l~ic(:s ~i50itt t!?e f ~ i c ?  cycle. 
If the )~:.cthod iscussci! i n  t h e  1:y33:td s tudy  is the rtsab?c o;,?;iett, tfica 
of the i u e l .  liowcver, reprocessing is a ncnesszy prccondicioti for  cvcn 
generating the  h igh- leve l  wastes, ~ n d  t h i s  results in the separation of 
plutonium. Should t h i s  lead to a dec is ion  t o  recycle the plutonium in 07.-dcr 
- .  
- .  
. ~ 
% ~ 
< :  
. , v 
.. 
*. - a - - 
. = 
- -  - I . .  % - - - .  - =  . - -  . . k i . .  
f&nd s&ag&s &f uranim ores, the& t h i s  decision would ~ i c a i p r  a* 
. - 
-As smwn in Table 3-3@,* the m3;rtPvely -31 mctttnt Etf &DX fie1 woufd 
cap1etefp s~%81p any effects thzt  taamgeBmts of eGriched uzaruulrr Bef kmfd 
e 
Bsve on the p w t t i c n  af ci?ritua. s - 
enough tllerraaf po:eer densixies to ru31 t h e  titeimal -ion propulsion s y s t a  
5 
sf tila3'; a l s ~  , -- 3 - j : - -  j p??.nT .; b;- 
l,%)- &e Gxoi~se 19,  ICiO, altrt Ic?Q .i;hc:s,f'l'f.ef tf? Stl::d)' 
- - -- - --- 
Past studies1' " have atteziptal to areuratrly predict botll the 
sisc and clizracter of t ; te  nuclc.ai. i ndzs t ry ,  the devclo;xx=n: z:ld i:lr;tzf 1a;:io;l 
of co;wnercia2ly feasible technaiogics, and t h e  rate of potential dcxlelopaent 
o f  such processzs as p a r t i ~ i o n j . n g  i n  ardcr to project the scope of a hypo- 
t h c t i c a l  space disposal prozrzn. Ne Iiavrc 2 more modest viei: of our predic t ivc  
e - b i l i t i e r .  As we zxa ao: attmpti?ig to estimate opcrationa: cosrs ,  btlt 
~ t f ~ i . : f f ,  ~ ~ ; s ? z T c ~ ,  j>- 7 j z ) -  -j.:;;jiti;.t:.:fi~ - i'_; ;;;;:) i L f j i 3 ~ i  .- Of 8 1pcf.~:~: ;;:I 
disposal  yrograa, it is  alstl of l c z s  sigt~if icnrtcc C i . 1  thi? purpuscs o i  t h i s  
study that predictions be precise, What v:e do nccd t o  estimate i s  the rough 
scope of the program. Y e t ,  oar predictive abi l i t ies  do not s u ~ f i c e  cvcn t o  
guess within a factor of two or tftrec. As a result, we have ellosen three 
d i f f e r e ~ t l y  sit& prc;grms ,te examine: 
one about the size of that predicted by 
&e very small, one very I ~ r g b ,  and! 
= our &m proj wtions of the size of the nuclear indus.;r).. 
= - 
L - 
ID raurtchies annually by the year 2000 
fr*+-. .- 
, ,tt;on ~ ; f  25,; ~ ' i  allf..c& waif 2 % : ~  si?uciic f aunc'i: e;;pa3llit)t by the yea;+ 
2000, As such, tcc expecl tkzl it would tlot fiave a =i;ajor i~fpcf; an m a n u -  
zb 7 c. J-?. .. ?.a- - . . -  .,.- im c__rr:j: c_: ;:i?z .ii.i:;: Si2z l i i -  ;-t,. G: ' I : . .  . . -. 5;ixt4:i> ..... *,=+,. ' - 3  tkz ,-k*;: .- , T i . z  L '  z zc-z~:c:.-L-c.~~~:~l~~ !r 
20:;~l to ~ $ 2  S <  i:~i:b2:: eff l a ~ l ~ i ~ . j i . ~  S  Or, as 11~s 1tc.c~ stv d g : ; b ~ t ~ d  - clsew:lcre, spz,sr 
disposal night be considered tot expensive or r i s k y  for a fu l l - sca le  disposal 
program, but \could b e  used t n  get r i d  of a few particdlarly trmblcsom 
12gI 
and long-lived isotopes such zs . In the latter case, t h e  sn;al,i nux5er 
of annual laurtches required would instill. confidcllce in the ability t o  
closelj, c;?eck zrld  itito it or t he  J lspasal  Tli5i;"Ls, an:] ei..c:t to provide n back-LIP 
system to deal xitit yzotential zborrs. Cost muX5 I:<.: iic a n!:tjor factor fctr 
100 launches annually by the year 2000 
- - 
Tilis program, intermedizte i n  s i z e  for this study, is somctqhat smaller 
than that predicted by BhTfL-lf!00 for implementatioit bf a systeir similar to 
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- to rerye1 e p2uton.iun and: s p i l l  use space disposal to raioyc the loiig-livcd 
alpha-mittfng actinides yezf2mefitly fiun th,e planet. It is also. closer in 
s i z e  t o  our estkxitcs of thc scoyc: nf an ur~nodifieil progrm s ~ l c h  as t h a t  
suggested in t h e  flyland study if the fuel cycle wcre not mcrlaged t o  keep 
curium pr~duction low. 
For t h i s  case,  any iauiich s i i , ? ~  :'fiufLf be rcquimd i n  additforr-to 
Cape Kennedy, and a \iholc. new operational systca would have t o  be devisd 
ja:t to Rinnazc! crbi tsl traffir . lt is ~ : ~ s . t ;  prnbsble t f tnt this m r l d  be 
bityond the  scope of KASA %a azslzge, and ei:hcr ~ i z  inditst:ry or a ilc;? agcircy 
would have t o  take over responsibility for the progmm. 
R ,  E .  Hyfmd eE, a l . ,  Feasibi l i ty  of S-zce Disposal o f  Ezdln2.ct iuc 
---.- . . 1 - . -  -.- . - . . .--.-- - -- ----.--I -- 
Nuclear Waste, M A  Technical Pferaorandtm T31 X -291 1 (Esezu t ivc  Srtiziiary) , 
EASA L e w i s  Research Center, December 1973. 
Flight Center, Dctcmbcr 1975. 
for Bast reactors, present spent fuel inventories have a rb the r  10:u' 
ORIGEk! - The Oak Ridge lsoeope Generation - a~td nep ie t i c i~  
Cede, report R"ORNL-4628, Oak Ridge Natlollal L.?-boratory, Flay 1973. 
-
6. See F i p ~ e  3.9 f o r  an c x p f a n z t ~  --I of this psi-ni;. 
IbSd, 
establish a actual space disposal prwgxam. In partiwlar, ?USA and its 
contractors aroul d need these i n p t s  : 
--The necessary resources, including materials srrch as a p p q d a t e  
and t b s  to ensure that the progzarir has the resources !t needs, 
(2) to tlse these resources to  build the program, and (3) t o  nut 
prograz operations. 
practical " p e d ~ s i o n * ~  to acquire resattrces aRd thea gc ahead 
u5Eh tbe prurpzz-. 2Z;iotc that  i z r  the case of spzze disgoszl, 
m~m~ssicxn" to establish the pmgras is seeded fma foPeigin 
gawemamts, as well as fm1 US. agencies and such aon-go-- 
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would affect the overal l  f e a s i b i l i t y  of developing a gi(re? sized 
prc?gran within a. given a'itormt of time. We also discuss scne of the 
martagcnent strategies and i n s t i  tutionat arranguicnts th3t  ciight be 
needed to cope with s ~ i h  bottlenecks. 
Suck a2 analysis zlso cna5lcs one to idcrt',ify rhe i r ! ; i ~ ~ t z n t  -3lisy *-& -
qucstictns that  ?&3,5??~t deilisie~-iifzkc~s #ill face if  they wish t o  establish 
F- f ~ l  I- scale spaccj dj s p r  a1 propa,+ -;;ol: cy qr*estio~s rcprd i ng msocrsf: 
* .  2t:pu:s&;i;tn, cspcciafi :; fi;l~tc-~.a; :;uccia? ~~:;,?g;;~i~r; 2 ~ Z S C ~ S ,  52rd-i 2s 
the advisabi l i ty  of new personnel training programs; and the content 
uf iastitetiurtal arrang-ts on such featuss as liability, relatieas 
btueen 8ASA anZ other agescies, and betima &A artd ether cuas~tries. 
As a preface to our discuss5u-a ue shall miteraze twr, obvisus pis&, 
First, waste aatlag-t progmss, fike a1 hmmm sctiviites, inwltm 
Both techtical hadware and Eaasaa organizatitln, S u r t ~ g s  in either 
611 affect. Bow well a p r o g m  is established arrd operated, Thus in 
anrtfpzixig proposals for the disposkng of radio actitirt w s t e  ia extra- 
terrestrial  space at feast as s&~& attentioa should & paid to lir;tnagcssmt 
and institutional cmsideratims as t o  technical ones. 
Setond, any waste s;snagePeerrt prograta will B c c ~ c  quite large as the 
progrm "gees to scale", i .e.  changes f r o m  a prograss uhich is a small, 
essentially Niboriented unit, t o  a large, full-seale operational, gmgraci; 
its character changes profoundly. Ihe tm tmes of projects are very- 
different, not onfy in  quantitative terms of size, cost, and so forth 
but also i n  qualitative tens. They q u i r e  quite different managerial 
aa$ institutional approaches. 
A s  a project "goes to scalew at least  two types of ckanges occur, and 
special ipanageent and institutional problem are associated with each. 
As the project grows and expands--the quantitative 'aspect of going to 
scale--probleins are general ly  ones of logist ics .  Resource **bott tt?necksSS 
1 
can threaten to liiitit or slaw down the growth of the project. As growth 
continues, the project also "goes t o  routine ," i. e, , these processes 
which were once infomaally carried out became standardized, documented 
and routinized, This results i n  part frolil increasing daands on the 
~. 
pmgrant: that it mpfe way fnm an RGD orientation, tu e q h s f z i a g  
wth, elfifitsat perfomaaee an a large seale. At tho same time, 
the *wrsamZitp of the prograta also changes. It gees fazsr a small, 
ezcitisg plojeet full of highly qtlaiified, highfr mtZrratetd people tu olw 
of l~f e  math., m- . bring operatioas, where Bifigeaee a d  umpte8te 
-es Rqai*d ta l&ke s S-ttt le-Based Space Disposal Progrartt =a 
a Reralitr: zt Varied tevefs of Required h'umbers of Launches. 
Shce one cannot predict just hou large an a c t d  space dispsal 
program might become, we have decided to use three i n t m  
&ced in Gapter 5, to i l lustrate what forms a shuttle-based progrant for 
&ding the wastes out of the sofar system might take. Ihe  scenarios 
differ priarrify i n  the nmber of launches required each year by the year 
2000: 10, 100, and 1,000 launches per year. This chapter a t t q t s  
rough, prelifinary estimates o f  what resources each of the thwe lwnch 
levels would require. I t  is clear titat those areas where our ntmbers 
are most skimpy would be prime subjects for  further research on the space 
disposal idea. 
Total payload assuwtions. Based on the discussion of Chapter 5 
above and cm the BWt-1900 report the following sumary fipres were 
used as a base l ine  for the analysis in th is  chapter. I f  99.0% o f  the 
f iss ion products in the radioactive wastes are removed, leaving only 
1% fission products i n  the transuranics, then about 115 kg. o f  trans- 
uranics would be disposed of per space "nission": however, each 
%&Wee'?-- req@res - a m sbttk lasm&es fer its cmpfetian--qae t o  1if€ 
She paylea& + the d e r  o a e r  to l i fe  the special stageee ze&et 
ta semi the payfuad on its jourptey sut crf the solar systea. f f  
99-Sk% af the fission products orem resmved, then &cat 200 kg. of t-- 
u e c s  swld be dispbsed in awe faus& Eaissian. 'FBus the lrariw~s 
W r  of Lamches per Year 
-
ss.* F& out 
Shuttle eqzip~ent needed, E.SA estimates that a giwen shuttle orbiter 
could be re-launched every two weeks (or 25 flights per year). A t  this 
rate of re-use, the various space disposal scenarios would require the 
fcrllowiog narsbers of orbiters for regular use uith additional orbiters 
to back-up ~riachines. 
--I0 LPY (launches per year): 0-4 of m e  orbiter's time. 
--100 LEY: 4 orbitters required full-time 
--I008 LPY: 40 orbiters required ful l - t ine 
M A  anticipates that an orbiter w i l l  be able t o  f l y  100 times before: 
needing a taajor overhaul (4 years of operation, if it d e s  25 flights a - 
year. With an overhaul every 100 flights, the agency estimates that 
an orbiter can las t  SM) f l ighf  s altogether. Thus +!a waste disposal 
l i fe  time of an orbital design exclusively to t h i s  mission would be for 
t 
the three scenarios, 50, 20 and 20 years, respectively. 
Wber skittle q u i p ~ t  would hawe t o  be xep3aced mze often that; 
orbiters. The sulid fuel bmsters (tw6 needed for each fl ight) can bt, 
~ecotlecl mid refurbished; but after being used s u e  20 ties, they have 
tu be discarded. And the external fue1 tanks last only one n ight ,  
'Phe "trpper stagesm [space tugs) used t o  end the waste packages 
h Z 6  deep space can be either reusable versions or expadable oaes; 5Z is 
preseatly mcfear haw m y  tiates a reusAle t& could be used,, 
Grmmd farsifities seeded. If each o a i t e r  is Peing re-launched every 
two ~t'eeks, generally one zssmbly facility and launch pad is needed for 
every t w o  orbiters. This is  because it takes one week (160 hours) to 
assmble and faw~ch a given shuttle, meaning that only twu can be lau~cfred 
E-rw a given fzcility r'lurinp a giver? t ~ o  week period. 1Kis wot;ld mean 
thzt for the three scenario..;, 1, 2 and 20 sets of assembly f a c i l i t i e s  
&d launch pads respectively would be needed each year for waste disposal. 
I t  should be noted that it takes about four years to build a new launch 
facility. 3 
Resource Recpirements Ifith Associated Bottlenecks in 
Acquiring These Resources For the Scenarios 
A t  the various leve l s  of effort outlined above, what resources 
would be needed, and what logistics problems with the U.S. might be 
encountered? Extraordinary resources needed wwfd be negligible for the 
10 launches per year scenario because that program could be included 
eas i ly  into the presently-planned regular shtsttle program. Therefore, 
our attention here is on the 100 and 1OOO launches a year options. 
P r o b l e s  of Orbiter  Suppa 
Orbiters require abwt 30 -ths t o  build. A t  present two orb i t e r s  
aze under construction at Elactwell International * s facilities at  Palmdale, 
Suuthern C a ~ l i f o r n i a . ~  Thus, to  grovide t h e  4 orbi ters-required f o r  the 
100 raunches a year p m p x  say, within f ive  years fTon the start of t h e  
space disposal prograra, tam space disposal ~rbiters plus a t  least one 
back-up orb i t e r  would have lo be under constmction ear ly  in that period, 
W i n g  t h i s  additional production to %.he present c o n s t m c t i a  rate of 
two o rb i t e r s  a t  a tist: thus umld  nean mare than dosbling t h i s  present 
production. For the lOOC famches a year scenario, 40 new regular orb i t e r s  
with perhzps mother 5 back-up mchines would Ec needed; to have then 
a l l  in five yezrs, i. e . ,  del iver  ut average of 9 a year, 22 sprtct- disposal 
orbiters ti.o.alC h w c  eo be u d e r  censtruct io;l a? a-~y given tiae. 22 space 
disposal o rb i te r s  plus 2 non-space disposal orb i t e r s  means 21 under construc- 
t ion at a given time, 12 times tltc present rate. If those 45 orb i t e r s  were 
wanted iil 10 years, ther. 11 plus 2 would be under con:;tiuction--mugf~ly 
6 times the present rate.  In shor t ,  roughly 2 t o  12 times as mzny resources-- 
materials, construction f a c i l i t i e s ,  persbnntl--would be ceedcd, thozgh of 
course increased orb i te r  prodrtction \.auld bring scme economies of scale, 
llle obvious question here is how quickly such an expansioa of pro- 
d ~ c t i o n  could be undertaker1 without extraordirlary strain on supplies and 
the economy. A t  the highest launch lcvcl  scenario, it is a question of 
whether there would be enough resources i n  t he  country t o  do t h i s  type 
of expansion a t  a l l .  In shor t ,  would thcre  be f*bottlenecks: here, con- 
s t r a i n t s  on expansion, and if  SO, where? Since we uere able ne i ther  t o  
* 
obtain spec i f ic  data  on what kinds of reso,lrces are involved i n  building 
orbitcrs and related shuttle equipment, nor e s t i s a t c  how easy o r  d i f f i c u l t  
it is to expand suppl ies  of these resources, rie csn only make s d?ew 
general comnents, Most ~b~iously, a 12 fold increase in shuttle p b t i o n  
xwld be a nassivc undertaking, w i t h  aany logistics problem. F&rrhersorr, 
these logistics problems could become politicguy important, sinc; get tag  
the resources wcrtrld require special palitical action by the governsent. 
Finally, space disposal is a waste rrta:agement option that is corepfex and 
repires large-scale equipment : thus it uwild be difficult to expand a 
spacr: Fisp~sril systen rapidly. 
bbre detzjfcd analys is  r r q ~ i v a s  that a separation-bets- the mnstrcrc- 
t ion and operational phases be enphrsizcd. I t  is i n  the constntction p!lzsea 
tha:. 2 ~uiftbef o", j r . p f i z r ? i  cl?sngcs ;.c;: ! 2 take  p! ace which t-:auld introduce 
The construction phase of expanding space 'shuttle activities to 
acct~modate a rad i~ac t ive  waste disposal m i s s i ~ n  involves problens concern- 
ing both the availability of aaterials as well as problems associated with 
per5oniel and the facilities themscl~cs. Recent attention has been drskn 
t o  the types cf nsterial st~ortages that the U.S. aerospace industry currently 
is faciag. 
& 
(i'hc nl~tional corinitmtnt t o  encrgy independence a d  t h e  
' prudilcrion rcpire:r.ent of sorie military progsms such zs 
the PfcDanncl! Uouglas 1:- 15 and Rockwell i n t e l n a i i o n a l  
0-1 are expected to lead to shortages of critical aluninuii 
and steels, according to Comqcrce Uepartment of fkcials. 5 
Special note  must be made of the. effect of the Alaska o i l  pipeline 
an3 orher planned pipelines, as well as increased construction in the rail- 
m a d  industry.  which increases the demand on mtcrial needed in the  
-= 
1- seraspace industry, This is par t i c i r l a r ly  crucial since the orb i ter  stmc- 
.. 
. 
are is constructed primarily cf ~lmi~~urn, which is also used for such 
other s h u t t l e  conponmts as the propellant tanks of the: shuttle external 
tank. These aaterial shortages could create se r ious  "bottf enecks" i n  a 
large, growing space disposal program. 
- In a recent review of t h e  space shu t t l e  progm,6 there :gas an 
extcfnsive disc~xssion or" t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  e n ~ . o * ~ t e r e ? d  i n  crbtaining prqper 
mterip-is f o r  t h e  cera=lic re-entry shield blocks. The nat ion ' s  resource 
base for the p r e  mate-i.ials needed was s t r e t ched  t o  presmt liaits, as 
w e r e  f ab r i ca t ion  C z c i l i t i c s  adequate t o  t h c  jot.. Eve= a t  present pmgrm 
more inforamtion on what s p e c i f i c  mater ia ls  bo t t l e~ iecks  could affect 
each of the two larger scenarios. Data needcd t o  provide t h i s  policy- 
relevant infomation--and data t h a t  should be gathered in any future 
resezrch on the space disposal idea--include: types, quen t i t i e s ,  2nd 
q u a l i t i e s  o f  the materials needed t o  bu i ld  t h e  s h u t t l e  equipment and 
ground f a c i l i t i e s ,  especially r a r e  metal alloys;  percentage of t h e  present 
t o t a l  U.S. supply of a given material  t h a t  would be needcd by a givez 
annual launch level  especia l ly  t h e  dra in  on supply i f  a prograra c?f 1000 
launches per year were undertaken; important alternative uses fo;. these 
materia -, such as  i n  the  production of c i v i l i a n  and military a i r c r a f t ;  
and technical  and p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  increas ing t h e  suppl ies  o f  
important but rare space s h u t t l e  r e l a t e d  materials .  I t  is obvious t h a t "  
? 
heaq- deraand for mater ids  could trigger unmticipatcd secondary effects 
such as those discgsscd in  Parts 111 ar,d IV. 
Space shuttle  construction facilities are also of siFal concern. 
These fvcifities are essentially l imited at presen; to the factories  of 
Rockweli International an3 the othei- cont rzctors and silb-~ont ractors 
invofvcd i n  co~;st;xtcting sltutt f c c q ~ i p ~ i n t  and g m 3 d  Ezcil i t5.c~.  A 
catral coltem wou.30 he +&ether th:! U.S. aeroffsace in3ustry c w ~ f d  
effieieritly absorb a rapid *msion af space shuttLe pmductioa. Specific: 
infamation on this &xtter is nearly coinpfctefy zbsstt, Though it  is  
likely thab-there nay be so- excess 1960s-built aerospace product;.o~ 
:J 
cg+cfgy zvaila$:s in 2 3 ~  iz&c;tr;; izs e.y;cnncould not b: d~.:c~;.:J;ed 
ky c.ur st::@ te:?. 
FL"iii;~ ari2-Sr_:,rsl,z en ::179 space disp;3saX propssal wrirl.2 requdrs 
following data: types and nuzber of facilities needed to build shuttlc' 
equipment, especially orbiters; spec i f i c i t i e s  of needed facil it ies for each 
of the t h r e e  scen~r ios ;  and how d i f f i c u l t  and time-coas~biing it would 
be to  expand present shutt le  production, especially whether present id fe  
capacity could be cctnvertcd to shuttle uork or whether whole new aerospace 
factories would be needed. 
Availability of const~uction personnel prc;ents another sc9 of 
eripluys about 45,009 constr.rctian workers, a fi~~:i:bei- xpected t o  stay 
fairly constant for the next several years.' In estimating t h e  mmpouer 
requirement for the three scerrarios, however, it is not reasonable t o  
extr~polate t h i s  figure for the construction of two orbiters to a sing.le 
" 
linear project o f  somg 500,00~ workers working on some 24 orbiters 
neccsszry for Zhe largest sca le  scenario. First, some ccononics of scale in 
pmduction should be realizerl, Secaad, m y  of the present workers are 
designers and R&D spcciaiists who should nat be seeded through the eratire 
I ifetigte of  a long- tern, large-scale space shuttle production schedule. 
Still, a rnpid o r  rnoicratc-ly y x e d  sxpansictn of shut t le  pductiorn would . 
require significattt; new n~nbers of persortncl, including new engineers 
ar~d increased nmbcrs of presently rare specialty teehnicians, such as 
tilanicm welders. S ~ C ;  it often takes  cortside.=able t j ~ 9  tr t ra in  such 
skilled pe~sonnel,  sho-ctsges c5 some type of workers wmld likely b? a 
major bottleneck to a large, f s i r l y  rapid expansion of a shtrttle-based 
space d i s p s s i  p m g r a ~ .  5-i~ t o  *.he exttrlsive t ra i~ i r lg  to' produce high 
quaf it:- aczwspacc engineers tecimiciaits, shortages of these tips 
of peraniic-f c ~ i l d  d.=lz-y z Inrge-scali. spzce d isp2sa l  progl-a3 f . 3 ~  years a;;-: 
a i-cl=.c- .-.T, - 2. JJ-~+ZI: ; - . : ;C~  fr&;i ( . ; i i~7 . -  pcr-kai?r cr.-:.21! ic:p~i-~an?. aersc;~,rc 2zaf ct;zs. 
should be done oa types and nuinbers of perscrmef needed to construct 
the shuttle hardware for a given space d i s p s a l  scertario, thc,present 
total U.S. nuzibers of these types of personnel, how-much t i ne  and money 
is involved in training additional personriel, and where the most cr i t i ca l  
bottlenecks are i t 1  t h ?  persoms1 ~i cture. 
- ~ R ~ S O ~ I T C C S  For 0yerr:tioils and. :-:;intenante. 
--- -- ---* -- -- 
Once a sp;icc disp~szl profra:; is t ; . ~ i . l t ,  it nrcrst=bc opc:ratt::.; ;nd maiiii-. 
tslccd. Resoumcs needed f o r  operat ion al-e l ikgly to pose substanti a1 ly 
different problems fram those prompted tj. the construction phase, Of ' 
coure the magnitude of resources needed will vary accordink to the spec i f i c  
scenario. 
... 
Expendable operating materials, especially Euel, will requi- 
special attention. Each shuttle launch requiras 95,800 kg (220,000 lbs)  
8 of l iquid hydrogen and 603,300 kg (1,339,WU lb s )  of liquid oxygen ; ir 
also requires fuel for the solid Zu5l boosters. Serious obstacles 
to the rapid expansion to a large space disposal program would be 
present if it is djfficrtlt nr very expensive to incrzase the pmductim of 
orbiters, especialfy during overhauls also present such n5stacles. 
Qar;itin= G ar?.;' r s i n t  enence per-sonr,cf r;:sy be avail :ible f 3 x 5  rhe p o l  of 
th i s  ntmber. Financing requireme~lts present another potential ly formida- 
bl r problem. 
Capital. - BiVlfL-1900 estimates the  cost per f l i g h t  of just a 
shuttle is about $10.5 niflion. However, every other f l ighr i n  a space 
disposal p l . o g x z ~  would include not just a shuttle orbiters but also a 
third stage; t h e  cost per flight of z shuttle/rcusable tcig i s  &out 
$1 2.5  trti? l i ~ z n ,  sh i i t t :  c/t.x~:ci.,d;!ble i.hij-9 srngc, abmtt $1 G n i l l i o n  (197,: 
9 
i; ccis t sit::.3 I C : t i 1  li an u'itllars) . ?'!ius a 1COs laiz~ci?es r: year pi,ogrLG k . ~ i " "
----- 
a year, in 1974 dollars; given in f la t ion  and cost overrtins, the actual 
--- 
price could be much higher. The reason for such high costs i s ,  of course, 
the large capital investment that  s h u t t l e  hardware requires; for instance:  
a shut t l e  orbiter costs sbout $300 million. This firancia1 requirement 
adds great ly  t o  an economy already s tra ined  a d  forced tiith Lht. prospect 
of huge capi ta l  outlays for energy production facilities. 
Policy cpestions associated with --- the nmgrams necessary to assure 
adeq:~atct. resoi?rces . ?'!I e fact that acqui ring adequate resourscs might be 
- --
2 problen far 3 largc, rs2idly exya r ,d i~~g  s p ~ c c  dist~asa]  ~ , ~ o ~ r a n  raise_; 
a msjor pol icy  5 ssue: uhzt technical, rr,anagcne2t, and institutioilaf 
ar2 avai l skfc  to  the progra~>? A brief discussi.ort or' stt~ii:> of these issuzs 
f ~ ~ ~ t ; ) ; >  2 j i ;  :;, w;,;!, st;.; 2 . !bcic. ' .~ no l j~ , : ;  oircr.tr:r: j'.:;cl;,. t o  t t :  fr .6:~' :  
* , . .  - . ,  -. ??...?<, 6 ~ ~ j - r . :  ( j 7 L - : A : : . : ~ ~  ;; c : , . . ~ ~ : : ~ ! ; ;  j.3 <.a ::::,~>:,;! \..l y-j; s.;,;c.: <;-::-;?.:?'.: c;>lj qzs, 
6.. 
. . - .  j.czr :-:>;jq.3 e;?;l fi<; 3.*;,;;c -;-o >.:.I--. Qy*:?:<e;;:.> g: j;zq, i,ct,!':cji $~?-: T&i;l.->j.;:s P & .  
of resources availsS?c r;nC ?.he a;;,ounts needed by tlia P ' L ' Q ~ I ; ~ ~ :  *fl;e first 
would be t o  develop nen ways tecl~nologically to increase the supply of 
rare m~terials and personnel. For cxanpfe, new cethods should be pursued 
to produce and machine ileedc3 al loys  o r  eel-amics rrtore e a s i l y ,  it:~re 
quickly, i n  greater q u a n t i t i e s ,  and perhaps cven at  lo;;cr u n i t  cos t .  
Developing silcli nett litctflods oftcr; requires rtew RGD progrars ,  which in 
resources? Second , new ways to cu-i: the prograin' r dc:nrgid f o r  i~srtic:;larly 
rare resources could be developed e i t h e r  by usifig mre avai lable  substi- 
tu te s  or even technica l ly  eliminating the need for the  resource altogether. 
. 
For instance, if titaliurn welders appear t o  be i n  short supply, f i n d  a 
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way to  cut the nudjer of welds needed per orbiter, or f i n d  a way t o  use t 
other, r,.arc available weldz:c-. Additional RGD miglrt be n c e d ~ b  i n  t h i s  area. 
3i i ird,  increase ?!lc s i . i ~ ~ ~ l y  OF resources zvt l i lzLlc  i c i r  tiie sl;::c-c: disposal 
prograz could be incrtaseG, m d  thus assured, by cutring the dcniand other  
programs Eave for t1:esc sane types of ~osources .  In pra:tice, :his uould 
l>s 8jf-Ficj;It, kh?l.\~]l i$[ksj ~~ . ; I j~~o ;>- . c ; :~ ; e : j - -~ ,  ~ i o t a ~ c ~  g,:~:? ~ - 1 : ~ :  I-,:; ia, ;- 
cis 1;"33.kj.;>z ~ k t ?  ~*~'SOT:>;:;<: r ? r e  - - - -  -; 
-v- 
, \ i I : - <  c3ti-:er :*;-:?IT-.... 1 i.!:; ?.iLcI. LL,! ' l~:. i 'k * c 
using t he  52:".;3 E E Y c I - ~ ~ I  5. FSrln3 f y, i l l  i he  fact: of ,j iks ly  pexs si.e:.it -+:,?;'t P ~ L S  
j:p,,C.,', cculd si :.{\I j. i.i.ll2 tllc yt~.:a~,rl:;;t s yt:.:. of ~..-r::::?::ici::= cut 2 ~ 2 : : ~ ~  c ; .  
its shci-t-tern d e ~ t ~ i f d  for resoUrCcs. !ti7 it::i?3~ta3t pol icy  cfiieslio;:.~ if 
. . hc:,- j;.y-j1 L:rys<T - .r:y.> c 5 :,,<x i::,<....: . . 
.-. ' 
, ' c::.t.::;:::. ~: -. 3 .  l . . . - , : ~ r  a:..> c.-- :,1:.2.<: 
I r. 
i: &.$ ..* , 2 : ; . , .  :* <.:::-:.; 2 sFy\<:cv .:-; -,>:c:,-:.< 
. I  . 
ij-<L':2:.:i <:.~ ;: 1 .:-- . .  - 
. & .  . !.:"?.;: I.::.;:* .? ; ;. :.:, ;<.: .-.* : : ;- :, . - . _  .?= :..:,.. ... ! Ji, -.. , , ,  
meridations ori ;zi)ic:: rcsorircc s t ~ e t c g i e s  ;.i;i.S,i shortlt': U:;C .',t f i !5 c;:.e i l' 
space disposal, or what RGD p r i o r i t i e s  i t  should se t .  Yet it is clear 
t h a t  f c t  IdASA dccisi.on- :nl;zrs ~ i j l  fiks.1.y bc prcsscii t o  1:eep thc::? 1:lndr: 
of "technical ly" related pol icy  questions in n i ~ i d .  
li!.zna~zmz~-rt-rt?lzttd aspcc. - of t h e  ~~~~~~~~es ?I:.ture xlsu  ?,ni<c! 
iri~por'i ant policy c~iie::tions. N,'CSA 2nd the  aciQSpncC i n , l u s r r y  aye ; , - zady 
exycrt jn t l i ~  procttrcracr~t of rescxjrces atad r-hci r USE i n  c.nr;s trt!.cii on ,IS$ 
. - . . 
< - < : ; ~ : q ~ ' ~ ~ j ~ ~ ; ~ m  \:p ~j-):!].1 sip?]~ ~ ~ - . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ r : ~  ?-.;:yek? ~ i v ~ ~ j ~ l :  - : x : . ~ i i >  SL:- . ; .  ~ : . : i : s . ! i ' r < .  . - 
i , , :  of sy:.c:i rele;.ance .to SI?:CZ < i f r , ) ~ ~ ; ~ . !  id?:. , 
i:irst, because of the u,~prccndcnteC tir.2 spa11 o: thc  space dis;?=rs.;l 
program (30+ years], NASA kfoulb need art unusuaily long-range rcsourcc 
planning capacity; it would need t o  i d e c t i f y  long-tern resoursc needs m d  
.c 
then make recomn~endatiorls to the rest o f  t h ~  prograa management conccmj.ng 
pr02~3rn C , Y ~ ) ~ ~ S ~ O ; I  T ~ ~ C S ,  ptncul-cmc~it p~licjes, and RCD i!rlori:.i.es. Tf:c 
me kcy policy qwstims here are on has t o  organize such z research 
a m The eeacy tra&+,ionzlly has left m z i p C & r  de.;.efo~- 
m t  to the mqorate a d  c&seational sectors. Wlt at least s ~ z e  S?SA 
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be asswed, f t is not c3c-r :kt turrezL rz?laqce +xi cox-pz-zl',e ajri for 
Tnirb, a rtajrrr siiitznzgeater.t isstre is likely to eriierge concerning 
L-icludicg tircc z a;urc?gez:c:lt of restxarccs, or  d;et'?.r r the agcficj- skoitl d 
turn p3Tt or a l l  of t h e  pragrzx ovei to z ~rja?r.te conrrzctor. NASA is 
pmgr;&3 ~ 5 ~ 3 d  Ir4;-3;ve i;;,-.jor c$z:i;?or I:: bock titi.. ~ 9 2 c . y ' ~  : i z t ,  k ~ d ~ c ? ~ ,  
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nc d n c i s i ~ r ,  on i:!;;t5er o r  zzt to ;~.;iai,c t3i progx-,n directly w\.rrfd 
have significant pol i t ical  consequences PL Xi'SA. bnning the program 
- 
directly gives the agency a degree of dimct control it srould not get 
with turning operations oirer to a contractor; yet it also means that 
t-;:'.s$ t&es t l .2  yoli-cical criti.~i?z ff.,ert to bc a gzjr>r acci<cnt, 
Becoating a supezvisor ar regulator Beans that WASA takes only part of 
the criticisn eere thcre to bc rr najor acciden~, Becoming a sr;pemisrzr 
oz 1~3~:_3;:t.-r p.<-~>.; kl=_tt 2;t.i;A t2::i;5 o33y p z l r  r:f 7ll.e fTj  f % r > ~ ~  fC1' t;n.fC-$~~s; 
4 :  y, ... l. .,- <. -.: . .. - ~2::: y ~ ~ i 3 :  t f i : . ~~  i::if: ~ z ~ i : .  Hs.::~\;ii.ey i~ C~~trzCt:~z rf:c:az5 grg 
.) 
11522, s c s  fc-5; cr" r.r.nt;ulf r'er ?<55ri 5s likely to be &drd tc; i n c s ~ s s  
.- . 
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e;;.e';ractg-f, &itii its zcgu::2~ion Ee czbried c x t  by r-;;3ti:,r- g ~ ~ ~ ~ i f z , z ; > z  
agency, si:ch as the Federal Aviation Adrj.,inis:ration. This uwld take 
f;%5.4 GT: %st?% fo:. p.'-'tt'lc: .;, hi: ~ L s . J  ~ t z n ~  tit35 t & j j ~  it w i ) ~ l i ?  1 jcit  
KASA's role tiiainly t o  FAD thus l init ing its overall role and foregoing 
a stmnz ratiozalc fo-r increzsiny agczcy fmzdine, it s ~ t ' ~ l d  reduce borh 
external p ! f t i ca !  pressure and avoid the internal sercss a prc;r;n of such 
religion, the educational llestablishment,l' and foreign governments form 
significant sectors of NASA's environment. These instit-utions are large, 
long-lived,-2nd powerful social gmups. They %re significant to &ASA 
'I 
because they are the sources of considerable pressures and for  incentives 
- ~ 
for agency operaticirs. he--esyeeiaffy  gotremmentsf agencies central 
z<$sfiss pQ::e strings, zcr! sei; c;crtzla cr;ndi+Fons ea he;.; the mrtey is t:, 
be used. Others often play a major role in d e t e d n i r g  frw well a pmgran 
c z ~  cr will perfem,  or, indeed, whether it w i l l  even exis t  a t  al l .  
l=zt~.2r c=?fj-s c>.p, critt-?;e T{>~I' ,  22%";r,l-cec;-s, &~~?-s55  C:~T el i ; ; ; f ~ t ~ t g  
C r 0- 
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nznsge;ilzcts ;issociztcd u i ~ h  space d i s p s a l  cE radiozsfivc wastes. 'i'k 
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to foreign poxers in order to g 2 t  their cooperation, Cther chapters of 
i s  G i . j 1j::yc k.2 br ie f ly  note socc of ti;? 1- 
instifutioilal issues associated ~ i t h  ~ lrc  acquisizion and use of resarces. 
l y ^ i l  ~~:t!i~~l.f;- 222 ft:z2il?- t%.- i~??~s ly  is +fie ini?.lal  end. Fu~?.ding 
ma)- be Zsund eilher firm privatl; insCiCurio;;s such as banks o r  fron tile 
* 1CI1:dcril r.; ststri ~r::;s:.rics. C-r {or I;I'oR~::~ s :~c>  ; : z ~  r p c c  ~ ~ Z S P ~ S ~ J .  
of prtblic policy ar i se .  Should funding cone direct ly  f r o m  Congressional 
apgropriations? I f  so,  should the  money be in  thc NASA budget or the FRDA 
budget? Or should some sort of  t rus t  fund be established, financed by 
- 
l ev ies  on the users of nuclear-generated e icc tr ic i ty?  And i f  such levies 

indiwi&als md cornunities into &ich the operational activities of the 
propam are carried out, Before we turn t o  a discussion o f t h e  second 
order ispact l e t  us ex3rnice  he diarac"ser uf the  official govern--* . l - ~  
altitudes a.zd p b 1 i c  ~%ri. f lrdzs  t c ~ a r S  the prctgrz-. This will afford 
a 0 v a e d  insight regarding the kind of reception semdary iqacts 
;=cc~:ii;e 2s r>e pwsgzap is e..ezFur;c..=.t ?.?-$for $ ~ a ~ ~ e n ~ n t : . - : ~ .  
Center, Space Shuttle, February f 975. 
2. Yhc,%2 cozversation xith Ir. Hwizrd Rt-.semari, Pmgf;ta Etraf sa tor ,  Space 
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unpreccde:i~ed t;i.n>-s. Sot ~ i t l 3 -  have the  Kucicar Kegif atory Cmzission and 
the Encl-gy Research acd Dsvc3ops:ent Administration increased their  interest 
i;i 2:h.;: arc&, bzr ti;-;y f=:i;i;. bc;.~ jcil; :j bjr the f ~ ~ \ r i r ~ ; i : , l < t z ~ ~ ~  Protection 
Agency, the Cwmcil on Enviromenzal {kalify, the Office of 33nagerne:~t atd  
. . .. PuGget, tile FpJfi al Ei;r;rc:- : % & l i ? ~ ~ :  y::tj czt z::l c j t ~  ~ \ I . - : ~ : S ~ ~ . C  Cf-gz;j j 
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outside stakeholders--incittding the nuclear industry and t h e  mtclear crit ics.  
Thcir decislon premises and constraints will be considered and assessed. 
A specific decision which has iinplicatioxs for rhc spacc disposal option, 
" plutonium recycle, will he examined t o  show dlc problms that alternative 
for waste trtanagement faces i n  being adnj~ted. 
The dsreinmt desire song a l l  Federal agencies is t o  reduce the 
uncertai qty which prcscnrl y characterizes waste ntanagetrrent policy. This 
mrze:.taj ni;y stex?, first fml:: tf..s La.& cf z: adc"-~~zee know1 edge base Co 
dcsig ,~  t le teci~.iologicaf core sf a waste trtasragaeiit systeq. h%ife  tirere 
appexs :o be a general sense of confidence in ?he office a1 posititxi 
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of agency actions and to preparing legs1 c!ia3 lerges to agency plans, Sue? 
bc?lavior, of cEtrse, preztry dc=?ahif  izes the p o l i t i c a l  environment for the 
Federal a: c-itcies cflzri;ec! \t.i;.lz dcur-1 oping and iq'i ci i ient i~g was tc managenent 
policy, 
!:?bi-rzl h:2-eL:;;cfa,-.:- f~-35 t y<37 ; .nr?>:25  ; ) r ~ - f ~ ~ u r ~  re-,.%--.-= zv c r  L\c PTCSCIZ 
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t o  the  need t o  provide t h e  nuclear industry with fin regulations required 
t o  design facilities for the back-end of the fuel cycle. 
Given the uncertainties irnd the pressures t o  reduce thea, f t  is hardly 
surprising that only a narrow range of technical alternati~es for wwte ~ 
ass;:geii;ent i:; hcizg przuc3.  The range is ieflncxf by ~ ~ z r  f gT~rs: 1s 
technology perceived as being virtualzy 'bne the shelFS? 1s tfte eftemaZ3ve 
"cost e f f ec~ i t . e '~?  I? i r clezr  hat Ihose vzriablcs dezinate fhe ~-~itraiz@ 
~. 
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EF3. a:id CEQ bath feel t f t z t  suzh an oit:cmc soufd he r;ost iu:fortun:ite. 
Until this last f i sca l  year, the  Office of Msnagemnt 2nd Rudgct has 
~ , 3 i  bc<:rl Jsy;s&. jcs f~rl .~~;:ia: zd;;c:r,ci for- \:;..stc n a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f i :  ;;:i.:>-'.--- 
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That behavior m s  due partly to their traditional approach to budgeting 
vIGcf; hef d t h a t  if thc agczcy i tsel f docs. no?: seek zoxr eiliqe!', it i s  zct, 
llte role of @.iB r.2 :iovr.,:i\efn the org-mfzztion w i r ; ~  largesse. Br~dget 
recently received major it~creases i n  their budgets for waste management 
act iv i t i es ,  the U4B nom of guarding the  treasury against profligate 
agencies remains. A l l  proposals arc given c lose  scrutiny. 
- 
9ks other Ex:tutive agencies, Ihe Fedezaf Energy Ari&nistration and 
of waste B-gezenr, policy. They are pri~ar- i ly  interested i n  qui-ck 
werrieritatiun o f  sotee sort  of a systera, %either is prticularly s e ~ s i -  
of their ic?eas have already been zdopted by the Comission. Two 5igriifi- 
cast pzssagespresented in tcstino~y before the .Joint Cornittee or! A t o ~ i i c  
Energy in April, 1976, suggesr the important s h i f t  in the Nay t>c Fedem1 
burczucracy fiss conceptualized the problem of ssaste managentcnt. 
. . Bit &r.;s)~ns \ y ' ~  Z Z ~ C  ~ i ' e ~ ~ d j ~ : ~  e- ch:? ::l;L?la~~zent 
of n.trcle;!r was tcs mst providc: p r o i ~ c t i o n  cf  t h e  pub1 5 c 
. - 
f,lr i::-i o q ~ t i i ~ f .  f:;e Csiljlot 7.a: <iff rhos-;: il~clsx.;.:::: 
o r  a t - t i c ~ - ~ ~ .  to  Fciture g ~ n c r a f i o i ~ c  or to u~?'ir,oxrr trch- 
,.,A 1 , . 'i' . .
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Among the ingredients for the safe msnagencnt dnuclear 
wastes tco that stand out are a trustk.~rti.j* techcology 
and a prGcess for the timely implmentation of that 
technology. The f.%C paogrm is addressirtg both. Having 
the t;e~hl:ology on the shelf is .noi enough. Criteria are 
required far ~.eteetion 02 o p t i ~ m  technologies and far 
*eiy op-~&;it i on, ~ ~ ~ a ~ S . z z r i @ : ~ i s  riust carry 02t ?.he tasks . 
Aqd t j c s g  a~gani:r;t_i;r:s w s t  hzvc c~n&tnic~t tG f ~ l l ~ ~  
t I i ~ i f ) ~ $ i  I- 
. ... f .  --. 
Althrrugh there wif l be criteria Ztgvancad ?a for 2eafing ~ L t h  the tecbmolagieal. 
core of thz syst~::, every 1;zd2~catim =su~f:csf ,c thz? the forthc~zit . ,~ st.,atm~;?t 
e*- * - .  
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of the debts &ich are articulztcii are: i lot  l imiting t h e i r  fut-tize a c t i ~ n s ,  
not sprea&ing our risks to then without con~vraitant bzncf i ts ,  not- cveriy 
Translated into design o5jectives for a waste aanagement system, the need 
and cmtinued operation, 
I f  the NRC has charted a new course in its waste management operation, EW.4 
has continued along rnu.41 the s m e  path taken by the %C for the past 
.- . 
:' %iwent)-yea;rs, - 1.n a.e- Spring -09. 1975; - the Divi-s&n p£ Was t o  Management and 
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nucl&r fuel opclc,. ~ < ~ ~ ~ ~ ' & ~ ~ ~ l ~  bf $hat b u ~ ~ ~ & ~ a t j ~  -shlft:i new dir&ctP+--:':-. ' - 
Kmeover, 1,RJl.i hhs i l ; c ~ c ~ . - i c d  i t s  ';'a;ldl.r,g o f  t!iz 'so-.crr: 1.cd adv,~nccd 
concepts such as seabed disycsal . That altarnative, in fact, has attracted 
only solving the technological problem but of avoiding sume of the p0ter.t; ? L  
polittsal and t?zmaiza~i~)i"tal p-;oblrpir; associared with f~zirt 45sposal uf Plie. 
the pressure t o  get  OD w i t h  those efforts that even the lu.ier5or Department 
which presently adteizfisters the area has objected to the haste w i *  -which 
the project has been carried out, The intent rearains, hawever, t o  have 8 
* 
facility capable of accepting high f eve1 cummrcial waste by 1985, 
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pTaa. ?%at la t ter  idea is still kicked a s a n d  Crm time t o  tiw. Yet, 
hak5ng interviewed iireually a l l  the people primarily involved in formulating 
aff pointed to its high cost and unproven technofogy as "the reasons for 
their rr jecilcit. 
TPte only possible mason idiy these inffuentials might chartge their 
future getiefazions. Such EL dramt ic  sh i f t ,  kowet~er, co~l ld  not. originate 
in the bureaucracy. it would have t o  be initiated either in Congress or 
t 
in the Office of the President. Neith~r af those two branches of govern- 
ment show any signs of &pang such e r ~ o ~ e l  attitude. I n  short, despite 
1 
the vkrifsq of ezqhsis a td -  apprwck ghat is presqz i n  the Federal 
bureaucracy today: iz see= unlikely thaz sufficient ettpport for the space 
- .  
resources required Eu c;s&>- iwt f3re praject sill not be fur&hc.ming. But 
i f  there is li f t l o  support inside the goxperA1ment 5er the idea, is &ere 
are sowo diffemneak song ukirit ies ,  vendors, and e~gi;x&ring firms on 
H i s t t ;  -_ically, the ixdustc has often obj ccCed to aiXditionaZ regul atow 
requirements For waste management. There was, for ext;r;rplc, substantial . 
opposition t o  the adoption of Appendix F to lOCFR50 which ~eqttired t h d t  
fought the idea  of a Federally opcrat cd yexnanent disposal facility. 
Frm these historical positions, xe can infer the i ~ d ~ s i t ; r j - ~ ~  res::i?nse 
to the syfe sytins. lie woi?'t_d C-X;YC~ t h e z  to be I ~ r g c i ~  op;.ose? b.c?cau..;c 
i* . . $ .  .a< *;.::I< !z:---. . ~>.. E*? - z!~;~,-.- T;:c.ir .~ c.: 
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CI of tile nsclcar c r i t i c s .  inere at,-e najor ciiffercnccs =brig these. Bgt 
raillion years. Other critics range to at1 extrenc pos i t ion  colorcd by their 
par t i sm cpposjtiox t o  nuclear power. If they t o  co~cede that  eny 
technological alternative night, in fac t ,  be viable, they ~ouid lose a strong 
" 
aniging point in favor c?f their pdsition. 
.i I t  b Lird toGpredfct just a t  podtlon the 6 le .r  critics d L d  -
s d q t  tmmd the space d i s p l i l  option.. On the one hand, they might be 
cxtre~ely sgcptica.1 abut  claim nado for the systm's teehnolb~ical . . ' 
reliability. On me other, :they would probably approve sf the total .. 
L 4 
-v21 of the material frozkthe earth if a-reliable system could be- 
* -
",',% 
dmo& tratcd ,' , 
. . 
3 
-+ I t  soans clear, hmever, .that no. oyertBc?s;.ing i ~ ~ ~ c d s r r e l l  of &uppost: 
for the space d i s p o h l  n p t i o ~  exists  today cithZr insihc 'a miside of .  a s  
Z 
.. - 
6. . < ., 
7- go;ieiin~ac nt . 31c spzcz n?te).xi.ativr, is percei ~ $ 3  as j u s ~  mt6 beicg hracticsl 
i 
.,. 
@ this tim. 
, 
C 
K:5i ;:C 125 for .?<t;:;?fj;22 t::a S?tZr? 0pfd :; ;Z..:C 2%: 1-5y.l ; c< i~ 
. - . - 
. 1 . - . . , ,:. ( ! : c i s i p X  i:::f.;;.-.. ,... , A:: XU i::--:e *>.-.- :'i,yJ 8 L7 
, 
, - ; - . i: .: ,..?> b': '<..I i 1 2 : . ) - s ; i : : ~ :  :,.=.;l.:i;:ve j.3 F I * . ~ ? ~ ; ~ ; :  J 1. 
- .  
_ _  ' i- 
. . 
. .E 
on o t k r  dczisiuri  intPr;.iving t h e  nuclear h f  cycle.' In particular- them 
needs to be a cotdtment in favor of partitimi-: the waste stream into the 
1 , ., 
shorter l ived f i s s i o i ~  pr&ur,ts .and  he iongcr lived transm-anic elements 
~ e &  also must be a decision against pluto&m recycle. In neither insttnce 
doe. it zppear tha t  the proper decisj.on will be mad:. 
, But d ~ a t  is rtiorc s ignif icant  is the fact 136~: i n  dle considcra_tion 
of tlles'c tvo decision:;, ziie i ~ l i c a t i c n s  To:: t he  spacc alternativi  never ; 
otrt.n enter illto play. 7 ; : ~  c?qx;si:o,~ on p.'cr';n;:i~z i . , ?cy~? .k  ( : ' 5 i ~ ~ 3 ~ ~ ~ T ~ i ~ i ;  
.. 3 
CA; 2 ~ ~ 1 . 3 .  
The Decision on Plutonium Recycle 
'P 
... 
?he issue of plutonium recycle (PUR) never captced much attention 
. . 
4. fm the ktolic Energy Cdss ion .  No Caissioner ever had a formal m 
. " .  
, . 
' mil had r mlatiroly long ti#%? .borim&- othtir i a t t e e .  h'd .to be reblyed, . , : :: . , .. 
. . .  




. ." ~ 
such as d 5 k ~ l o ? ~ n ~  %ak.t6rs,. be&= :>lJCLeould bicaae a s d e n t  poiicy ' , ,.. , 
- 2.' . . . . 
. . 
. . 
' i . -  4. .. ~ gukt ion .  A t f  cppion, therefore, was d5rectcd quite naturallf- to more. '.. 6 s  
- .  
-:*-, 
. . j.y,d,;;< - T*;. A14"a.rl%. 2 . 2  ftw:* - -  - y:; 3 ,  .--- , - ".. ,I 
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 P 
c~;iri;crcial applica'cim. Its 01-igins u~ce back to t b o  wori: at the 
w 
National Laboratory at llanford, k.&hingt& in th& :?iddle 1950 *s . A t  that : - 4 . '! 
r, . .- - - .  
. ! 
t i m e ,  llanford was aFeratGd for .  t ? ~ e  IEC by Grmral Electric. Sho+tly a f r c  I 
I 
research into PUR beg&, CoIpsrissimer h'i'llard Libby requested the Director: I i 
*. . ! 
. . ;  
of  the Division of . Reactor . ~ e v e l o p k n t  to supply the rationale for ... the 
- , 
I 
. . . i 
prcijact: . ~ 
- ,  I 
m 
~ n e m  arz tiirsc principal resons for u~itartaking an -. 1 
_,_ in?. grated rro;:ran f c l r  t h e  developmtztt FF .p?~: toni~a  I 
t c c h . : ~ !  c i ~ y  ap.ilicn!> l c t o  ii-s USC: ;:s y ~ ~ ~ ~ % - k e a ~ t ~ r  i i 
Liid 3 5 . ~3 c p-rt? a s !-c: 1.1 <>:is : - .. 4 
a .  IizprirvcJ a p 2 i s . i ~ b  i l i t )  of it*r;:t:>r te&i~olo<*= uI I  
based upon use of enriched fuzls. 1 
b . Increased ari ?i =L:i"u 05 uraniu  resources. Q P !  t I 
c. Eventual lowering o f  fuel costs .  ?POOR 
Perhaps the most pressing a d  iaeaiate  need for thar i 
technology arises from the Uni:ted Statese  dcsire.:to 
assist other .countries i n  tho application of nuclear 
I 
... power for pcaceful pdrposes I t  i s  clear that other - .. 1 
countries are-reluctant t o  embark upon a large scale 
",. - . 
, ,  , .  . " .":;<.x>,?,, -
. ~ " ,  
, . _ "  - ."I 
, - # .  , , , , . . , .tP. :; - .8 *.=- 
- - 
. I * .  , , ' 
*I.., - *  .2 4 ., . ., h ,  '-: - . . . . .  . . - .  . ,">. --:., > 
i.! , , - -  . , . - me pa- PrOP.l' -& -$,Gw1. f(lod -$': . :-g;,::+. . :,;8'A,>,. , .  .  - , -, . 
r , , .  ' - . . . -gs- mur itbntirhri.q, jClrlants. &ycf$ng af '"ebri *1uW#dt5Jr'- :.- ..,< ,;.. - , 
. . 
- L , , 
.bmducsd in  themal ~wer metars  era r e d u ~ . ~  ,tB9 .:. . . .  . . . .  
:'. :*$:-, . a- 
k r v r e  RIR  caul^ D D Q ~ ~  a - keali&reviei= teihnj-'izd p r ~ ~ &  t , & ~ &  _ 
. ,. 
, .  , . . " . # I  . $ 
- , ;:,*, ' 
; ' 
'.affectfd fir ecoo~z i c s  cf the  ~ o n & ~ t : ; i d  to-be r&solv&. . - , l'bose iuclad@, 
. 
. # 
.." , -,". . . . 
reactar physics, plutonium bearing fuel al&ent dt*bpmt, tnd pluto&b 
" ,  . 
,. , 
recavcq? procis s 2evc Fqixent . Hail Ford 'pmpasd tfi dmi a ~ d  c:;lstruce~,n . 
Y 
of two f::.ilitias to tackle these prdhlcz~s: the ?lutor,iua Rtsiycle Tes t  
is, i t  adiieved a contrulLed SL l f -sustaining rtt:c?nar ~ r z c t i o n .  Pdiing that 
five year period, the AEC spirt $21.3 aillion on operating afid research 
costs in :?Sition to the capital f-mds comitted. 
me nuclear industry, hw-ever, was hardly s a t i s f i e d ,  In a letter 
to  the then direcar of Reactor Develope~rf, Frank Pittman, written i n  
1962 bj 8 .  Efcnr.~:I~ Lf:s~is, Pi~m;t?*s predcccsrcr 2nd 11.3ru a Vicc IV;:c~ident 
of Bcc.h"icl Corporatio:~, the cox;A<zint was made that:  @*At: present fwe] have 
.. m facts, O Z ! ~  s ~ ? c c ~ ! ? . . I ~ ~ G z s  ~ f '  St.>ij..: I;ighll. i.: :.>Z~C;I.I Z?V~ .QTS .This ~ ~ i t 1 1 2 t i r ~ ; ~  
is hs6 i r r  the U n i i ~ L '  Str?:e:; fix: ?- ...s p;t>iiirg 5 ;: b.2 a rvf1;t fc,; -:ic:,?ble 
obstacle abroad in trying to  ut i l i ze  the slightly enriched reactors of US 
2 design ," 
Despite the intent  of the program t o  aLake US reactors aid thereby US 
mnufaoturcrs more competitive abroad and despite Davis * prates tatinns &at 
he eorrld think of * W n g  rore irportmt ta ntr overdl 
.h, - , I  . . 
p- today than plutonium mcycle,' ~ l p t r y  ba l l4  st 'w- &a m y  , . 
.I" 
: tignzficant r?lc. In October, 1966, for cxasplc, Hilton Shw, nor the .' 
- : ;b& p i d k i n g  I@ Zhei~ Farr of dLe- propa.m, = are cc~i t i r ru ing our effarts 'tb 
. . 
: sppsoledpgwa. ta tha i m h t y - s p & s o r e d  A par later, the ' 
sitrati~n hart kt changed. Wav, wi t i  ng to P i r ~  C ~ : x ; . i e c - i i i ; i ,  r ~ ~ a ~ t c d  t?lat 
. . " ~ .  
. . 
.. , - ." - 7  .... - , 3 %  -.- - rt:csT J""* ,-f ; *t.-.,,:j.. j c-y . T - ~ ! . L : : : ,  h ~ : ?  33p ::, -: 5hli-.-? -- 
.> ., .. . -. x -. .,..- ' L.-, 6. . r !  - 
cot;ifilf;'d w i t h  &!A* I r q i d  i;:;;rezx i..r, lisirt H B L ~ Z  I ~ T ~ C L O T  ca;i;ll;ia~e::,~.~s *fir: tlre 
amo;wnt of plutonicm expected to be discharged. Coping w i t h  thaso domestic 
challenges n w  overskadovred exports is the prime rationale for PUR. 
But the fe i lure of the nuclear industly to act in t b  face of those 
problems urrs mrt the only constraint affecting the future direction of the . - 
C C ~ T J I ' Z S S ~ ~ ~  'r PUi? policy. '~%e .Joint Czmri ttcc Gli A t ~ m i C  E n c ~ n  (JMB) 
. . 
was hccokng increzsingly restive with cactinue2 e.C involve~ient i n  l i g h t  
mtcr reactcr t(echnology. 3n their repast on t h 3  EZC ,n,!lCliczLzsr ion B; 71 for 
R' 2969 the . ic . in t  C c . ~ i i , t . ~ o  strcs;c-2 tiic is;v~l*ta;lcc of p;~z;~iii; or!l; Cls!::z:ssio:~ 
ptrticipatior! i n  the PUR program as soon as possible. The following year 
the XAE reiterated its "oft expressed belief concerning the importance of 
privaze igustry taking on the lion's share of the significant work that 
reraains t o  be done in  the plutonium recycle area .:' I 
. (  ' ,  
, . 
a~goriaticn and presnm on t h e  p r t  of Milton $haw, tile industry; rr!&& 
. ,, 
seated by the Enism Electric institute (EEI) proposed a @&st: lrpbgram,.'b. 
- ". 1 .  
'shoulder responsibility for PUR. EEI along w i t h  i(es tinghouss and Genenl,,  
,,&'! klectric vouid fii3ricnto o%J i p d i z t e  a i l ed  u r a n i u l  a d  plutcz~iub fud. 
* 
'i rods in c&?ercial reactors. Slf&:itly xoze at< $$. dlXion wctrrld 5e o p p t  
over a period of five years. Tfre proposal #as co~~dit ioned LZOR the A X  
per grm. That alteratioa ;z;ruld provide a sasi::gs of over $1 ~ t i i l l ~ o n  for tT~c 
- . i;?;ixi. . q;. . . - - -   - . - P C  . - .  ? ' . , .:,~i:,.; (_' . 7,r.... .*, .-. . , r .  - .  t'  1.2 c ' ,  ;,..:,c.< ', . - - " 
. " . v . .  . .  k.? :,iltr ;'le ;:::.r:;;ci.-,: ..,: ~ 2 -  !-:, - . "~" ;~ ; .,.. ,...A . ..  . ; .I;. . . f . 4 , ‘  9 : .,.. . _ . < .  ,.:-: . .  < .; ,.. . 
:; *- -..t> - . . , _  . - - ,. .. - . .; . - : . .* . . . . .. , 
. L&.- ~. ; , l r '  :A. ..L ; T J  ; *.*-. , * .. C . - L  ... " .  . . . . .. . - 7 .  - 
. J' .- 
accepted in e a l y  1970; direct AEC inuolveiacr,L in PUR devclcii~wont \;as by and 
5 * large terminated a t  the end of that year. 
& t o  now, tho regulatory s i J c  of the Comrxission had little, if any, 
influence on the cours3 of PUR development. On April 18, 1969, however, ' the 
regulatory s i d e  took its first action m plutoniuml recycle; jt acceptcd 
en ancndmcnt t o  tha technical speci fications of the Big Rock Point Reactor 
in f i g .  Ihe ~ira~lges pc :~. i itted *.e reactor---rliosen 3s p;t;t of the 
. . ind!:ctiy-rin prcgl-a~,!--~c: 03 ~r.~:e \.:; 7 fr:c3 1>112$1 3 :pnt:zl  m n ~ ;  rj :;,.-? 't'.:: :?? 
ftid xti3s. Zte license war siaulxanxausly rslfi'>ilded t o  p c i a i t  tllc Co?~r;u:;,~+r 
Powzr Co~lpany which owned the reactor to possess and use up to f i f t y  k i lo -  
- grams of plutonium i n  the mixed oxide fuel. 6 
Three d a half years later, the Corapany applied for and received 
* 
another license amendaent which allowed it  to  increase its use of aixed 
: . . h v i ~ e r , s r t 1  : ~etiofi ~ & n ~ i l  @WAC) reguest& AEC 'for a heving oa tba, , . ,  
. .. - / ' _ ,  -. .. 9: 
- .- 
. ' . , ,  im!@mh@ut . . s l ~ f $ . l c d  rui; , in . FO&P~ - ~ s t t r i c t : ~ ~ ~ t  for &ti Restern, ~ l s t ~ ~ ~  
. , .  , ,  . 
3 ., 
, .  . 
. . " ~ .   
, ,. " 
' 
& h&@&n; $&ing.#w$~tPy relief and aia iBjtmmiiion againsr *e ii : ' ., 
. . 
. ., 
,* .  , . , *  
. , 
I " , . .rL- . .  . 
,_I * '  
t .  imd.piag & . & & i d  '&x& axid* fuel at the 8 ig  Ilad: Point Reactor. ' - : 
i . . . .. I 
., , 
, r ,  > :  . . 
I 
'.:;$' : . , '&i e-, a&$& I$&: b g ~ ~ i o k  . ,  b s i & ~ t i , . r h ~  . ~ a a ~ i i ~  i m  agreed to a - : 
, , , ,, 
r .  
,. , . ,, ,. , * ' ,  ,. 
" ,  . . >. , ,. 
, , . . , .  . '  , . .  , . " , , ,-. , ' s - " ~  . 
. ,  - 
,?' .,.' - . . - .  
irealying : & ~ ~ h ~ ~ ~ u ~ & ; ~ ~ o n s l i i r ~ c ; r ~ .  . , , . rle'E6:~~cd . iw$, . e;ila~it+i&i OE t£te?r pi^^ s to: #, 
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b:,L';d :,-as releassi: i n  lP...:i;~r;'i, 19; . j rt tiic '!f;di~!.~c>b:~.  he A:;: siaS'k 
~oncludcd that the adverse environmental and safety consequences associated 
wit.!? ~rs ing ~ luto;~ ium as a reactor fticl were smal3. Thus, tho staff judged 
the problem of safeguarding the plutonium from diversion as being a 
'banage:ible one," and recommended. the PUR be approved. n\ey did indicate. 
that a ra0r.e dctailed -safeguzrds program w c + ~ L d  11.. d~irc:ol~zb i n  thz  n ~ x t  
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- . ' Although- the draft d m n n e n t a l  staf--ant. is w e l l  . ",.. , 
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done and reflkts a hi@\ quality eLC;5oxt, it is iir- . ._ .. a 
cai@Ic.te-because it f a i l s  t o  prcsatt G riatoiled and , , Si ..i? 
~ ~ p r e t i c n s i v e  ans,'>si,s c?f brcti.envircrmont,:l Impacts of . 6 
. - 
. r .  potenti el diversion of sped a2 ~iuclertr materia f s ;;;id 
o£ alternative saf;eguards progr- tc. protect the' 
' U  pub.lic fro@ such a threw. -a . 
A .  
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. ,* , . 
- ~ 
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'U h: &ran&, the t 'onj i i*~:~~,  on4 . "Liz, r f ~ ~ r i c a n  p~op.l e shc;ir.liI 
ha& the benefit of s full discussion ~f the dversjor! 
.: r 
. . 
, . and snfegttards pm3:r;;, i t s  .- j . yzc ts ,  ar:; ~ m i s n t l a i  
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t .  wgrz;ldfatheringtK during the p e r i d  in  dti& the -a* 
safeguards issue is being resolved. 
'L' \ 
The letter had a mofound ef fect  on the fledgling NRC; it promoted a major ' 
.tevim of d c  forner Co!missionls plans for reaching an affin;iative d c c i ~ i o n  
m: WR* 
' Chi 2:ay 6 ,  1935, the n.w Coiiimissicn annoanced its tentative judgement 
i 
on how the Pl iR Gccision should be nadc. 
On thc basis o-i" 5;:s cossidcmtion to  d?tc  of the 
y@lbt;.:;l~ filch L.CT % - >, .. : h ~ ,  Ccmj :.:.io!~ i s  p ~ ~ t r i . ~  : +>nalig c.: 
the vj: cx:., stJ>jcr'f ro consj Jc rn i i o i~  c:F ro-iacnts to 
received, ti:ar a c o s t  -bciiefi t r+nalj.sis of si ter-nat ive 
. safeguards progri!ms should be prepared and set  forth 
i n  draft and finai environmental impact statements 
before a Co~lnission decisiot~ is reached on wide-scale 
use of mixed oxide fuels i n  l ight water nuclear power 
reactors,. n\s Comission is also provisionally of the 
view that in light of the variety of factual situations 
and legal considcrati~ns that may be presented, as well 
&s the ri& to &d rbc! for appropriate participation 
.,2* 
' . fa tht deciriamaking process by pasties to the individual 
..: . . pmqmiings, the matter of deferral' of future licensing 
actions which arb rely.ed to  the dde - sca l e -use  c f  mix& ' . 
w i d e  fuels. should be 'address~d 4:ithi.n $$c context of t h e  
individual 1 iccnsigg proccrsdin~s, It is- fie Ccrrsnission ' s  
provisional view that the following guidelirtes shottld be 
&served i n  resclving *e deferral issue in such pr6; 
I ceedings: (1) there shauld be no sddi tional l icenses 
p granted for usc of mixed oxide fuel  i n  f i gh t  w a r - r  nilclear 
power riiact.ors except f as cxpcrintcl~t a l  pun;oscs ; a d  (2) 
' 
kj SI rcspcct to light. i:arcr tic<; car pr?i.;er retictoy fuol 
. ,- cycle activi  :i;=ti (act ':.i.ties ot.!ii;?s .,!.w. 1rl.cel err; pmcr 
reactor cons t y t c t i ~ n  and operation) which denend for 
their just i f icat ion on wide-scale use of ~ ~ T x c d  oxide 
firel i n  Lighjlt water ~irclear pcriqer reac.toors, tllevc shac!d 
he no aG\Ii ~iar?a3 1 i c r nses  $ranrcb ~115.c'n \.ioxld f<?sccl osc 
fizturc safegzards oy??,j.ms c.7 r e s u l t  In L?riscc:;saq- 
"grandZathering ." l3is wodd  not: precl!~.tc thc granting 
* * c," 3ir3e;:;$5 frrr cu>c.rirnc~,tcl ar!d/or ? :~c i !n i ca l  feasibility 
*! pu::; ? c*; :ltS . 
* 
offered interested parties the opportunity to conment on that provisional 
dccis iot~.  %IC Coni:nissicin 1leld ziecting v:i th reprclscn tat i l res of industry 
and the general public t o  c lar i fy  any questions those groups migkt have. 
' ,  Over 200 comments--more them twice.de number received a t  the i n i t i a l  
~TPJPS, rr-ti.1 i t i  cs, and envirorr~ci~tnl orgpi:? ; a t i o n s .  
1. A cost benefit analysis of alternative programs fcr 
safeguarding plutonium mixed oxide 'fuel and faci l i t i c s  
which handle them w i l l  be prepared on an expedited basis 
and publisticd for comcnt as a supplcmcnr to thc overall 
Environmental Statement on Mixed Oxide Fuel, 
1. The pu%l%e w i l l  have the opportunity to further - , , . 
participate .in the ultimate decision by commenthg on 
the safegudrds supplement and proposed rules and by 
participating i n  kcari%s. 
3. E l i g i b i l i t y  criteria have Seen es ta\;lished for . , 
interim iicensing of related fuel cycle activities.. . 
pendi~lg a Conmission decision on wide-scale use.. The 
criteria rcq~iire c&sideratio2 of such factors as the  
dejwrldsr*~:; cf 5.ndivi.riual Esci litics on wide-scalc use 
of r;l.xed axi.dz feel, possihle $oc-cciosr~~e of safc-  
g~aj:i'.s ililtcrnatit..?~. m d  ;.ilc ii::pacl: Z ~ C :  :..V+?Y;&!,~ 
public i n t e x c s t  of delays S.n l iccns i~ lc .  
4 ,  Operating l i  ccnsos xnd a~ocndrnc.rits LO epcrztinp: 
I.Pccr;rn:; sa:r also bc 5.ssved ttli~ictr au?hct:.ize tho v ' ; ~  
c,f t ~ j ,  i .l oxide C'ucl. In 1.; gilt vatw ~:oi:~.r rcac!.s=.:; . 
almost fifteen months could be shaved of f  the originai estimate of when a 
finai dccision c , ~  FU2 would be w d c .  
The f inal  a.ct i n  th is  extended history of the PUR decision came in 
Junv, 1976. The Natural Rcsources Defense Council spearheaded a court 
att.ack on the Concfiissj.o:its Eovcmbe~, 1.9 75 f i n s 1  rtllirzg . Tfic Sccond Circuit 
!:OUZ~ of Lipyeals, i+~lled t h a t  the Nuclca:. Regulator>* Cr!lrLqission via?.ated its 
safeguards --could be f inal ized.  
As tho reader can see from t h i s  discussion, the debate over whether 
or not to proceed with pfiltonium rccycl e xicver directly invol.ved the  i ssue  
of what the implications might be for alternit0 choices of waste managcment, 
* 
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1, Plutonim Recycle Progrim at  Mnford, AEC 958, March 1'4, 1957, pa -Ii 
2. latter, Davis to Pittroan, July 9, 1962. 
5, Shaos to Nollingswarth, October 28, 1966, p. 1. 
4* Skm t o  Commfssicsn, Octaber 24, I%?, p. 1. . 
S, See the following r.randum arrd Cwmiss5on documents: Shaw to 
MDlliagsuorth, Lease of ~lutonivn for Ixpct5&tion in Dresden 1 &act@, 
October 28, 1966; Shaw to Comission, Meeting W i t h  EEI Comittee on 
Nuclear Fuels to Discuss Plutonium Rccycla R&D Programs, October 24, 1967; 
Shaw t o  Commission, AEC-EEI Bieeting of Plutonium Recycle, November 2, 1967, 
December 27, 1%7; Industry Sponsored.Plutoniurn Recycle Programs, 
BEC 960/1l, January 31, 1968; AEC Supply of Pu for EEf-Sponsored 
Pu Recycle Program, AEC 960/13, July 22, 1968; Shrw to Holling~wortir, 
Plutonium kcvcle Program Proposal by Edison Electric Institute (EEI), 
October 9, 1969. 
6 . Amedmt No. 3 to Operating license No. D P R ~  , April 18. 1969 &Id 
Change No. 17 to the Technical Specifications of Operating Liceuse 
No. tPpr-6, A p r i l  18, 1369. 
. . 
One dominant: t h e w  stands out clearly i n  the history of the Federal . 
Government @s attempt tc implement a waste management system: any option 
whi ch  does not find public acceptance w i l l ,  regardless of i ts  technologiciaf 
merit, aat be adopted. The experience a t  Lyons and the story of the 
Retrievable &face Storage Faci l i ty  (PSSF) both provide striking evidence 
for that claim. Thus. any future p l s n s t o  d'evelop a qmce disposal s y s t e  
must recognize the  significance of the public acceptance factor and take it 
into account. 
This section attempts t o  prwide a preliminary estimate of what public 
attitudes t o w d  the space disposal option might be. I t  nust be stressed 
that tho  estimate can only be a very approximate one. For one thing, it is 
based on data which did not address the issue of space disposal direct ly.  For 
mother, the  es t imae  has had t o  be made before any firm program has been 
pr0pes.d or any de ta i l s  of pomible plans have been made public. Clearly 
once that occurs t he  ent i re  complexion of the issue w i l l  have changed and 
m y  predictions made herein about public reactions w i l l  ha-:e t o  be carefully 
re-assessed. Thus, the  only question t h a t  t h i s  seccion cart reasonably address 
2s a limited one: are there  i td iea t ions  tha t  public a t t i tudes  toward the  
space option a r c  such that: it. has a hope of being accepted? 
O ~ e r  t he  years a number of studies have been made about public a t t i t udes  
towards nuclear p e r .  U t i l i t i e s  and vendors have conciuctcd several public 
opinion surveys. For t h e  most part ,  however, the  data gathered has not been 
made public. Several studies, undemaken by academics, have probed public 
 pinions about nuclear po&--oftcn a s  part  of larger  studies dealing u i t h  
public a t t i tudes  towards higllly complex technological systems. In the  l a s t  
year, two studies about public a t t i tudes  toward nuclear power have been 
released. The first, done by ilrs Batoiic Kurthue~t  ~abbmetorics.' I o e u s s ~ s  
primarily on the  issue of rruclear waste management. The second, undertaken 
by Lou Harris for  the  archctect-engilieering f izn ~8~x0, * deals inme gcnernl lp 
with the e n t i r e  range of issues  now surfachg i n  t he  great  nuclear debate. 
Those two studies provide t h e  core of data  from which inferences about public 
a t t i tudes  toward t h e  spate option are drawn. 
PUBLIC VALUES ASSOCIATED W I T H  h'UCSEAR WASTE DISPOSAL: BMVL-1997, 
June 1976. 
A t o t a l  c C  +venty two groups, comprising 465 persons, from five regior ; 
of the  U.S. were ,..berviewed. The groups were agsregated t o  yie ld  s i x  s e t s  of 
respondents: enviroruncntalists, nuclear technologists, junior and senior 
high sc)raol students, public u t i l i t y  employees, church and c iv ic  organization 
members, surd universi ty students. Those final groups contained as few as 
52 people (pubfic . u t i i i t y  employees). and a s  mapy as 164 responde~ts  (university 
otu8cats .) fbe 81pvey was ~ n i s t e ~  by group with t;be rcspmdents writing 
- S t  &rs %bm QO a farm prov~ded, Before the survey was ansuered, the 
r c s p d e p t s  viewed a f i f teen -ti hla which provided reasonably accurate 
and unbiased infbmattom.abaut nuclear wastes and the prablers associated with 
- 
its ~ ~ t .  -,,- 
. .
me srrpvey questipxnzhe -. uas designed to obtain social value informstion 
abau the relative oimportancc of f0lr4 aspects of nuclear uaste disposal as well 
8s fnfomatiea cq~.erning ssre broader issues associated with the subject of 
. mncieer waste duposal. Phe four nyclear waste disposal aspects or *factors 
driek fm the backbone of the qvwtiormaire were described as fo?losrs: 
-Short Perm Safety: Those risks involved i n  t he  storage; t r ~ l s p a t a t i a n ,  
and eqlaceacnt of nuclear waste naterials.  These risks are lzrgely borne by 
the  people who used the electrical pcrzer b%ich created the wasres . These 
risks would occur during a feu years following the  creaticn of the waste, 
Long Tens Safety: 'lbt porticm of to ta l  r i sk  which beghas after the 
w a s t e s  w e r e  f ina l ly  emplaced or disposed and which would continue for  the 
next 2U),000 years. These r i sks  uould be due t o  geologic changes and other 
'Vlcts of Cod*' and possibly t o  negligence by man. 
Cost: ?he dollar cost required by z given waste disposal aethod. 
Accident Detection and Recovery: Steps t h a t  could be taken to reduce 
the conscquences of an accidenr i f  it does occur af te r  f inal  disposal, 
The study assessed the iapprtance of each of those criteria i n  f s r  
#r*.s. First ,  the respooldents were asked simply t o  rank order the different 
Factors, i .e., most important.. .least important. Second, the people inter-  
viewed were required t o  assign a number fran Q-100 which reflected the relat ive 
a w t e  management system. 'Pkird, each perswr uas presented with twenty 
seven charts tach of which represeated a hppcthetfcal w & t t  managencpt s)Crstga. 
IP e& dart the four factors were kaously fisted 8s having 14righ,n 
'&i.;iz , or wlauw scores. The respodcnt then aswsed the acceptabi l i ty  of 
such e dedfned sy&a. The assrs.rmeEt w the dependent variable a d  the 
.HOT. on each of the f- factas was the independent n r i a b l e r .  Regression 
coeff ic ients  were then calculate&. 'Phe higher the coefficient,  t he  nore 
inportant the factor was perceived t o ~ b e .  Fortrth, each respondent was =;red 
t o  caastruct  a system uhich voulc! be minimally acceptable to him. 
Only data for the firsi three methods were reported i n  detai l .  This is 
because the  fourth kethod (rainhaally accepalle) ~~lsyctared to measure soaethirlg 
different *.a the first three. The threc reported nathods yie1dc.d substan- 
t i a l l y  similar results. (Figure 8.1) Long tm considerations were 
the PC .r important. The degree to  which they dominated varied from method 
to method. Shart texm consideratian and accident detection and recovery were 
scmdmt  less important i n  the  samples ' collective opinicm. Cost factors 
were s ignif icant ly  less central  i n  assessing a waste management system. l r h  
the six sub-groups were analyzed separately some important dis t inct ions  
emerged. Environmentalitas placed s ignif icant ly  mm emphasis on lung tera 
concerns and nuclear technologists placed s ignif icant ly  aore importance on 
short team considerations than did the  saaple as a whole. (Figures 8.2-8.4) 
In sadi t ion t o  the  questions dealing with the importance of  the  four 
factwrs, questions were asked which attempted t o  measure acceptabil i ty of 
* 
various perfcrkmce levels  f o r  each of the foprr factors. Short t e r n  f a t a l i t y  
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PER YEAR PER YEAR PEZ YCA? PER :0 PER 100 P%S lidQO PER lC,O00 PER 1OO,OW 
YEARS  EARS YEARS ' YEARS YEARS . 
DEATHS PEZ YEAR l;I THE UNITED STATES 
INCREASING SAFETY c;n DECREASING RISK- 
I. ENVlRONMENTAtf STS r) (D IV. PUB.LlC UTILtTY ENIPLOYLtE$ % 1 NUCLEAR TECH?:S'.OCGTS ' Ob****@**O V. CHURCH MEMiSERS(C:*JIC 
Ill. JR. HIGH AND HIG;: C'=.!IO9L ORdANf ZATlONS 
STUOENTS 0- 4 .Vie UNIVERSITY STUDBNTS, 
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r 9 . i ~ ~  GENERATION THAT USES I I I 
NUCf EAR POWER SHOULD TAKE m - 
ALL THE RISKS FOR WASTE 
DIS?OSAL. 
28. THE MA lN  CONCERN OF NUCLEAR 
WASTE PLANNERS SHOULD BE A 
SAFE SYSTEM FOR THE SHORT 
TEHM. 
LONG.TERM SAFETX 
11. FIJTUHE GENERATIONS MUST BE 
TOTALLY SAFE FROM OUR 
NUCLE,\R WASTE. 
29. COMPAHEO TO OTHER PROBLEMS 
THAT FUTURE GENERATIONS WlLL 
FACE, NUCLEAR WASTE MONITOR- 
ING IS INS1GN;FICANT. 
COST 
-- 
3. I N  DEALING WITH NUCLEAR 
WASTES. COST SIiOULD BE OF NO 
CONCERN. t 
25. TO SATISFY CRITICS. THE US. 
NVCLEAII WASTE SYSTEM WlLL 
P r r o m n L v  COST FAR MORE THAN 
IS NECESSARY. 
ACCIGENT DETECTION AND RECOVERY 
-. . .- - - . - . . -- - -. -. - - 
2. NUCLEAR WASTES SHOULD BE 
DISPOSED OF I N  SUCH A WAY THAT 
NO ONE WlLL EVEn BE ABLE TO 
DISTURU OH RECOVER THEM. ..- I 
15. WHATEVER DISPOSAL SYSTEM IS I 
Source : 
DEVISED. THERE MUST BE A WAY TO 
DETECT LEAKS AND RECOVER THE 
- t XASTE. SO I* r-. AD A s A 
0-0 1. ENVIRONMEF~TALISTS 6 + IV. PUBLIC UTILITY EW;PLW= .
. &-4 I t .  NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGlStS z........ C V. CHURCH MEMBERSICIXC 
A------rh Ill. JR. HIGH AND HIGH SCHOOL ORGANIZATIONS 
STUDENTS 3-- 4 VI. UNIVERSITY STUOEK-S 
Figure 8 . 2  , 

8. RIE CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR 
POWER P W T S  SHOULD BE St.OWED 
UNTIL AN ABSOLUTELY SAFE WASTE 
DISPOSAL SYSTEM HAS BEEN 
DEVELOPED AND THOROUGHLV ' 
EVALUATED. 
10. THE RADIOACTIVE HAZARDS IN 
NUCLEAR POWER ARE NO GREATER 
THAN TiiE ENVIRONMENTAL 
HAZARDS FROM COAL BURNIN'O 
POWER PLANTS. 
13. THE BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR POWER 
MORE THAN OUl'WEIGH THE 
HAZARDS IN  NUCLEAR WASTE 
STORAGE AND DIrPOSAL. 
18.1 WOULD NOT WANT TO HAVE 
NUCLEAR WAS1 ES DISPOSED OF I N  
MY REGION OF THE COUNTRY. 
21. BASED ON PAST OPERATING 
. EXPERIENCE, NUCLEAR ENERG'f 
HAS BEEN DEkIONSTRATED TO BE A 
CLEAN AND SAFE S3URCE OF 
ELECTRICAL POWER. 
24. USING BORE COAL IS FAR L4SS 
HARMFUL TO MAN THAN USIKG 
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8. IN THE NeXT 10 YEARS, SOLAR 
POWER COULD SGLVE THE 
PROBLFM OF ELECTRICAL POWER 
IN THE U.S. 
23. IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS, GEO* 
THERLIAL POWER COULO SOLVE 
THE PROELEM OF ELECTRICAL 
. POWCH IN THE U.S. 
26. PAY1XG A LITTLE MORE ATTENTION 
'iO CONSERVATION WOULD MAKE 
MORE ELECTRICAL POWER 
UNNECESSARY. 
0----.9 I. ENVI~~ONMENTALISTS Q 4 IV. . P U ~ L I C  UTILITY EMPLOYEES 
&----6 It .  NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGISTS s...~.... a V. CHURCH MEMRERSICIVIC 
Ill. JR. HIGH AND HIGH SCHOOL ORGANIZAT10iYS 
STUDENTS 0-- -0 VI. UNIVERSITY STCDENTS 
PERCEIVED EFFICACY OF ALl'E?N,47IVES TO hUCLEAR POWER 
year each received average judgments a t  t he  midpoint of the 8asrrtisfactianam 
scale or above. Fa ta l i ty  rates i n  excess of one death per ye= received 
cverzge judpents  vhich &re closer t o  t he  very rrnsatisfactory end of the 
scale. Muc11 the same findings wcre reported for t he  Long term safety factor.  
In general, however, a t  any given risk level ,  the  r i sks  were perceived s 
being more sat isfactory as short  te rn  rzthcr t h m  Ions tcra r i sks .  
The study also fo.,r~ld thz t  qpro;;inately 752 of thc s a p l e  rated an 
increase of $3.00 i n  t he  monthly cost  of e l e c t r i c i t y  above the  midpoint on the  
@lsatisfzctioaw scale. An increase i i f  $10.00 uas given an avcrage sat isfact ion 
r a t i ng  of jus t  below t h e  midpoint on the  metric. The sample a l so  f e i t  than 
reculted ir. a death rcjtiction of krcater ~ i i l t i i  50% over no suc!i sysrcin at  311. 
The different sub-groc;,s hati so.~c:cila: d i '  ^ erent i d r  .s of what z s a t i s -  
factory perfoimance c r i t e r i a  should be. Ihc extremes wcre occupied by the  
environmentalists and by the n u c 4 e ~ t t e d m i c i a n s .  Their responses fonaed 
boundaries within which the  remaining groups were contained. (Figures 8.5 
t o  8.8) . 
me investigators a l so  asked a set of questions dealing with m e  
generalized attitudes touard nuclear power and nuclear waste management. The 
average score f o r  each of the g m p s  on those items is shown i n  Figures 8.9 t o  
8.13. The marginal dis t r ibut ions  of the questio;~~ i s  given in Table 8.1. 
Attitudes Toward Suclear Waste Disposal Factors 
1. Who should bear the  risks of nuclear uastes: Most groups were 
clustered around the middle of the  agree-disagree scale except f o r  nuclear 
0 
ATTITUDE RESPQXSE FREQUENCIES 
FOR TOTAL SIVbtYLE 
1. Overpopulatjon and econonic conditions 100 
are &ore serious th rea t s  t o  our way of 229 
l i fe  than the psatlcn of ~iuclear y s t e  
dispikal. 
2. Nuclear wastes shauld be dispased of in 147 
such a m y  that  no one w i l l  ever be able 325 
t o  recover then. 
5. In dealing with nuclear wastes, cost  60 
should be of  no conccrn 138 
4. B? scd 011 irtfornaticn I got frm. :I?: s 11 
sfudy, t h e  hazards of nuclear uzste:. are 22 
Itss serioirs thzn 1 t!!~.:ght. 
5.  1 1 1  t h ~  ECX?. 20 ).C;t3.S, 5<.131 i?:lt!iCT COV!~; 2 2  
s~I\ 'c  :i?e i@r~bf  of el cctricc* ? >s-;er 5% 
i n  the U.S. 
6.' Tiic loss of even one l i f e  from nuclear 34 
waste is unacceptable. 7% 
7 .  '9he U.S. can maintain a strong econarpy 34 
without having n u c l a r  power. 7% 
8. The construction of nuclear poser plants 96 
should be slowed u n t i l  an absolutely safe  21% 
waste disposal system has been developed 
%I.? thoroughly evaluated . 
9. Nuclear waste is one of the  nost serious 41 
th rea t s  facing thc world. 9% 
10. The radioactive hazards i n  nuclear power 33 
arc co greater than :he cnviroi~zterttal 7% 
hazards frcn coal-burning power plants. 
11, Future generations rust be tota l ly  safe 10s 
fmm our nuclear waste. 23% 
12. h ray opinion, the  inforatation contained 58 
i n  t h i s  study seriously underestinates 88 
the real risks of lglclcar wastes. 
'SA = Stmngl y  bee; A - Agree; AD = Neither A g m  
D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree 
nor Disagree; 
fhe benefits of nuclear power a m  than 
artweigh the hizards i n  nuclear waste 
s torage and disposal. 
Nuclear p w c r  is the most promising source 
of e l ec t r i ca l  power for t he  next 30 ).cars. 
Whatever disposal system is  devised, there  
rust be o uay to  detect leaks and recover 
t h e  mste. 
Bnfore I got involved i n  t h i s  study, I 
knew very l i t t l e  about tile problen of 
nuclezr hzts tes . 
The construction of addit ional e l ec t r i ca l  
parer plants  w i l l  not be necessary for  
the U.S. t o  maintain its present standard 
of l iving.  
I would not want t o  have nuclear wastes 
disposed of i n  my region of the country. 
. 
Tine gcncr;.tioa- t h z t  c ~ c s  n:!clcar pcr..:cr ' 
shou!S take 311 tI~c r j s k s  for r:i:stc 
disposal . _ _,- ___ .- - 
- 
Goverr,;cnt aad iridustry ha:-c done c? i:r c.2 
job 6; I:eepSr.g the ptb:;c infor:izii i ~ i ' ~ t r ~  
the zdvantages and disadvantages of 
nuclear pwer .  
Based on past operating experience, nuclear 
energy has been deinonstrated t o  be a clean 
and s a f e  source of e l ec t r i ca l  power. 
Part icipating i n  t h i s  study makes m e  
realize j u s t  how frightening nuclear 
waste is. 
In  t h e  nest  10 years, geothermal p w c r  
could solve the  problem of e l ec t r i ca l  
power i n  t he  U.S. 
Using more coal is f a r  less harmful t o  
man than using ~luclcar potier. 
To s a t i s f y  cri ' l ics,  t h e  U.S. nuclear 
waste system will probably cost  Car 
more than is necessary. 
26. Paying a l ittle more attention t o  
conservation would rake more electrical  
pataer unnecessary. 
27. Ke shuuld imediately stop developing 
nuclear technology as an energy source. 
28. The wain concern of nuclear waste 
planners should be 'a safe system for the 
short tern. 
29. Cwpared t o  other p~ubleos that future 
generations w i l l .  face, riuclcar waste 
mojlitori~lg is insignif  i'cznt . 
30. If the United States does not increase 
the production of electric i ty ,  our 
cconcxy w i l l  decline. 
Source: BMIL-1997 
t ~ o l o g i s t s  who clearly disagreed that the users of nuclear energy should 
bear t he  r i s k s  of waste mwgement. 
2. Absolute safety: Nost groups agreed tha t  t h e  future  shoulz be 
100% safe ... except f o r  t-he nuclear technologists who disagreed. 
3, Significance of waste problems: Environmentalists and nuclear 
technicians bracketed t h e  responses of the other groups on +his  qusstion. 
4 Concern about cost: Fair consensus araund the middle of the 
agree-disagree scale  that cost  should be no object. 
3, I r re t r ievabi l i ty :  h'i3e variance on t h i s  issue.  I r~teres t ingly,  
the  enviroll~ientalists  and the  rruclear tcchnicia ls  a r e  c loser  on t h i s  issue 
than on any otlrer.. .both terrd t o  desire rc t r icvr!b i l i ty .  
6. Cetcction 2nd rccovcrj.: S-ircli~s c c:-sensvs nmctrig ai f grcyps 
-.. C Y L C . ~ ~   clear tc2inic2i:is thzt leak:; s:lo,:ld b:. detcctcd acd ~ ~ ; ~ - p j i t . l .  ~!lftre 
may be scae logical  incorisisterrcy bstutvn the responses on t h i s  ques t ion  
cmd the  responses on tile previous i t e m .  
. . 
Perceived Severity of Nuclear Waste Problem 
1. Relative t o  overpopulation and econanic conditions: A l l  
groups except junior and s tn io r  high students and environiental is ts  place 
more concern on those problcras than on nuclear waste management. 
2. Loss of one l i f e :  A11 t h c  groups, t o  van-l7.l .  d~c_rces, disagree 
with t h e  idea t ha t  even one l i f e  l o s t  becausz of nucirsi csstcs is one l i f e  too 
5. Serious threat :  None of the  groups agrea thal; nv--lear waste 
is one of the most serious th rea t s ;  there  is however, a vide range of o:,inion 
expressed. 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS1 
OE POOa 
Perceived Safety  of Nuclear Power 
1. Slow nuclear power u n t i l  waste czln be handled: An extraordinar i ly  
wide range of a t t i t u d e s .  Nuclear technolo2ists  and environnental is ts  nark off 
t h e  boundaries with t h e  remaining eroups i n  vctueen. 
. 
2. Nuclear vs. Coal: Only t h e  nuclear  technicians believe tha t  
the r i s k s  of auclear  power arc less thzn coal f i r e d  p lants .  
3. Benefi ts  of nucleai- power: CIost grwtps ne i ther  ngrce or 
disagree  with t h e  idea t h a t  t h e  benef i t s  of nuclear power outweigh t h e  r i s k s  
of waste nnnngement . Olr ly the e11vil-o:1:xnt a l i s t s  and t h e  nticlear tecilrlici ans 
express stror,gly held views. 
4 .  Disposal i n  the res:v.?.dent's rc-gion: a l l y  the i;:rcfe:!r 
Perceived Ned f o r  Nuclcar Power arrd Need for Power i n  General 
With only t h e  el~vironraental is ts  d issent ing,  the re  is a relatively 
strong consensus t h a t  nuclear power i s  required f o r  a strong economy, t h a t  it 
is t h e  most promising energy source for t h e  next generation, t h a t  it is necessary 
Cur the  maintenance of our present  standard of l iv ing,  and t h a t  its developcient 
must be continued. 
Perceived Efficzcy of Altcrnativcs t o  Nuclcar Power 
--.- 
Hith t h e  exception of nuclear  technologists  who have no f a i t h  i n  
the a l t e r n a t i v e s  of s o l a r ,  geothermal, or conservation, t h e  renaining groups 
are by and la rge  ambivalent about a l t e r n a t i v e  sources of erttrgy being prac t i ca l  
i n  tho near term. 
Evaluation of t h e  Study 
The seudy appears t o  be competefit l y  , although not imaginative1 y , conducted. 
The i nves t iga to r s  a r e  t o  be cc'ixl>lement.ed on t r y i n g  t o  measure d i f f i c u l t  value 
t rade-offs  in  a number of d i f f e r e n t  ways. The lack of breadth, both i n  
devising t h e  measures of sys ten ic  perfomance and i n  t h c  range of i s s u e s  con- 
sidered is somewhxt disappoint ing.  Nore importantly, thc study suffers 
from four l i m i t a t i o n s  which c o ~ b i n e d  OUI. t o  make: onc cautious :bout h ~ w  ntuch 
weight is given t o  i t s  f indings:  
a. S~lniyle: Qaota saxpljrig makzs s m s e  i f  )mu wish t o  fixid out tile 
opinions of p a r t i c u l a r  groups of  individuals .  The d isadvantar -  of t h a t  sampling 
design is t h a t  it i s  hard t o  gcnera l izc  t o  any otl tr yopala. I -  -particul~rly 
t o  a cross section of Rt.lcrjc:n.c. If we :;c?icvc tiiaz the sis gt,ouj?s ir;olatr:d 
21 2 the only @ilr-Z. ;i;;@~e \*(ii cc docs c- C..Ii,r.: l o  CG3:i: p?.cLli, :.:. ;,::z;~ ;:c~t b-r: 
a la rge  one. But i f  we bel ieve  t h a t  uastc nanagc;.tent is an issue that  toucl~es 
v i r t u a l l y  everyone, then perhaps w e  need t o  f ind  out t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  a s  w e l l .  
Th i s  study tells us  nothing about t h a t  l a rge r  set o f  opinions. 
b. Inference: A major technica l  f a i l i n g  of  the  study is the  lack of 
information abaut confidence i n t e r v a l s  around the  mean scores. Diffcrcnces i n  
t h e  Iiieans &,iczg t h e  various groilys may simply be due t o  sampling e r r o r s .  This 
is p a r t i c u l a r l y  l i k e l y  because o f  t h e  small sasp le  s i z e s  employed. The study 
does not provide u s  d i t h  a Kay of detemizting d~cther t h c  diffcrencc.~ a r e  "real" 
or are merely s t a t i s t i c a l  z r t i f a c t s .  
c. R e l i a b i l i t y  and v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  measures: By measuring t h e  impor- 
tance  of the  four f a c t o r s  i n  four  ways, t h e  inves t iga to r s  could asscss  t h e  
r e l i a b i l i t y  and v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e i r  measures. Using t h e  methods of ranking 
and t h e  wthermomcterm s c a l e  produced s imi la r  results--al though t h e  score  from 
one method could only explain about 60% of t h e  var ia t ion  i n  t h e  scores obtained 
f r o m  u s h g  t h e  o ther  method. The s i t u a t i o n  was worse when t h e  measurcs of 
importance dcrived f ro~n  regression , , ~ ; ; f f i c i c ~ - ~ r s  i.-ere ~rsctl t o  predict scices 
obtained from t h e  other  two mcthods. 1,ess than 301 of t l ~  v a r i a t i o n  coilld be 
e x p l ~ i n e d .  S t i l l  worse was t h e  use cf t h e  'h in imal ly  acccptablen nt thod  i n  
cicplaining scores ohta3i;ed u s i ~ l g  tltc ot:l~c3- t.!:rc.;! m,,;t,hoJt.. l!cre less than 
10: of ~ h c  \ral-iation i n  rhe tilrec otltcr scores cotrid be expi:iirlcd. Tiic last 
method, then, c lear ly  measures soncthil!g other  than the  iqmrtance attached to 
each of the foer factors. 
d.  Explanatory power: The major l j a i t a t i o n  of the  study was it f a i l u r e  
. . t o  pro*:iJc cs~il ,:~!stoxy rer,.xml:ig f'o:, i . J :-:.s~~r.ii:;..l  d;s t l . ! ' i . : t ionc  do 
sense, then the  significance of t h e  study increases by severa l  orders of 
uegnitude. We can view t h e  var iables  measured--particularly t h e  importance of 
t h e  four f ac to r s  and their associated acccprablc levels  of perfomance--as 
dependent var iables  located a t  t h e  t i p  of t h e  stem of  a funnel of causal i ty .  
The fu r the r  back along t h a t  stem we can go i n  cstablistr ing causal and explanatory 
antecedents, t h e  mcre we can understand t h c  context of opinion and the  r i cher  
the  measurements become. In addit ion,  secondary analys is  would reveal i n -  
c o n s i s t e ~ ~ c i e s  m d  paradoxes wfiicll would furr!:er il:f o m  our undcrst :tndj ng. The 
inves t igators  have not ur~deriaken any such explanatory o r  secondary anslysis t o  
date. Until  they do we ought t o  be wary of a t taching much s igni f icance  t o  
t h e i r  findings. 
A SURVEY OF FUBLIC AND LEADERSHIP ATTI'I'UDES TOWARD NUCLEAR POICER 
DEVEL0PME.W IN THE UNITED STA'CES: A Surver Conductcd by Louis Harris and 
- 
Associatcr f o r  EF.'iSCO Scrvicrs  11)- August 1971;. 
, -* - 'ZL- --.- -
* 
This survey was ca r r i ed  out i n  t h e  spl-i r,g of 1975. A nat ional  c ross  
sec t ion  of 1537 i idu l t s  were in:erviewcd j v  their hoa~cr;. In add i t i on ,  301 
perscns K!IO l ived  ;:ear nuzlcar  poizcr plzl l ts  \:ere in: c-r'vi.e\wd. F j ~ l n l i y  fj f :y 
people from each of four leadership groups ( p o l i t i c a l  lcaders,  regula tors ,  
hus i~ icr ;~  leaders ,  and cnvirol-aie~ital Icr\c!err;) k.ci-c sl:l-vcycd . l71c questionri:.i re 
d e a l t  iiittl a broad range o f  to2ics including the  nature of t h e  energy sllortage, 
"- Qg n-ended responses: Tnose interviewed were asked what they 
perceived were the major d isadvar t t~ges  o f  nuclear  power. This type of q u e s t i ~ n  
provides infonnation about what t h e  respondcnt f e e l s  is important--not what 
t h e  researclrer deem s ign i f i can t  o r  wishes t o  know. Responses frm t h i s  type 
of question provide a good indicator  of aiilat the  pcrson bel ieves i s  s a l i c n t .  
Ten percent o f  t h e  t o t a l  public spontaneously mentioned waste d isposal  as a 
proble~n In terns of shccr nuahers, wastv disposa l  was rile f i f t h  most 
mentioned disadvantage. tlmon:: the lca:!crs, !rc..icver, waste nanrrgcncllt cr:j o::cd 
a s i g n i f i c a n t l y  higher degree o f . s a l i e n c e .  I t  ranked f i r s t  among environmen- 
talists and rcgula tors .  Even among business and p o l i t i c a l  leaders,  waste 




TWO OR VIREE PlAIN DISADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR POlt'ER PLANTS 
Total 
Nucplant Poli- 
Total Neigh- t ical  
Public bors Leaders 
% 0 I 1D 
-- --- 










Danger of radiation contamination, 
leaks, cracks in reactor 
Dmgcr 9" accidents, explosions, 
- +aFd+; site s 
Thrmal  pol lut ion,  k i l l s  narino l i f e  
Problems with radioactive waste 
disposal 
Pol l ution , dainage t o  environment 
Expensive, high cost 
In i t i a l  expense is hj  gli; financing 
problems 
Lack of technical h~ouleC::c.:, 
mscerta5:~'it y of C ~ ~ S C C ~ C ~ ~ C E .  
Neccl str ingent contrci s ,  s a f w ~ ~ . ~ - + i ~ s  c,h . - 
Public anxiety over safcty; objec- 
t ions  of errvironmental groups 4 
Danger of sabotage 2 
- Sites not available 
Danger t o  workers i n  nuclear plants  1 
Puts people out of work 1 
Ineff ic ient ,  breaks down 1 
Shortage, lack of plutonium 1 
Length of construction time .. 
Fuel get t ing in to  wrong hands; 
t he f t  of plutonium 
Exempted by governnent from l i a b i l i -  
'ity claims, insurance coverage - 
Human carelessness, e r ro r  - 
A l l  other answers 
None, no bisadvant ages 
No anwer 
Dm1 e know 
P R O B E S  CONNECTED WITH NUCLEAR POWER PIANTS 
Tile d i ~ p o s a l  of radioact ive  waste 
mater ia ls  which remain radioact ive  
for many centuries t o  come 
Major problem 
Elinor problem 
Hardly a problem at al l  
Not sure 
3 e  escape o f  r ad ioac t iv i ty  i n to  
the  atmosphere 
Major problem 
Mi:!or problem 
1-tarcily a probttcr;\ at a l l  
I4ot sure 
1 % ~  cl\nr?cc ;r an ex~, los jon  ir, 
thct casr  oi' ;,n accicqont 
Major problem 
Minor problem 
Hardly a problem st a l l  
Not s u r e  
The discharge of warm water 
i n t o  lakes and r i v e r s  t h a t  
would endanger f i s h  and 




Hardly a problem at al l  
Not s u r e  
The threat of attempts t o  
sabotage nuclear  p lan t s  
Major problem 
Minor problem 
Haidly a problem a t  all 




Pub1 i c  bors 
% % 
Poli-  Busi- h v i i o n -  
t i c a l  ness R e p  mental- 
Leaders Leaders lators i s t s  
' 6  'I % t 
Table 8.3 COD':. 
PROBLEMS CONNECTED w Ini N ~ C I .  ., .I POWER ?LANTS 
Total 
Nucplant . t i -  Busi- 
Total !Icigh- :i.l ness 
Public bors Lb,dcrs Leaders 
0 - % % % 
Giving off fumes that 




Hardly a problem at  a l l  
Not sure 
Tnc poss ib i l i ty  that pl~tonium, 
\ M c h  is made in a nuclear 
poxcl. plant ,  could be stolen 





1 Envi19n 4 







t.la j o r  pro51 e.d '-4 34 33 43  20 
I.5 r,or prclbl c 29 2 1 28 4 7 
i ! u i . 2 1 ~  a ~ T O L I C L ~  :it 2: 1 18 28 2< 3 3 
Ei'o t sure 19 I. 7 - - 
uBIAJOR'g PROBUMS COSS~C'~f:3 !YZ*fii NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
Total Mid- Stlb- 
Public East west South West CitLcs ur3s T~.$*ns R,~rnl  
9; O b  0 *G 'b 8 76 3 C 
- - -  
7he d. , ~ S I X  of radio- 
active waste materials 
which remain radio- 
: * t i v o  f o r  many ccn- 
t u r i c s  t o  come 63 67 67 55 62 64 65 58 63 
The escape o f  radio-  
a c t i v i t y  i n t o  tho  
ntmospherc 49 57 53 43 40 S5 4b ,  42  47 
The chance of on ex- 
plos ion i n  tho  case of 
an nccidcnt 47 SS 45 47  36 SC dS 40 49 
The d i s c h a ~ g o  of \ ~ n r n  
water  i n t o  lakes  acd 
r i v e r s  t h a t  could cn- 
danger f i s h  and othcr 
water l i fe  47 49 52 41 4 2  53 43 44  45  
The t h r o a t  o f  a t t m p t r i  
t o  sabotago nuc lea r  
powcr p l a n t s  39 42 39 38 37 42 38 4 1  38 
Giving off fumcs t h a t  
can p o l l u t e  t h e  a i r  36 42 34 36 30 43 31 33 35 
'i'hc p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
*Iutonium, which i s  mado 
i n  o ;iucloar ;lowor p l m t ,  
could bo s t o l c n  by rncli- 
calrcvolutio~ln:*fcu 34 38 33 30 35 38 33 35 30 
High 
Solr,e School 
High G.rad.1 Building Mare 
School Soma Cs1- Nuclear Power 
or Col-log*Plants i n U . S .  
~ o s s  lege ~ r a d h v o r  oppose 
Table 8. S 








A major radiation leakage f r o m  a nuclear 
power plant can carlsc fall-out that can 
kill large nu& - -I.*: o f  people 
Coxipletcl y true 35 46 
P2l-tly t1-:1e 2 7 21 
Partly tii;Xme G I 
Co~pl c t e 1 )* wit r ~ ~ c  6 8 
Not sure 25 17 
Ho'c water frca n!lclc.,zr ?ot:er plan~s 
c~dangers fl's:~ otl;cr szter lice in 
nearby lake3 m d  s;rea:::s 
-. - 
Ccmplctcly true 33 44 
rs:i: y t f i i s  33 24 
C Fartl). unt- 1-JC .I 8 
Cn,:.;.jetel;* cnf rue  S I ?  
I.IL-; 3ur: 0 I / a '  13 
. ,- f.f p f:.';' : <:I.:.: i?':l' p : C ' y  i > l ; r z t ~  C <q 
c a s e  r;:cii oxt iv i ' l j '  c-x;.cs;trc to ;cn 
nany people 
Completely true 25 
Part1 y t ~ u e  29 
Partly untrue 11 
Cbaplctcly untrue 9 
N o t  sure 26 
If aciear parer were being produced a l l  
over the country , some reuoIutionaries 
or criminals could steal nuclear m t c r i a l s  
and make their own atoiil bombs 
- Completely true 21 
Partly true 34 
Partly rmtrue 11 
Coqletcly uncrus 13 
Not surc 2 1 
A nuclear power plant can f a i l  and the 
nuclear materials can come together to 
cause a massive nuclear c plosion 
GOtplctct- t m r e  17 23 
Partly . 22 19 
kzrtly untrue 9 7 
Completely untmc IS 2 1 
Not sure 57 30 
Poli- hsi- 
t ica l  ncss Rcgu- 




---.-- --- -- 
Envir 
i s t s  
% 
Total  
Nucplant Pol j - Busi- Envir~ 
Total c i h -  t ical  cess Regu- =atz 
hlllic tcrs L ~ ~ J ? L . ; - s  Leaders lators j 5 t:
t % % % 4 C. * 
-- 
Allowing people t o  use natura l  gas i n  
t h e i r  hozes, i f  pn.rs;~tions are required 
t o  ~ s k c  sun? !ea!:a!;c \-.-ill not a>$iy.*.i,?tc 
~;mple *,r. cause a t  exploziion t 5 1 S  SG 9' 9 8 103 
Alloving automobiles t o  be sold, i f  i!lc 
federal government checks up on how safe 
tkcy zre and requires o,-.nrrfacm~-srs t o  
cal l  b;ck defect: ve .j:-s to  bc f ixed C 5 E? 9 6 100 98 
Allowing ccal  t o  be miilcd deep ir. the 
grouiid, if  t h e  nine i s  inspccted t o  be 
s ~ l e r S i , e r s u i l l  b e s ~ f ~ f r u z ~ c a v . : . - i n  8.7 7 9 
* Allowing w ~ c l e a r  pwer p l m t s  to  be 
b u i l t ,  i f  the  governnenc certifies that 
they w i l l  not  pollute the  a i r  and water 80 81 
* Alloxing nuclcar poser pla-nts to be 
b u i l t  , i f  tile governnen t r e g u ~  arly 
inspects t hc  y lzn t  t o  be sure t h e r e  
. is no radioactive leakage 73 - 77 
' *' ~ l l o t c i n ~  nuclear  pokier plants t o  be 
b u i l t ,  i f  the  plants meet rough govern- 
ment standards fo r  nuclear waste 
disycsal  79 fj 0 
* Alloviqg nuclear  poi-:cr p l m t s  t o  he  
bilil t , if tile plants a::c prohibi tcd fron 
dunping warm water into streams rind lakes 
t h a t  could endanger f i sh  and o t h e r  water 
l ife 76 71 
Allowing nuclear  power p l a n t s  t o  be 
b u i l t ,  i f  t h e  government is sat isf ied 
on inspection t h a t  an accidental  
explosiori is  unl ike ly  t o  happen 75 77 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS [con t inucl) 
OF POOR Q'JALn'Y 
Table 8.6 can't 
RISKS TAKING 
lbtal 
Hueplant Poli- Busi- Envi r 
rota1 Neigh- tical ness Regu- w n t a  
Public bors Leaders Leaders l a t o r s  ists 
% % t b % % 
-- 
Allwing  nuclear power plants  to be 
bu i l t ,  if the  plants  have preper securi ty  
to  prevent the  s tea l ing  of plutonium o r  
the sabotage of the  plants  by revolution- 
aries 75 7s . 
Allowing l iquor t o  be sold t o  adul ts ,  i f  
the jmblic is warned a b u t  t h e  dangcrs 
of alcoholism * 7 78 
Allorsing cigarettes t o  be sold, i f  t h e  
packages have a c l ea r  waning of  the  
dangers of c iga re t t e  smoking 68 77 
Allowing s t r i p  mining f o r  coal t o  t e a r  
up the  ground surface, i f  the  coal 
producer is required t o  reclaim the  
land a fzer  using it 68 71 
Allowing prescribed drugs t h a t  can k i l l  
people from overdose t o  bc sold, i f  the  
package warns people about the dangers 
of excessive use 62 66 
Allowing synthetic fabr ics  to be sold 
f ~ r  clothcs, cur ta ins  and rugs, i f  
pcople are varned of the  dangers of  such 
fabr ics  catching f i r e  SS 51 
b. Close-ended questions: The sample was then asked spec i f ica l ly  how 
u c h  of a problem they perceived waste mnagemcnt t o  be. When confronted with 
the issue, over s ix ty  percent of t h e  public fel t  it was a major problcm and 
another fourteen percent felt it was a r i n o ~  problea. Po l i t i ca l  leaders, 
. 
regulators, and environmentalists recognized the potential  problems i n  uaste  
management by majori t ies ranging from 76% t o  98%. In sharp contras t ,  only 
57% of the  business leaders f e l t  tha t  waste disposal was a major problen. 
c. Demographic and a t t i t ud ina l  corre la tes  of opinion: The a t t i t udes  
of t he  public h u t  r istc management were not evenly dis t r ibuted across 
demographic l ines .  People l iv ing i n  t he  South ?n.J/or i n  small t a m s ,  those age 
f i f t y  and ovcr, a!ld those u i t h  l e s s  than high S C ~ Q O ~  education tended t o  see 
l e s s  of a problem. i b t  surpr is inaly ,  those cpposerl t o  nuclczr pxer tended t o  
see more of a problem i n  waste d i s p s a l  than thosc who favored thc  nuclcar 
opt ion. 
d. Radioactive releases frwr waste: Ovcr one ha l f  of the  public found 
some t ru th  i n  thc  claim thz t  wastes can causc radioact ivi ty  c.:p * O S U ~ C  t o  too 
many people. Only one quarter of the  business lcaders f e l t  tha t  the  statement 
was t ru thfu l  while over ninty , i rcent of the environmcntalists were convinced 
of its correctness . 
e. Risks worth taking: By margins ranging from 74% t o  94% a l l  t he  groups 
intervieved except f o r  environmentalists f e l t  t ha t  mclcar power plants  should 
be allowed t o  be bu i l t  i f  tough standards f o r  nuclear waste disposal could be 
enforced. The envi romenta l i s t s  demurred; only one quarter  of them were wil l ing 
t o  see socic.y take such a r i sk .  
Evaluation 
This  study does not s u f f e r  from some of t h e  wcakncs~ss  of t h e  first one. 
It uses  a c ross  sec t ion  sample of s u f f i c i c n t  s i z c  t h a t  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  t h e  
d i f ferences  noted a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be s i g ~ i f i c a n t .  This s tudy f a i l s ,  i n  general ,  
. 
to  provide any explanation of t he  b t t i t u d c s  measured; tb ta ,  we a r e  somewhat 
at a loss to intcrprrttr- them sensibly.  Cecause oC the sttldy's broader naturc, 
l i t t l c  o r  no a t t e n t i o n  was paid t o  mcrtsurcncnr r e l i a b i l i t y  and 
a,'Lications of t h e  Data - for Lmderstrtndin~ fi!blic 
Attitudes Towards t h e  S p c e  D i  sposa 1 O p t  - ion 
The EBzSCO s tudy  pro\-idc: t5c co:t~r.xt frrr unde:-standing Idox the i;&lic 
r e l z t e s  t h e  issue of iq:zctc r?zr .a~cmnt  o o? hcr ;u:clcar issues a i d  to other 
tyjbcs of s ~ i a l  risks. To t ! ~ c  cxtent  th:rz tlie yui:lic sccs tile p j - o t l ~ n  :?s 
pressing t h e  chanccs of devoting s i g n i f i c a x t  s o c i a l  resources t o  its s o l u t i ~ a  
are increased. This is par t icular l )*  important f o r  the  space option as i t s  
coaL w i l l  most l i k e l y  be g rea te r  than v i r t u a l l y  all o the r  a l t e rna t ives .  
Waste managmcnt wzs not vic~ed ss a very important problem by the  general 
publ ic  i n  the open znded quest ions (Table 8.2). More i m c d i a t e  i s s u e s  tended 
t o  dominate publ ic  concern suc;r rs r a d i ~ a c t i o n  lezkagcs and the raz l  po1lu:ioit. 
However, anions r egu la to r s  and p o l i t i c a l  leaders :tho shape pol icy alternatiires . 
thc qrcs t ion  of  waste wanagcmcnt was extl-enidly s a l i c n t  . t t  would seem tbcn 
t h a t  the  space option w w l d  nor be clirninzted as a possible nc~!iorl of 1:3stc 
disposal  s inply  on t h e  basis of i t s  cos t  - jf it cam t o  hc see11 a s  the  only 
viable method. The d a t a  does nc t  provide ally i n s i g i ~ t  on what choices h-ould 
be u d e  i f  several poss ib lc  methods, among them t he  space option,  were i n  
competition. 
3 % ~  8nta i n  Table 8.3 c a s t s  t h e  problem of waste management i n  m r e  
;-z. ;irg of  a l i g h t  than the  d a t a  considered above. Here t h e  problem o f  mste 
disposal  is viert.cd a s  more severe than radioact ive  r e l eases  t o  t h e  atmosp!rcrc, 
the  chances o f  explosion,thermal pol lu t ion ,  sabotage, a i r  pol-ut ion,  o r  sa fc -  
guards. Again the  a t t i t u d e s  of key govcrnscntal leaders  a r e  s t ronger  than 
those of thc p 3 1 i c  i n  general.  Thesc a t t i t u d e s  strsgest a sr..1-n;12 c o m i t m c ~ t  
t o  f inding s m e - s o l u t i o n  t o  the  problem of waste disposal .  Tfte space a l t e r -  
native could p r o f i t  from that comitment i f  i n s u n n c ~ n t a b l e  difficuities--h'hctf.?r 
teciinological o r  p o l i t i c a l  --begin t o  plague o the r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  . 
Thc Bat te l l e  study provides t h e  b a s i s  f o r  assessing public  reac t ions  
t o  t h e  space o2t i~:;  empared t o  o the r  pessiblc- a l t c r n a t i v c s  for k:aste nar?a!:c.- 
sent:. The spsce ojxion is characrcrized by tf:e f n c t  t.!;at i t  i c n : ! ~  ;o intrr:r;c 
shor t  telm r i s k s  of managc:nc-nc because i t  rcyt~jres a g rea te r  11:t:lbcr of steps 
i n  handling and s torage  and because it introduces an additio1;al risk of  booster 
f a i l u r e ;  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  does, however, reduce long tern r i s k s ,  alnrost t o  
tcro, once t h e  rocket has l e f t  t h e  ear th ;  t h e  space option is a l s o  dist inguishcd 
by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  accidents  a r e  highly v is ib le- -detec t ion ,  i f  not r c c t i f i c a t i o n ,  
i s  not a major problem; f i n a l l y ,  t h e  space option tcnds t o  be more c o s t l y  than 
other a l t e r n z t i v e s  such 3s bur ia l  i n  s a l t  o r  i n  the  seabed. 
Those four c l l a rac te r i s t i c s  which d i s t ingu i sh  the  space dispozal option 
from o t h e r  a l t e r r ~ a t i v e s  were prec ise ly  t h c  four  fac tors  whicl~ the  Bat te l l c  
grollp s tud ied .  S igni f icant ly ,  cos t  considerat ions~,  which marlr obser;*crs c i t e  
a s  a major reason why the  spacc op t io r~  riould not bc v iable ,  was t he  l e a s t  
important value f o r  evcry group surveyed. (Figures 8.2 t o  8.4) For 
f i v e  out  of the  s i x  groups, cos t  considerat ions were f a r  l c s s  iniportant than  
any of  t h e  o the r  t h r e e  evaluat ive  c r i t e r i a .  Evert mong nuclear tcchnologists ,  
t h e  s i x t h  group, cos t  uas t h e  l e a s t  iepor tant  f a c t o r  i n  assess ing  a system, 
although not as by grc:lt a lnsrgin a s  with tfie otlicr groups. 
In  addit ion,  t h e  prime v i r t u e  o f  t h e  sprrce a l t e rna t ive ,  the  complctc 
removal o f  t h e  material  so t h a t  t h c  long tern r i s k  is  reduced t o  zero, was 
considered t o  bc of p.ir::r: i~:;l~rtz:icc by 21 l of tile I : T O : I ~ S  pc.1 l c d  cuccpt ti:*- 
nilclcar t e c h ~ o l o g i s t s .  They a1 1 cc!lsid~rc\! r5e recluct io11 b f  loag term risk 
t h e  s ing le  most important dimension along shich  a waste Ixtngcmcnt system was 
t o  he cvaluaicd. 
Countering thosc  t rends  which were c l  ezl.1 y sup~?ortivc of the idea of 
space disl?o;nl \:ere :he rcsponqc.5 d c a l i n z  r:i:h s301-t tern sc?fcty a?.! ~ i t h  
acsidcn; dc.:cc+ion anJ l,c;al.cry. .:\void~;::lt: (1:' s7:crt ipra! 7-i.rls \.a,-. coli? Sdcl .  .. ;i 
1 i 1  i t  I : a! 1 t i  s a ?  1 e . 1 n f a c t ,  dcpcfir',iiig n:l :iilicii 
measure i s  used, s r x  groups valued reductioil o f  shor t  t c n J  r i s k s  more hiz:!ly 
than reduction of long term rishs. Similarly,  accident de tec t ion  and recovcry 
ranked f a i r l y  high a s  a c r i t e r i a  for chojcc.. .although it  -was gencra l lp  no: a s  
important a s  e i t h e r  the  reduction of long t c m  o r  shor t  t e n  r i s k s .  Sincc t h e  
space disposal  option w i l l  probaljly incrcasc the shor t  Term r i s k s  and w i l l  
make accident rccovcry (although not de tec t  io;l) more d i f f i c u l t ,  t h c  d a t a  
suggests t h a t  a pos i t ive  a t t i t u d c  r e s u l t i n g  from the  space optiorl's favorablc 
pos i t ion  of reducing lcng tcr;n risks nlzy very. rsel? Lc conplctely re:-crsd 
when t h c  t o t a l  range of valucs is included. We have, of course, no tiap of 
k n o ~ i n g  for su rc  j u s t  how the  four val t~es  ~j 11 be aggrcgntcJ by ilic public 
as it nakcs i t s  cvalust ions.  Gut the  d a t a  ce r t a in ly  does not suggest t h a t  the  
space option w i l l  bc met by e n t h u s i a s t i  publ ic  r e s p a s e  even i n  t h e  a b s t r a c t .  
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